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Abstract
This thesis investigates the inter-relationship between incomplete market ar-
rangements, limited commitment in financial contracts and endogenous unsecured
consumer bankruptcies in a heterogeneous agent general equilibrium framework.
There are three chapters that complete this thesis. The following describes a brief
abstract of the three chapters.
Chapter 1: We construct a general equilibrium heterogeneous agent model
where a continuum of ex-ante identical agents face uninsurable idiosyncratic
shocks. Consumption insurance is restricted to a financial contract in the form
of a one period non-contingent bond that is not enforceable. The existence of
sequential incomplete markets along with incomplete contracts results in endoge-
nous defaults in equilibrium. A novelty in our framework is the presence of partial
defaults and the specification of the stochastic labor endowment shock. We dis-
cretize a normal mixture autoregressive process that can capture higher order
moments of the earnings distribution. The calibrated model delivers a significant
mass of households amounting to 18.9% who hold zero or negative wealth. Fur-
thermore, about 28.7% of the households have a history of bad credit implying
that they have limited access to the credit markets. Importantly, these statistics
match their data counterparts almost perfectly. Finally, we highlight the fragile
assumptions of asymmetric default costs prevalent in the sovereign default liter-
ature.
Chapter 2: In the second chapter, we extend our model in two directions.
Firstly, we incorporate a risk neutral financial intermediary that takes deposits
and offers loans. In this way, we allow a price schedule that is contingent on the
loan size, idiosyncratic earnings and employment state. Secondly, we model de-
faults that resemble the U.S. Chapter 13 bankruptcy law. In particular, defaulted
agents face a temporary exclusion from the credit markets along with an earn-
ings loss structured in the form of a wage garnishment. Our results highlight the
role of financial intermediaries and risk-neutral pricing on the bankruptcy rates.
We also deliver wealth and income distribution moments including the inequality
indexes that match household survey data estimates.
Chapter 3: In the third and final chapter, we capture the effects of a “credit
crunch” and a “credit easing” shock on the real activity in our heterogeneous
agent economic environment. Shocks take the form of a gradual tightening or
loosening of the borrowing constraint. Periods of adjustment are set to mimic the
Global Financial Crisis episode (2008-09) and the credit boom periods (2000-07).
We confirm recent results in the post-crisis literature and find that tight credit
generates a recession in the short run. However, we observe that in the long run a
credit crunch increases productive capital in turn leading to an output growth. An
interesting finding in this chapter is that prolonged periods of credit expansion
drives an initial consumption driven output boom accompanied with excessive
debt followed by increasing default rates leading to a destruction of productive
capital and ending up in a sever recession.
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Preface
The United States experienced the most dramatic boom and bust in household
debt, during the periods 2000 to 2007, ever since the Great Depression. Household
debt increased at a steady pace throughout the 1990s, and then jumped by $7
trillion between the years 2000 and 2007. This boom in debt ended badly. By the
year 2009, delinquency rates on debt had reached above 10%, a level significantly
higher than seen since the Great Depression. The subsequent recession has been
termed as the U.S. Great Recession of 2007-09 and its international spillovers
resulted in a Global Financial Crisis.
The Great Recession started with an initial decline in aggregate economic
activity such as consumption and employment and the recovery was extremely
slow. The debt fuelled boom in house prices and its eventual collapse triggered
by widescale mortgage defaults has been identified as the primary reason be-
hind this crisis. It is now understood that the steep growth in delinquencies on
household debt in 2007 was driven mainly by lower credit score individuals. This
event underscored the importance of the cross-sectional distribution of agents and
their wealth, borrowing and income on aggregate downturns. In particular, the
widespread growth of wealth and income inequality have raised concerns about
their potential impact on societies and economies.
Although detailed analysis both in the academia and the popular press have
come out detailing the causes and consequences of wealth inequality, relatively,
little is known about the considerable proportion of people holding zero or negative
wealth. Negative wealth arises when a household’s total debt exceeds the total
assets. The presence of negative wealth, even when such a status is temporary,
affects the household’s ability to save for durable goods, restricts access to further
credit, and may require living in a state of limited consumption. We know little
about the characteristics of such households or about what drives negative wealth.
A better understanding of these factors could also prove valuable in explaining
and forecasting the persistence of wealth inequality and aggregate economy.
The Survey of Consumer Expectations (SCE), introduced in 2013, has a special
section on household finances fielded once a year. This module collects detailed
6
data on the composition of respondents’ financial assets and debt. The survey es-
timates that about 18.1 percent of the households in the U.S. population have net
wealth less than or equal to zero, while 14.0 percent have strictly negative wealth.
Interestingly, they find that the negative net worth households are characterized
by huge amounts of unsecured debt in the form of credit cards or student loans
rather than mortgage debt.
Motivated by these observations, we build a theoretical model in our first
chapter that is designed to capture these salient features of the data. Our model
incorporates a continuum of agents facing uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks to their
labour earnings and unemployment risk in the spirit of Bewley (1983), Huggett
(1993) and Aiyagari (1994) literature. Agents in this economy can only par-
tially insure against these risks through borrowing and saving in a one period
non-contingent bond. We extend this standard framework by allowing for lim-
ited commitment. The presence of sequentially incomplete markets accompanied
with stochastic risks endogenously generates defaults in equilibrium. A novelty
in our model is that following default only the amount of debt exceeding the
household’s assets is erased from the budget constraint, that is, defaults could
be seen as partial. Essentially, the net debt exceeding the level of assets can
be defaulted upon. In this way, our default parallels the structure of Chapter 7
U.S. bankruptcy law. Defaulted households are punished with a temporary exclu-
sion from credit market. The equilibrium in our model is a stationary recursive
competitive equilibrium.
A second highlight of our model is in the calibration of the stochastic pro-
cess underlying the labor earnings risk. In influential work by Guvenen et al.
(2015) analysing the labor earnings of over a million agents using adminstrative
records stresses the importance of capturing higher order moments of the earnings
distribution. Since standard AR(1) processes cannot capture high skewness and
kurtosis, we employ a novel methodology developed by Civale et al. (2016), and
calibrate the parameters of the log labour earnings growth using a normal mixture
autoregressive process (NMAR). This process is then discretized and used in our
computation.
The incorporation of this process goes a long way in explaining the left tails
of the distribution. Importantly, our computed results reveal that over 18.9% of
7
households hold negative net worth consistent with the empirical evidence. Fur-
thermore, the model produces unsecured default rates of about 7.4% similar to
the levels observed in credit card charge-offs. Finally, our results bring into ques-
tion the form of default punishment followed in the sovereign default literature.
We observe that agents are more likely to default in a high income state when the
default punishment is characterized by symmetric costs.
In the second chapter, we enhance the model by incorporating a risk-neutral
financial intermediary that provides loans to borrower households and takes de-
posits from saver households. The pricing of these loans is contingent on three
states: the size of the loan, the idiosyncratic level of labour earnings and the status
of employment/unemployment. The optimal pricing thus depends on expected
default probabilities. The presence of a price schedule contingent on idiosyncratic
earnings and employment state is the novel feature in our model in comparison to
others in the literature (see Athreya (2002), Li and Sarte (2006) and Chatterjee
et al. (2007)).
Since the pricing decision of the intermediary is based on an expectation of
the borrowers’ default probability, we find, as expected that the equilibrium level
of defaults is much lower. The level of defaults we obtain is about 0.65% consis-
tent with the Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings observed in the U.S. The wealth and
income distributions are much more realistic exhibiting a right skewness and a
very long right tail. The inequality indexes we obtain for these are respectively,
0.76 and 0.50. The data counterparts for these statistics are 0.80 for wealth and
0.43 for income. Furthermore, we find that about 5.35% of total households are
constrained, or in other words have a bad credit history (score). These results
highlight the importance of the presence of a financial intermediary and moreover
risk-neutral pricing in affecting the economy. The results further stresses on the
importance of accurate pricing of loans in influencing default incentives. An in-
termediary facing informational constraints or some form of inadequate screening
methods would fail to see key borrower characteristics that could impact repay-
ment of the loan in the next period.
We conclude this thesis by coming back to the Global Financial Crisis. In
the last chapter, we deviate from the steady state analysis and implement out of
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steady state experiments by focusing on the transition dynamics of our heteroge-
neous agent general equilibrium model with endogenous defaults. We examine the
relevance of the credit supply view of the crisis, see Mian and Sufi (2016) using
two computational experiments. The first is an unanticipated gradual tightening
of the household’s borrowing limit. The period of adjustment is calibrated to
mimic the observed credit crunch in U.S. that lasted for a period of six quarters.
The specific form of this gradual shock is inspired by related work in Guerrieri
and Lorenzoni (2017). Our results reveal that a credit crunch causes a consump-
tion and output drop (recession) in the short run consistent with most findings
in the literature. However, of particular interest is the dynamics we obtain in
the long run. We observe that this short run recession is followed by an output
growth in the long run wherein the economy finally settles down to a better steady
state characterized by improved aggregates. Aggregate consumption and capital
is higher and debt and default rates lower.
Our second experiment involves relaxing the borrowing limit, also known as
credit easing. As in the previous case, the unanticipated shock is adjusted grad-
ually such that easier and easier credit lasts for a period of seven years. This
experiment is something novel to the literature. The aim here is to match the
loose borrowing environment prevalent in the U.S. during the years 2000-07 and
analyse the consequences. There is a plethora of literature that analyse the effects
of financial shocks and constraints on the aggregate economy. Although a good
variety of these explain certain features of the crisis such as the expansionary
phase or the contractionary phase, a complete characterization of the entire cycle
is lacking. Our credit easing shock in the third chapter aims to fill this gap. We
find that in the initial credit expansion phase, loose credit hikes both consumption
and output generating a temporary boom. However, this is also accompanied with
an accumulation of debt. Eventually, defaults kick in and deleveraging of heavily
indebted households results in increasing defaults and destruction of capital. The
aggregate output drops due to two reasons. First, households cut back on their
spending habits or consumption because of excess debt and secondly due to the
loss of productive capital from defaulted assets.
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Chapter 1
Default motives and negative net
worth households
1.1 Introduction
According to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 14% of households in United
States have negative net worth, that is their total debt exceeds the total assets
(see figure 1.1). The main research question of this chapter is the following - How
can we explain this significant mass of agents with negative net worth
using a standard heterogeneous agent general equilibrium model?
Different factors might contribute to this undesirable outcome. Mortgage debt
is the natural answer to such a question. Surprisingly, New York Fed found
that among households that feature high negative net worth the vast majority
of debt comes from student and credit card loans and only 20% of them own
their own house (see figure 1.2). In other words, it is non-collateralized debt and
not collateral debt such as mortgage that is behind the low negative net worth.
Understanding the factors that drive negative wealth is of particular importance,
since it could prove to be a valuable tool in explaining the persistence of wealth
inequality across major countries, particularly so in the United States.
In this chapter we present a general equilibrium model with unsecured con-
sumer credit, where households are subject to idiosyncratic labour earnings shocks.
In this manner, households are ex-ante identical but ex-post heterogeneous. Due
to lack of commitment and the one asset available for trade in our economy,
markets are sequentially incomplete.
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Figure 1.1: Asset and Debt by Wealth Group: This figure displays the average and
median level of assets and debt across four different groups of households. Firstly those featuring
non-negative wealth and secondly households in every tercile of negative net worth.
Our model could simply be characterized as an extension of Aiyagari (1994),
where agents have a default option. All households in such economies seek to
smooth intertemporal consumption, subject to borrowing constraints. Further-
more, in our model framework, unlike the complete markets case, default can
arise as an equilibrium outcome endogenously. Default in our benchmark model
is strategic and induces a temporary exclusion from credit markets. In particular,
borrowers can default on their debt obligations whenever their expected value
from defaulting is higher than their expected value to repay.
We make default option available only amongst households with negative net
worth. This assumption is strong, yet reasonable, since in reality households with
positive net worth, would not risk to loose their assets when defaulting.
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Figure 1.2: Debt Composition by Wealth Group: This figure displays the debt com-
position for four different groups of households. Firstly those featuring non-negative net wealth
and secondly households in every tercile of negative net worth. Seven categories of household
debt are presented, housing mortgages, credit cards, auto loans, student loans, medical bills,
legal bills and other personal loans.
In support of this argument stands Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy code,
under which filing for bankruptcy results in seizure of all assets and a resulting
discharge of household debt. Since in our model we only consider the net level
of assets, namely the positive assets net off debt that a household holds, it is
sensible to assume that households with positive net worth are not allowed to
default. Following the default period a household faces difficulties in getting new
credit, for a period of around 6.6 years.
A first key element of our model is the nature of default punishment. We
depart from the literature on strategic defaults by assuming that a defaulted
household moves to zero net worth, in other words his/her net (and not the
entire debt) liability is discharged. In this sense, default could be characterised
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as “partial”1 as only the fraction of debt exceeding his assets is discharged and
thus erased from his budget constraint. From this point of view, we claim that
even in cases of household bankruptcies, all defaults are partial2.
This assumption of partial defaults is consistent in the context of sovereign
default literature where novel evidence suggests that defaults are only partial (see
Arellano and Mateos-planas (2013). Furthermore, this implies a shrinkage of the
default incentives in contrast with the case under which a “unilateral debt write
off” would be allowed (default in full).
A second key assumption of our model is that households trade amongst each
other directly. Most of the research in the household bankruptcy literature, such
as Chatterjee et al. (2007) and Li and Sarte (2006) amongst others, assume the
presence of a financial intermediary. One advantage of this approach is that
the interest rate for borrowing and savings is not the same, since the financial
intermediary clears the financial market by charging a premium for loans. In this
manner, financial intermediary internalises defaults and can guarantee non-risky
savings/deposits.
However, the approach of risky savings, where households trade amongst each
other depending on their financial position, allows for spill-overs of defaults in the
production side of the economy, via the asset market clearing condition. In this
manner, defaults can affect the equilibrium outcome and the whole economy, in
a direct way and not only via the price channel.
1.2 Contribution and Main Results
Our model economy follows closely Li and Sarte (2006), but we drop the pres-
ence of financial intermediaries and exogenous labour supply choice. Instead, we
enrich the earnings process by including non-Gaussian earnings shocks on top of
an unemployment risk. The rich stochastic process is assumed to capture the
1The term partial in our framework can be mainly seen as entering a debt restructuring
program following default.
2Under Chapter 7 bankruptcy Law in the U.S. some of your liquid assets transferred to
the courts can be distributed among your creditors as partial repayment of the debt you owe.
These are called non-exempt assets. Provided all your liquid assets have been distributed the
remaining debt is discharged. This is equivalent to assuming that following default
your net asset position is zero.
13
high skewness and kurtosis in actual earnings data. The absence of financial in-
termediaries is assumed so as to understand the implications of a uniform price
for borrowing and lending. Lenders are not compensated for holding risky loans
that might be defaulted on. In equilibrium, this would result in a higher risk free
rate and less capital in equilibrium relative to the standard Aiyagari-type frame-
work. Due to this high interest rate, households who faced a history of bad shocks
would face high repayment costs and would more likely end up in the lower tail
of the distribution with negative net worth. Li and Sarte (2006) separate risky
borrowing from risk free deposits in the presence of a financial intermediary who
charges a premium to carry the risky loans. They attempt to capture Chapter 7
and Chapter 11 filing rates and not negative net worth households.
We now discuss the main results of this chapter. Firstly, we match key statis-
tics of the U.S. economy. Our theoretical framework generates a mass of non-
positive net worth households of 18.9% with its counterpart in data being 18.1%.
Furthermore, the default rate in our model economy of 7.4% replicates the default
rate of credit card (unsecured) loans in data which is around 7.6%. Li and Sarte
(2006) predict the filing rates for Chapter 7 and 13 to be 0.86% and 0.39% respec-
tively. This substantial difference in our predictions can be mainly attributed to
the mechanism prevailing in our model. Lenders have greater incentives to lend in
our model as compared to Li and Sarte (2006), due to the higher lending rate (Li
and Sarte (2006) finds a deposit rate of 2.516%). On the other hand, borrowing
incentives are also stronger due to the lower predicted lending rate as compared
Li and Sarte (2006) (around 13%). Therefore, trade is larger and so do defaults.
We also claim that a wide class of models failing to capture wealth inequality
underestimate the mass of negative or non positive net worth households in the
economy. Our model generates a wealth gini index of 0.795 even if it does not
properly resembles the fourth and fifth quintile of the wealth distribution in data.
This issue arises because of the assumption of a single interest rate.
Additionally, we capture the households with a bad credit record in the econ-
omy. We find that 28.7% of households are constrained or equivalently they face
difficulties in having full access to credit. This value coincides to the value of 29%
in data which measures the mass of borrowers that have a very bad credit score,
specifically below 620.
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Another key result of our model is that households in an unemployed state
or a bad labour income state default less compared to households in a good
state. On first inspection this result appears to be controversial. However, recent
empirical studies (see Gerardi et al. (2015)) witness that the vast majority of
financially distressed, or equivalently heavily indebted households do not default.
The authors find that 80% of unemployed households, even when having less than
one month of mortgage payments in a savings account are current, in other words
they do not choose to default.
Our study serves as a theoretical pillar to the findings of Gerardi et al. (2015).
Low income households in our model do not choose to default, except for the
case that they are heavily indebted or are very close to the borrowing limit. An
explanation of this behaviour is that low income households value more the access
to credit, since accumulation of debt serves as a means to increase their current
consumption above the subsistence level. These households presume that if the
bad state persists in the future, no access to credit market will be pernicious.
The presence of partial and not full default is also a decisive factor for generat-
ing this result. The outside option is not so appealing for low income households,
since only a specific fraction of debt will be discharged. Thus, default is more
costly for them compared to high income households. Households with high dis-
posable income are able to enjoy a high level of consumption at any case, even
following the default event.
Finally, a theoretical contribution of this chapter is that we highlight the
strength of a mechanism commonly used directly or indirectly in both the sovereign
default and consumer bankruptcy literature. We show that asymmetric default
costs can revert the above discussed results and generate more defaults in the low
income state.
Firstly, we claim that the use of asymmetric costs as in Arellano (2008) is not
empirically relevant and can only be based on implausible assumptions. We prove
this by modifying our benchmark model with the condition that post-default,
there exists an extra cost in the form of wage garnishment. This is in line with
Chapter 13 bankruptcy law in the US.
The notion of asymmetry arises from our additional condition that wage gar-
nishment will only occur, when a household’s income will exceed a certain thresh-
15
old. In this manner, we alter the default penalty to be conditional on the level of
the borrower’s labour earnings. Thus, high earnings households default less, since
their penalty is much higher, or to express it differently they have a lot more to
loose.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. In Section 1.2 we review
the literature related to heterogeneous agents models, financial contracts and de-
faults/bankruptcies. We then describe our model economy in Section 1.3, present-
ing in detail the household’s problem. In Section 1.4 we provide a brief description
of the stationary recursive competitive equilibrium and state the market clearing
conditions. We discuss the calibration strategy in Section 1.5. In Section 1.6 we
present our results for our benchmark economy along with the case of asymmetric
default costs. Properties of the model along with distributional effects are dis-
cussed. We conclude this chapter in Section 1.7. Further details of the equilibrium
properties and the numerical procedures are summarized in an Appendix at the
end of the second chapter.
1.3 Literature Review
In this section we will review the literature on each critical part of the model
employed in this chapter. This will include, firstly literature related to heteroge-
neous agents models in a general equilibrium framework and secondly related to
financial contracts and defaults/bankruptcies.
1.3.1 Heterogeneous Agents in General Equilibrium
The adoption of heterogeneity3 as a concept by macro-economists finds its roots
in the “rational expectations revolution”. Until the 1970s macro-economists were
using ad hoc aggregate relationships. Lucas and Sargent amongst others intro-
duced the new agenda of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. The
essence of this framework is the optimal decision making of the individual agents
consistent with each others beliefs and nature.
3An extensive review of heterogeneous agents models in general equilibrium framework is
given by Heathcote et al. (2009).
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Despite that and mainly due to lack of appropriate mathematical tools, the
first generation of macroeconomic models followed the famous work of Kydland
and Prescott (1982), was along the lines of the representative agent framework.
Since the realization that numerical methods can be used to study heterogeneous
agents, and the data evidence which confirmed this necessity, macro-economists
started modelling heterogeneity.
Heckman (2001) in his Nobel lecture states: “The most important discovery
was the evidence of the pervasiveness of heterogeneity and diversity in economic
life.”
For instance, by introducing to a general equilibrium model, households that
are ex-ante identical and ex-post heterogeneous due to facing idiosyncratic unin-
surable income risk (see Huggett (1993),Aiyagari (1994)) , a precautionary savings
motive is present which increases aggregate wealth and reduces the equilibrium
interest rate.
An early work in this literature was by Huggett (1993) who constructed an
economy where agents experience uninsurable idiosyncratic endowment shocks
and aim to smooth consumption by holding a risk-free asset. He used a borrow-
ing constraint of one year income and found that the resulting risk-free rate is 1%
below the corresponding representative agent economy. In later work, Aiyagari
(1994) addressed the impact of uninsured idiosyncratic risk on aggregate sav-
ings rate and highlighted the importance of asset trading to individuals and the
implications of inequality in wealth and income on aggregate assets.
Additionally, as economists we find interesting to study welfare effects. Intro-
ducing heterogeneity provides a suitable workhorse for addressing welfare ques-
tions. A representative paradigm in this literature is Storesletten et al. (2001).
This work finds that countercyclical variation in idiosyncratic risk, firstly am-
plifies the welfare cost of aggregate productivity shocks and secondly imposes a
cost on its own. The magnitude of this effect is an order larger compared to the
one documented in Lucas (1987). Additionally, the magnitude of these effects
increases non-linearly in risk aversion.
In general a lot of macroeconomic questions cannot be addressed without the
use of some kind of heterogeneity. For instance, the evaluation of large scale
government programs, such as social security policies, minimum wage policies,
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tuition subsidies and any other sort of large scale reform, requires heterogeneous
agents general equilibrium models.
In that manner, one can account not only for general equilibrium effects but
also for the heterogeneous impact of policies across the population. Conesa and
Krueger (1999) analyse the role of idiosyncratic uncertainty in an economy where
rational agents vote on hypothetical social security reforms. In this model a tran-
sition to a fully funded social security system might have less political support
than in the benchmark model without heterogeneity within generations.4
Heterogeneity with complete markets
This heterogeneity can be seen as the smallest deviation from the representa-
tive agent model. Naturally, the assumption of complete markets is unrealistic.
From an empirical perspective, it is rejected at multiple levels. For instance, At-
tanasio and Davis (1996) find that large changes in the distribution of household
consumption is due to changes in earnings.
Moreover, complete markets imply that when agents have identical prefer-
ences there should not exist consumption volatility. Furthermore, Jappelli and
Pistaferri (2006) studying the empirical transition matrix of consumption using
a panel drawn from the Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth
strongly reject the consumption insurance model, providing evidence of significant
volatility.
In heterogeneous agents models with complete markets, there are cases that
the source of heterogeneity will become irrelevant. In particular, even though
agents might be subject to idiosyncratic insurable shocks the macroeconomic ag-
gregates might do not depend on the wealth distribution.
For instance, Maliar and Maliar (2003) allow for idiosyncratic but fully in-
surable productivity shocks and show that aggregate dynamics coincide with the
corresponding representative agent economy subject to “aggregate shocks”. The
heterogeneous agents economy behaves exactly as if there was a representative
consumer, facing three different shocks (i.e. labour,preferences and technology
4Agents are ex-ante identical and the source of heterogeneity within generations is due to
the realizations of the labour productivity shock.
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shocks).
Heterogeneity with incomplete markets
The “standard incomplete markets” model (SIM) is the backbone of studying
heterogeneous agents models. There exist a lot of variants within the SIM frame-
work. However they all share two common features. Firstly, they all introduce
imperfect insurance and secondly realistic risk-sharing mechanisms.
In these models, a large number of agents facing idiosyncratic shocks make
independent choices (i.e consumption, savings etc.), while these choices deter-
mine the aggregates, thus equilibrium prices. This model resembles the stochas-
tic growth dominating the business cycle literature. Agents maximize expected
lifetime utility in response to shocks, by adjusting consumption, hours, savings
and generally any choice variable.
The question which arises naturally is how this market incompleteness should
be modelled. One way that this could be achieved is the use of information
frictions. Attanasio and Pavoni (2011) present endogenous incomplete markets
by introducing moral hazard and hidden savings. They show that these features
generate what in consumption literature has been called excess smoothness of
consumption.
An alternative way proposed by the literature is to work with enforcement
frictions. For instance Krueger and Perri (2006) allow the agent to step away
from a contract (i.e. limited enforcement). In particular, agents enter risk-sharing
contracts, but at any point in time have the option to renege at the cost of losing
their assets and being excluded from future risk-sharing.
These two approaches could be integrated. For instance, Chatterjee et al.
(2007) present a model where the set of assets is exogenously determined, but
borrowing costs are specified endogenously as a function of default incentives.
Particularly, the default option results in debt discharge, yet bankruptcy remains
on a household’s credit record for some length of time. In this setting two things
are clear. An indebted household will weigh the benefit of maintaining access to
credit market and credit suppliers will have to price their loans accordingly, ac-
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counting for the likelihood of default (also taking into account the credit history).
Efficiency and constrained efficiency
A very interesting question in this class of models (SIM) is how close agents
are to achieving perfect risk sharing. Levine and Zame (2002) examine whether
market incompleteness matter for welfare, for prices and consumption. Intuitively,
we could think that if the horizon is long enough it might not matter if the agents
are able to self-insure, i.e., borrow in bad times and save in good times. Levine and
Zame (2002)’s argument is based on a framework of an infinite horizon exchange
economy with infinitely-lived agents. Trade takes place via short-lived real assets.
They find that as the discount factor β tends to 1, hence agents become
increasingly patient, the welfare losses tend to 0. This holds only under the
assumption that no aggregate risk is present. In particular, the source of risk
stems from transitory and purely idiosyncratic shocks and only one consumption
good is traded. This result is fragile:
(a) when aggregate risk is introduced.
(b) more than one consumption goods are available.
(c) shocks are permanent.
Along the lines of the previous discussion we would also be interested in un-
derstanding whether information constraints or limited enforcement structures
exist such that constrained efficient allocations can be decentralized, with a risk
free asset, but no state-contingent claims. Allen (1985) studies Pareto efficient
allocations in a two-period model including information frictions.
In Allen (1985)’s environment, risk averse agents are able to hide their random
labour endowment from the planner and borrow/save without being monitored.
Hence, planner finds efficient to transfer to all individual at time zero, and leave
intertemporal smoothing on them. Consumption allocations in this model can be
decentralized via a competitive asset market, where a risk-free bond is traded by
agents with the same initial level of wealth.
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1.3.2 Financial Contracts, Limited Enforcement and De-
faults
In the classic heterogeneous agents literature, founded on income fluctuation prob-
lem, agents’ consumption smoothing is ultimately determined by their distance
from the borrowing constraint.
In the typical Bewley (1983) economy agents are not allowed to borrow, but
in Aiyagari (1994) borrowing serves as a means to smooth intertemporal con-
sumption, while agents are constrained by the so-called natural borrowing limit.
However, default option is not present in the Aiyagari economy.
Borrowing constraints are employed by ruling out defaults and also avoid Ponzi
schemes. The latter is a prerequisite for the existence of equilibrium in an economy
with incomplete markets. Zhang (1997) endogenises borrowing constraints seeking
insights on their relevant economic drivers. For this purpose he introduces the so
called “no default borrowing constraint”. This constraint-type does not allow an
individual to borrow more than the amount he would have the ability to repay.
In other words, the constraint itself incentivise individuals not to default. This
is feasible by setting the borrowing limit such that the expected utility when the
individual is not excluded from the asset market is never lower than the utility of
autarky.5 However, default in Zhang (1997) is not an equilibrium outcome, due
to the very tight borrowing limits. This tightness guarantees that agents prefer
to repay in every state of the nature.
There are several papers that modify the standard incomplete markets model
(SIM) to allow for defaults. A significant part of the literature employs this
modified model to study the welfare implications of different bankruptcy laws or
changes in bankruptcy laws.6 For instance, Athreya (2002) models an exchange
5The default penalty in Zhang (1997) is permanent exclusion from financial markets. This
type of exclusion is called “autarky”.
6There is a large body of literature along the lines of U.S. bankruptcy code. In U.S. there are
different types of bankruptcies laws. The three main bankruptcy chapters are 7,11,13. Chapters
7 and 13 are primarily used for individuals while Chapter 11 for companies. Chapter 7 erases
most types of unsecured debt. This includes credit card debts, medical bills, gasoline cards debt
and few others. Under Chapter 13, depending on your disposable income, a debt restructuring
payment plan is proposed, and the bankruptcy court appoints a trustee to supervise your case.
First all the monthly payments, agreed under the debt restructuring plan, should be successfully
completed and ultimately the rest of your outstanding debt is wiped off.
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economy augmented with a default option which resembles the Chapter 7 “total
liquidation” bankruptcy. Bankruptcy in his model induces a temporary exclusion
from financial markets. Probability to re-enter is exogenously specified by the
use of a lottery which determines the average length of time that a household is
borrowing constrained (i.e. no access to credit market).
Li and Sarte (2006) explore the two types of bankruptcies, Chapters 7 and
13, that are allowed under U.S. law, in a general equilibrium framework. In their
model bankruptcy induces a temporary exclusion from credit markets, while each
of the U.S. bankruptcy chapters is modelled explicitly via the use of different value
functions. In disagreement with previous work done in this literature complete
elimination of bankruptcy provisions causes output drop and welfare decline, by
decreasing capital and labour input in the production function.
Default Punishments
Default necessarily induces a penalty. We described above two different types
of penalties, Zhang (1997) used a permanent exclusion from financial markets,
while Athreya (2002) and Li and Sarte (2006) a temporary exclusion. Both pun-
ishment ideas, are influenced from the contributions of sovereign default literature,
consisting of two different strands.
Firstly, Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) based on the stylized fact that default
makes re-entry to international capital markets more difficult, they suggest that
once a country defaults will be denied any access to capital markets and will be
permanently reverted to autarky. In this model the default is an optimal choice,
namely it doesn’t happen accidentally and the benefits of default grow with the
size of outstanding debt.
On the other hand, Bulow and Rogoff (1989) suggested that due to recent
developments of financial markets it is more realistic to assume that following
default, a country could still smooth its expenditures, by trading contracts which
involve no credit.
This type of default punishment plays a major role in any limited enforcement
environment, since it directly affects the incentives of agents (countries, firms or
individuals). A reasonable question is how incentives are differently influenced in
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each punishment case. Literature provides a menu of different results. Hellwig
and Lorenzoni (2009) allowing for trading no-credit involved contracts post de-
fault, show that consumers default much in the high endowment state. This allows
them to attain a consumption bundle which gives them higher utility compared
to the repayment option. On the contrary, Arellano (2008) applies an “asymmet-
ric” punishment imposing fixed output costs in the defaulted country only when
output is above a certain threshold. Furthermore, a temporary exclusion from
“international intertemporal trading” is assumed. With this type of punishment
default incentives are stronger the lower the endowment is.
Therefore, the importance of the default option along with the punishment
nature is outstanding and hence modelling such mechanisms appropriately needs
careful consideration.
1.4 The Model Economy
We build a modified version of deterministic growth model allowing to include a
large number of households facing uninsured idiosyncratic shocks. Our model is
closely related to the models of Li and Sarte (2006) and Chatterjee et al. (2007).
Time in our model is discrete and indexed by t ∈ (0, 1, . . . ,∞). Economy is pop-
ulated by a continuum of ex-ante identical infinitely-lived households distributed
uniformly over [0, 1].
1.4.1 Preferences
Individual households care about streams of consumption in the standard way,
that is, they have time-separable preferences over streams of consumption.
U(c0, c1, c2, . . .) = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct), (1.1)
where for each period t, ct is restricted to belong in C, the per period consumption
feasibility set of any individual household, which specifies non-negative consump-
tions. The discount factor β ∈ (0, 1) is common across all households. The period
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utility function u(ct) is continuous, concave, strictly increasing, continuously dif-
ferentiable and satisfies the Inada conditions7. For simplicity we assume that
households supply labour inelastically (normalized to 1) in the sense that any in-
crease or decrease in the price of labour (wage) does not result in a corresponding
increase or decrease in its supply. Hence, the period utility function is assumed
to be a CRRA, characterised by constant relative risk aversion.
u(c) =
c1−σ
1− σ , (1.2)
where the parameter σ measures the degree of relative risk aversion that is implicit
in the utility function. Our model is stationary and in what follows, we do not
use the time t index.
1.4.2 Endowment
Households do not value leisure, since it is not an input in the utility function.
Thus, the time endowment (normalized to 1) is supplied to the market. House-
holds face idiosyncratic labour income risk, or earnings risk. This risk arises from
two different sources in this model.
Firstly, households face unemployment risk, in the sense that there exists an
exogenous probability that a household will transit from employment to unem-
ployment and vice-versa. We denote by s ∈ S = {u, e} the employment status
of a household today. Hence, for each household there exist two distinct cases,
either s = e, implying that the current status of a household is employment, or
s = u denoting that the current status of the household is unemployment. Em-
ployment follows a first order Markov chain with transition probabilities denoted
as pi(s′ | s).
Secondly, households conditional on being employed receive a stochastic id-
iosyncratic labour endowment y ∈ Y which follows a first order Markov process
7 lim
c→0
u′(c) = ∞. Inada conditions are named after the Japanese economist Ken-Ichi Inada
Inada (1963). The conditions as such have also been introduced by Hirofumi Uzawa Uzawa
(1963).
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with finite support Y ,8 a set with cardinality N .9 We denote by pi(y′ | y) the
conditional probability of transiting from state y today to state y′ tomorrow.
These conditional transition probabilities of the Markov chain are identical across
households. We denote by Π(y) the associated invariant distribution.
For both the idiosyncratic shocks s and y we assume that a law of large
numbers holds10, so that for instance pi(y′ | y) conditional on being employed also
represents the fraction of agents subject to this particular transition.
1.4.3 Technology and Production
There exists one representative firm in the economy producing output by the
means of a neoclassical production function.
Y = F (K,N), (1.3)
where Y is total output, K denotes the capital input, and N denotes labour. The
representative firm takes factor prices as given, hence w and r choosing optimally
capital and labour respectively. The production function is assumed to be a
typical Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale.
Y = KαN1−α, (1.4)
where α captures the share of capital income in output. We further assume that
capital depreciates at a constant rate δ when used in production, where δ ∈ (0, 1).
8A discrete random variable, say y, takes at most countably many values. In particular there
exists a finite or countable set Y ⊂ R such that P[y ∈ Y] = 1. Therefore, we know with certainty
that the only values that y takes belong in Y. The smallest set Y with that property is
called the support of y. Since the number of elements living in Y is finite, we call Y the finite
support of the random variable y.
9Cardinality of a set Y, denoted as |Y| or card(Y) is a measure of the numbers of elements
in Y. It can be interpreted as the set size. However, sets can also be infinite. Thus, cardinality
of set could also be infinite.
10A detailed discussion of how law of large numbers could be applied can be found in Judd
(1985) and Uhlig (1996). Uhlig (1996) shows that if we let X(i), i ∈ [0, 1] be a collection of
identically distributed and pairwise uncorrelated random variables with common finite mean µ
and variance σ2, then
∫ 1
0
X(i)di = µ. To achieve that, he interprets the integral as a Pettis-
integral. Gelfand-Pettis integral just extends the definition of Lebesgue integral to vector-valued
functions on a measure space. It can be used in the case where the measure space is an interval
with Lebesgue measure.
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A single good is being produced every period and it can either be consumed
or invested via the only available asset in the economy, which is a one-period
non-contingent bond.
1.4.4 Aggregate Resource Constraint
The aggregate feasibility condition in the model economy can be expressed as
F (K,N) = C + I = C +K ′ − (1− δ)K, (1.5)
where C denotes aggregate consumption, K represents the aggregate capital stock,
N is the labour input and δ denotes the depreciation rate of capital when used in
production. All aggregate variables are denoted by capital letters.
1.4.5 Financial Markets and Contracts
Trade takes place every period amongst households. The only available asset
for trade in the market is a one period non-contingent bond.11 Since a market
for contingent claims on future labour earnings is not available, pay-offs to the
existing asset cannot span the consumption space. Thus, markets are sequentially
incomplete12.
Unlike the complete markets case, where agents choose optimal portfolios hold-
ings at period t = 1 (initial period) and no subsequent trade is necessary, incom-
plete markets favour trade amongst agents every period. It essentially serves as a
means of smoothing intertemporal consumption, achieving the maximum lifetime
utility.
11As Zhang (1997) states this assumption is consistent with the existing moral hazard or
adverse selection problems in reality which leads to the missing market.
12Quinzii and Magill (1996) propose that the commodity space Rn can be written as a direct
sum of the market subspace and its orthogonal complement, namely Rn = 〈W 〉 ⊕ 〈W 〉⊥. Since
the market subspace must not offer arbitrage opportunities, there exists at least one vector of
state prices pi ∈ 〈W 〉⊥. Thus, dim〈W 〉⊥ ≥ 1. Since dim〈W 〉 + dim〈W 〉⊥ = n = #D it follows
that whenever the market subspace offers no arbitrage opportunities dim〈W 〉 ≤ #D− 1. Thus
#D− 1 is the maximal dimension of the subspace. This leads to the following definition of the
complete and incomplete markets
Definition: Let the market subspace 〈W (q, V )〉 be arbitrage free. If dim〈W (q, V )〉 = #D− 1
then the financial markets are said to be complete ; if dim〈W (q, V )〉 < #D−1 then the markets
are incomplete.
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Purchasing a bond with positive face value a′ implies that an individual house-
hold entered into a contract13 where saves qa′ units of period t good, getting a
promise to receive a′ units of good next period. On the other hand purchasing
a bond with negative face value a′ implies that a household entered into a con-
tract in which by receiving −qa′ units of good at period t commits to deliver,
conditional on not defaulting, a′ units of good at period t+ 1.
Therefore financial markets are incomplete (SIM), while financial contracts
are unenforceable, namely a limited commitment problem is present and any
borrowing household can default at any time on the outstanding debt that holds.
1.4.6 Default Option and Penalty
Henceforth we will refer to a household that borrows as the “borrower” and a
household that lends as the “lender”. Furthermore, only households with negative
net worth (a′ < 0) are permitted to default. On defaulting, the amount of debt
exceeding assets, in other words the net liability, is discharged and erased from
the budget set. We thus, implicitly, assume that defaults are partial 14.
This default option closely resembles Chapter 7 of the U.S. bankruptcy code
for unsecured debt, such as credit card debts, medical bills gasoline card debts
and few others. In this model framework, a defaulted household faces temporary
exclusion15 from the credit market.
As in Athreya (2002) and Li and Sarte (2006) we model exclusion from credit
markets using a lottery. Each period following default a household remains in
the borrowing-constrained state with probability θ ∈ (0, 1). The mean waiting
time for the household to regain full access to financial markets is given by
1
1− θ .
13Quinzii and Magill (1996) suggest that a contract can be defined as a reciprocal agreement
between two or more parties to perform and/or to receive the transfer of some specified goods,
services or income under specified contingencies from some initial date (its date of issue) until
some terminal date (its date of maturity).
14An alternative approach to study partial defaults is to allow for two assets; a short-lived
one period bond and a long-lived perpetuity bond with coupon payments that decay geomet-
rically over time. Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012) studies the maturity structure tracing
important effects in emerging markets, attempting to give a role for different maturities in the
dynamics of debt and default. However, the whole analysis occurs in a completely different
framework than ours, as lenders are risk neutral and production is absent.
15Representative papers using temporary exclusion from the credit market as a default penalty
is Athreya (2002) and Li and Sarte (2006).
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The parameter θ is exogenously calibrated, employing the underlying Bernoulli
process 16 with parameter 1− θ capturing the mean waiting time.
Furthermore, in line with Bulow and Rogoff (1989), any defaulted borrower
cannot borrow following default. However, is allowed to trade contracts involving
no-credit. Therefore, in this model borrowers are allowed to smooth consumption
to some extent even following default, by saving if possible via the one period non-
contingent bond available in the market. Essentially they are allowed to become
lenders, provided that their labour income is sufficient.
At any given state, an unconstrained borrower (i.e. he has access to credit
markets) should choose either to repay or to default. Hence, value of the option
to default can be described by the following equation.
V o(a, y, s) = max
{
V R(a, y, s), V D(0, y, s)
}
, (1.6)
where V R(a, y, s) is the value associated with repayment and staying in the
contract, V D(0, y, s) is the value associated with defaulting on your outstanding
debt, while V o(a, y, s) as clearly shown from the above equation can take either
of the two values, depicting the value of the option accordingly.
It is important to emphasize that in this environment default cannot be ran-
dom (luck). Instead, it is defined as an optimal choice as described by equation
1.6. In particular if the value of the borrower when remaining to the contract is
greater than his value when defaulting, his optimal decision will be to satisfy his
repayment obligations.
In the model environment, borrowers can find themselves in two different
groups. We follow the terminology of Athreya (2002) and Li and Sarte (2006)
and we define the borrower who currently has full access to credit market as
unconstrained and the borrower who defaulted and is borrowing constrained (with
no access to credit market) the current period as constrained. By construction
of this model lenders are always unconstrained, since they have full access to
financial markets.
16Consider a Bernoulli process, the random variables are i.i.d Bernoulli with common param-
eter 1 − θ ∈ (0, 1). The natural state space is Ω = {0, 1}∞. Let Sn = X1 + . . . + Xn (number
of successes or arrivals in n steps). The random variable Sn is binomial with parameters n and
1− θ. E[Sn] = np. Let now T1 be the time of first success. Formally T1 = min{n|Xn = 1}. We
know that T1 is geometric, hence E[T1] =
1
1− θ .
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1.4.7 Household’s Problem
Households maximize expected discounted lifetime consumption utility subject
to their individual budget and borrowing constraints. Households take prices,
namely the bond price and wage rate as given.
We only study stationary recursive competitive equilibria, namely we require
the distribution of agents across states to be invariant. In this manner, probability
measure will remain unchanged, even if individual households can move across the
earnings or wealth distribution, thus social mobility is allowed.
Naturally, all aggregate variables are constant over time in equilibrium. The
recursive formulation of household’s problem dictates the use of Contraction Map-
ping Theorem17. Due to this formulation policy correspondences will be time
invariant.
Households are endogenously divided into two groups. Firstly, households that
have complete access to financial markets, that is to say they can both borrow
and lend. This households belong to the unconstrained group. Secondly, house-
holds that have limited access to financial markets, namely they are borrowing
constrained, being able only to lend if their labor earnings are sufficient. This
households belong to the constrained group.
Borrowing and lending in this model is considered as net. In particular, a
household is a borrower iff is a net borrower. Similarly a household is a lender iff
is net lender.
17Definition: Let (S, ρ) be a metric space and T : S → S be an operator mapping S into
itself. V is a contraction mapping if for some κ ∈ (0, 1)
ρ(Tx, Ty) ≤ κρ(x, y), for all x, y ∈ S.
A contraction mapping simply brings the elements of the vector space S as close as possible.
Theorem 1.4.1. Contraction Mapping Theorem: Let (S, ρ) be a complete metric space and
T : S → S be a contraction. Then there exists a unique measure νˆ ∈ S such that
T νˆ = νˆ
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1.4.7.1 The Unconstrained Households
The states for an unconstrained household can be described by its level of as-
set holdings, a ∈ A ⊂ R, its labour endowment draw, y ∈ Y ⊂ R+ and its
employment draw s ∈ S ∈ [0, 1].
A household that is an unconstrained borrower faces two options. It can
either repay its debt obligations in full, or default on the outstanding amount of
its debt holdings. We denote by V R(a, y, s)18 the value function of a household
that repays its debt in the current period. We denote by V D(0, y, s) the current
value associated with defaulting. Finally, we denote V o(a, y, s) the value of the
option to be unconstrained.
The recursive formulation of this problem could be presented by the following
equations.
V R(a, y, s) = max
{c≥0,a′}
{u(c) + β
∑
(y′,s′)∈(Y,S)
pi(s′|s)pi(y′|y)V o(a′, y′, s′)} (1.7)
subject to
c+ qa′ = wy [1− (1− ρ)1s=u] + a
a′ ≥ −B (1.8)
where c denotes consumption in the current period, a′ denotes the next period
asset holdings, w is the household wage, q is the current price of the asset and
1s=u is an indicator function which takes the value 1 when household is in the
unemployed state and 0 otherwise. In this case labour earnings are equal to the
unemployment benefits, which are defined as a fraction of the average labour
earnings, thus b(y) = ρwy.
Equation 1.8 stands for the budget constraint and borrowing limit. Note
that there is an upper bound B¯ on borrowing. Constraints in asset holdings
are generally necessary to rule out Ponzi schemes and ensure the existence of
equilibrium19. In the literature a priori bounds are often chosen to be a certain
18For notational convenience we will not introduce a different value function for a household
which is an unconstrained lender. However, it should be clear that whenever we compare the
value of repayment and the value of default we do it only for values of a < 0.
19Aiyagari (1994) explains that if for instance the interest rate is negative a borrowing is
necessary for a maximum to exist. Without a borrowing limit the present value of earnings is
almost surely infinite. In Aiyagari (1994) the limit is chosen to be the present value of budget
balance, also ensuring the non-negativity of consumption.
30
fraction of total income. In this model we specify the bound accordingly ensuring
that aggregate borrowing can never exceed the total capital stock in the economy.
We turn now to the right hand-side of equation 1.7. It ensures that households
that repay their debt in current period will be unconstrained the following period.
In this fashion, they will enjoy full access to financial markets.
Let now V C(a, y, s) denote the value function of a borrower that defaulted and
is currently borrowing constrained. In this case a ∈ R+, namely the household is
allowed to hold only net positive assets in the constrained state. In other words,
borrowing constrained households are only allowed to save and/or lend.
The recursive formulation of the problem associated with value of default could
be presented by the following equations.
V D(0, y, s) = max
{c≥0,a′≥0}
{u(c) + β
∑
(y′,s′)∈(Y,S)
pi(s′|s)pi(y′|y)V C(a′, y′, s′)} (1.9)
subject to
c+ qa′ = wy [1− (1− ρ)1s=u]
a′ ≥ 0 (1.10)
where similarly to the previous problem, c denotes consumption in the current
period, a′ denotes the next period asset holdings, w stands for household wage, q
is the current price of the asset and 1s=u is an indicator function which takes the
value 1 when household is in the unemployed state and 0 otherwise.
The budget constraint in equation 1.10 indicates that once a borrower (house-
hold that is a net borrower) defaults, his/her net asset position is zero (a = 0).
In right hand-side of equation 1.9 we observe that households choosing to default
are necessarily borrowing constrained in the following period.
From the second constraint in equation 1.10 it is obvious that following the
default event the household can only save and/or lend. Consequently, a′ should be
restricted to belong only in the positive subset of a household’s trading possibility
set.
1.4.7.2 The Constrained Households
In this section we specify the problem of borrowing constrained households, namely
households that have defaulted in previous periods. The default punishment is
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modelled as a temporary exclusion from credit market. Similarly to Athreya
(2002) and Li and Sarte (2006) we model exclusion using a lottery. In particular,
we assume that every period after the default event households face a probability
θ to be borrowing constrained and 1− θ to regain full access to financial markets.
The recursive formulation of the problem of constrained households could be
presented by the following equations.
V C(a, y, s) = max
{c≥0,a′≥0}
{u(c) + β
∑
(y′,s′)∈(Y,S)
pi(s′|s)pi(y′|y)θV C(a′, y′, s′)
+(1− θ)V o(a′, y′, s′)}
(1.11)
subject to
c+ qa′ = wy [1− (1− ρ)1s=u] + a
a′ ≥ 0 (1.12)
where c denotes consumption in the current period, a′ denotes the next period
asset holdings, w stands for household wage, q is the current price of the asset
and 1s=u is an indicator function which takes the value 1 when household is in
the unemployed state and 0 otherwise.
We now move to the right-hand side of equation 1.11. We observe that con-
strained households will re-enter the credit market with probability 1− θ and will
remain constrained with probability θ. In the case of re-entry their value func-
tion will be the value of the option. Therefore, transiting to the unconstrained
state households have the option to borrow while being able to choose between
defaulting and repaying.
The budget constraint in equation 1.12 suggests that constrained households
during the exclusion period can accumulate positive assets, by either saving or
lending to other households, conditional on the sufficiency of their labour earnings,
so that consumption is non-negative and the budget constraint is satisfied. The
constraint in equation 1.12 guarantees that in the constrained state no borrowing
is allowed, since households do not have access to credit market.
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1.5 Stationary Recursive Competitive Equilib-
rium
Prior to the definition of equilibrium in our economy, it is useful to explain the
notion of equilibrium in an infinite horizon model with a support of an underlying
Markov process. Equilibrium in infinite horizon models is a matter of continual
readjustment to the resolution of uncertainties, generated by a time homoge-
neous20 Markov process (see Duffie et al. (1994)).
The concept of Recursive Competitive Equilibrium requires that all agents
behave optimally and all markets clear. Additionally, the notion of stationarity
requires in our economy that agents’ distribution across states is invariant.
We denote the household’s repayment decision as z, where z = 1 when a
household decides to default and z = 0 when decides to repay its debt. We are
now ready to describe the equilibrium in our economy.
Description of Equilibrium
A stationary recursive equilibrium in our economy can be described by a set of
prices {w, r, p}, namely the wage, the interest rate and the asset price respectively,
a set of policy functions for the unconstrained group {c, a, z}, thus consumption,
borrowing/saving and default option respectively, and a set of policy functions
{c, a} for the constrained group, a set of value functions {V R, V D, V C , V o} for
repayment, default, constrained and the option to be unconstrained, a set of
aggregate variables {C,A,K,L} and finally a set of probability measures {µuc, µc}
where µuc denotes the measure of unconstrained households and µc denotes the
measure of constrained households, such that:
(i) Taking prices as given, households policy functions solve their maximization
problems.
20A Markov Chain Y (t)is said to be time homogeneous if
P(Y (s+ t) = j)|Y (s) = i)
is independent of s. When this holds, setting s = 0 yields P(Y (t) = j)|Y (0) = i).
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(ii) Firm’s maximize profits yielding
w = (1− α)
(
K
N
)α
r = α
(
K
N
)α−1
− δ
(iii) The labour market clears and N is given by
N = (1− Π(u))
∑
y∈Y
yΠ(y)
(iv) The goods market clears
Y = C + δK
where C is given by
C =
∫
A×Y×S
c(a, y, s)dµuc +
∫
A+×Y×S
c(a, y, s)dµc
(v) The asset markets clears and K is given by
K =
∫
A×Y×S
a′dµuc +
∫
A+×Y×S
a′dµc
1.6 Calibration of the Model
Due to the inherent non-linearity of our model we are unable to derive analyt-
ical solutions. Hence, we are forced to use a numerical method to compute the
equilibrium of our economy. To solve the model numerically one needs first to
calibrate the parameters. We decide to set the model’s period to one year and
we calibrate all the parameters accordingly.
In this section, we describe our calibration strategy in setting the structural
parameters. We set the risk aversion parameter σ to be 3. As is conventional in
the literature (Krusell and Smith (1998)) we set the capital share to output ratio
in the Cobb-Douglas production function as α=0.33. We further assume that the
deprecation rate of capital is δ= 3.5% annually. The rate of time preference, β is
set to 0.94. The probability of exclusion from the credit markets, θ is calibrated
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to 0.85 implying a mean exclusion period of 6.6 years consistent with Chapter 7
Bankruptcy law.
Since agents in this model are facing two different types of idiosyncratic risks,
namely countercyclical unemployment risk and also acyclical earnings risk, we
will analyse both types in the following sections.
1.6.1 Unemployment Risk
Idiosyncratic unemployment risk is determined by a 2× 2 transition matrix. The
probabilities composing this matrix represent the transition in and out of unem-
ployment for each state that an agent belongs.
In this manner piuu depicts the probability than an agent finding himself in
the unemployment state today, will remain in this state the following period.
Similarly, piue shows the probability that an agent will transit from unemployment
today to employment the following period.
To calibrate the transition probabilities of this matrix we follow Krueger et al.
(2016). Since, Krueger et al. (2016) examines the case of both idiosyncratic
and aggregate risk, we simplify their approach by allowing only for idiosyncratic
unemployment risk. The idiosyncratic transition matrix can be uniquely pinned
down by calculating the job separation rate pieu. Alternatively, we could use the
job finding rate piue.
Krueger et al. (2016) uses the monthly Current Population Survey (CPS)
dataset to compute quarterly values. Since the time period of our model is yearly,
we use the quarterly job finding and separation rates to compute the yearly tran-
sition probabilities. We assume that an individual starts the first quarter as
employed and calculate the probability that this individual will remain employed
at the end of the fourth quarter, piee.
This can take place in multiple ways. We denote as s1, s2, s3, s4 the job sepa-
ration rates in the first,second, third and fourth quarters of the year, respectively.
There are in total 8 cases that we have to account for. These are listed below.
(I) The individual does not lose his job in any of the four quarters of the year
(1, 2, 3, 4). The associated probability is (1−s1)×(1−s2)×(1−s3)×(1−s4).
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(II) He loses his job in the first quarter, finds a job in the second quarter and
remains on job in the following two quarters with probability: s1×f2× (1−
s3)× (1− s4).
(III) He loses his job in the first quarter, does not find a job in the second quarter,
finds a job in the third quarter and does not lose his job in the last quarter
with probability: s1 × (1− f2)× f3 × (1− s4).
(IV) He does not lose his job in the first quarter, loses his job in the second
quarter, finds a job in the third quarter and doesn’t lose the job in the last
quarter with probability: (1− s1)× s2 × f3 × (1− s4).
(V) He does not lose job in the first quarter, loses his job in the second quarter,
doesn’t find a job in the third quarter and finds a job in the fourth quarter.
The associated probability is : (1− s1)× s2 × (1− f3)× f4.
(VI) He loses his job in the first quarter, doesn’t find a job in the second and
third quarters and finds a job in the last quarter with probability: s1× (1−
f2)× (1− f3)× f4.
(VII) He does not lose his job in the first and second quarters, loses job in third
quarter and finds a job in the last quarter with probability: (1− s1)× (1−
s2)× s3 × f4.
(VIII) Loses job in first quarter, finds a job in second quarter, loses job in the third
and finds a job in the fourth quarter with probability: s1 × f2 × s3 × f4.
Therefore, knowing the above probabilities we can calculate the probability
of an individual being employed at the beginning of the first quarter and who
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becomes unemployed at the end of the quarter, pieu, as follows:
pieu = 1− piee
= 1−
(
(1− s1)× (1− s2)× (1− s3)× (1− s4)
+ s1 × f2 × (1− s3)× (1− s4)
+ s1 × (1− f2)× f3 × (1− s4)
+ (1− s1)× s2 × f3 × (1− s4)
+ (1− s1)× s2 × (1− f3)× f4
+ s1 × (1− f2)× (1− f3)× f4
+ (1− s1)× (1− s2)× s3 × f4
+ s1 × f2 × s3 × f4
)
(1.13)
In a similar approach, we calculate the transition probability from unemploy-
ment to employment, piue. We use CPS data and we follow Shimer (2005) for the
measurement of the job finding and separations rates.21 By following this strategy
and using the CPS data we find the transition matrix presented below, by calcu-
lating the average probabilities from 2006Q1 to 2014Q4, since we are interested
in including the period of the global financial crisis of 2008. Off the principal
diagonal is the job finding rate and job separation rate respectively.
piuu piue
pieu piee
 =
0.1700 0.8300
0.0420 0.9580

21We download the following series from CPS: The unemployment level (UNEMPLOY -
Thousands of Persons, Monthly, Seasonally Adjusted), the short term unemployment level
(UEMPLT5 - Number of Civilians Unemployed for Less Than 5 Weeks, Thousands of Per-
sons, Monthly, Seasonally Adjusted ) and the employment level (CE16OV - Civilian Em-
ployment Level, Thousands of Persons, Monthly, Seasonally Adjusted). Denoting by ut the
unemployment rate and by ust the short term unemployment rate, we define the job finding rate
1−
(
ut+1 − ust+1
ut
)
and the separation rate
ust+1
1− ut .
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1.6.2 Earnings Risk Conditional on Employment
A large body of literature calibrate the earnings using Gaussian AR(1) processes.
This Gaussian innovations inherently produce an income distribution with zero
skewness and a kurtosis of three. However, recent studies, in particular by Gu-
venen et al. (2015) show that earnings shocks display a sizeable deviation from
log-normality, which is the standard assumption in the incomplete markets liter-
ature.
In particular, Guvenen et al. (2015) using a large panel data set of earnings
history drawn from U.S. administrative records have found that earnings shocks
display strong negative skewness and extremely high kurtosis. The data produces
a kurtosis of 30 and a skewness of −1.35.
These higher order moments cannot really be produced by a Gaussian AR(1)
process. Guvenen et al. (2015) recommends the use of a first order autoregressive
process with normal mixture innovations (NMAR).
Following this, Civale et al. (2016) develop a discretization method, building
on Tauchen (1986), which they refer to as Extended Tauchen (ET). This method
improves on Tauchen (1986) in two directions. Firstly, the AR(1) innovations are
distributed as a mixture of normals. This ensures that the stochastic process can
capture the appropriate higher-order moments, namely non-zero skewness and
high kurtosis. Secondly, the state space is selected optimally, so as to deliver a set
of targetted moments. This gives remarkable precision levels while approximating.
We employ a first order autoregressive process with normal mixture innova-
tions (NMAR) given by the following equation:
yt = ρyt−1 + ηt (1.14)
where
ηt ∼
{
N (µ1, σ21), with probability p1
N (µ2, σ22), with probability 1− p1
(1.15)
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In the above process y denotes log-earnings, ρ the persistence of the log-
earnings process, and ηt stands for the Gaussian innovations.
We denote ∆yt = yt− yt−1 as the log-earnings growth. Following Civale et al.
(2016) we calibrate an NMAR process targeting the data moments of Guvenen
et al. (2015) reported in Table 1.1.
There are six parameters (ρ, p1, µ1, µ2, σ1, σ2) that govern the NMAR process.
We follow the strategy of Civale et al. (2016) and fix ρ = 0.99, p1 = 0.9 while
imposing that µ2 =
−p1µ1
1−p1 to ensure that E(η) = 0.
22
Hence the remaining three parameters (µ1, σ1, σ2) are left free to match the
targeted data moments of Guvenen et al. (2015). The NMAR calibration that we
find is reported in 1.2.
Table 1.1: Targeted Data Moments of Guvenen et al. (2015)
E(∆y) Var(∆y) S(∆y) K(∆y)
0 0.23 −1.35 17.8
Table 1.2: NMAR calibration following Civale et al. (2016)
ρ p1 µ1 µ2 σ
2
1 σ
2
2 N
0.99 0.9 0.0336 −0.3021 0.0574 1.6749 12
1 N is the number of states.
22This is because the unconditional expectation is E(η) = p1µ1 + p2µ2.
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Table 1.3: Calibrated Parameters
Description Parameter Value
Preferences
Households Discount Factor β 0.94
Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion σ 3
Technology
Capital Share α 0.33
Depreciation Rate of Capital δ 0.035
Defaults
Probability of Remaining Constrained θ 0.85
Unemployment Rate* 7.25%
Notes: This table reports the calibrated parameters for our benchmark model economy.
The unemployment rate that we obtain from the calibrated employment risk and calibrated
earnings risk processes is 7.25%.
1.7 Results
In this section we present and discuss all the results obtained from the compu-
tational solution of our model. This includes the discussion of value, savings
and consumption functions. We further discuss the default regions, that is, be-
low which net worth to income ratio households decide to default. We compare
households in different states, i.e., employed, unemployed, high labour earnings
state and low labour earnings state.
We then turn to the case of asymmetric default costs, describing the nature of
the mechanism that we have added to our benchmark model. We next present the
new results obtained when we account for asymmetric default costs. This includes
a discussion of value, policy functions and more importantly default regions. We
then comment on the default regions and we compare with the corresponding
regions in our benchmark model.
Finally, we examine the properties of our benchmark model economy. We
present the statistics generated from our model and we compare with their coun-
terparts in the U.S. economy. We discuss in more detail the distributional proper-
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ties of our model, presenting the wealth distribution quintiles, a wealth histogram
for households with good and bad credit history and finally a wealth histogram
is reported for the employed and unemployed households in our economy.
1.7.1 Value and Policy Functions
Figure 1.3: V o for Employed and Unemployed: The left panel of this figure presents V o
for unemployed under two different realizations of labour earnings shocks. The right panel of
the figure presents V o for employed under two different realizations of labour earnings shocks.
The realization is denoted as yLow, yHigh and is located on the north-west part of both graphs.
In figure 1.3 we observe the behaviour of value of the option for both employed
and unemployed households. We present the value of the option for two dif-
ferent realizations of labour earnings shock. Note that unemployed households
(see Krueger et al. (2016)) carry the idiosyncratic state even if does not affect
their current labour earnings directly, since they do not participate in the labour
market. This occurs due to our definition of unemployment benefits, which are
defined as a fraction of potential labour earnings of a household.
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The value of the option, V o , embodies the optimal choice between value of
repayment and value of default for households with negative net worth23, along
with the regular value function for households with positive net worth. Recall
that households with positive net worth are not allowed to default in this model.
A striking result is that households with higher labour earnings realization
both in the employed and unemployed state default more compared to low labour
earnings households. In figure 1.3 the straight horizontal line of value of the option
indicates the choice of the default option.
At a first inspection, this result appears to be counter-intuitive. We pose the
following question: Why would households with lower labour earnings choose to
default less? Firstly, we should recall that in this model default is strategic. In
this sense, we disregard cases where households can’t pay and we only consider
cases that households won’t pay, as a consequence of their optimal choice.
Analysing the right-hand-side part of figure 1.3, we can indeed see that house-
holds with low earnings, find default optimal only when their net-worth is very
negative. The cost of default bears an exclusion from credit market, hence an
exclusion from borrowing for a period of around seven years24. This is in line
with Chapter 7 bankruptcy law in the United States. A Chapter 7 bankruptcy
remains on a household’s credit report for at least seven years from the date of
filing the Chapter 7 petition. This implies that during this period households will
have very restricted or no access to credit.
It is clear that in this model borrowing serves as a means to achieve consump-
tion smoothing. In particular, households with very low earnings find crucial for
their survival to have some access to credit that enables them to achieve even
a low consumption level. In support of this argument is the left panel of figure
1.3. The graph indicates that unemployed households default less compared to
employed households, or more precisely default only when featuring lower levels
of net worth compared to employed households.
To further comprehend this result, we should recall that the only source of in-
come for a household in an unemployed state is unemployment benefits. However,
23Note that net worth is expressed in every graph as a ratio of net worth to mean income.
24We calibrate parameter θ in our model to 0.85 which captures an average exclusion period
of 6.6 years.
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this income might not be sufficient for a household to support even the essential
lowest level of consumption while also repaying his debt.
One could argue that in such an event household should find it optimal to de-
fault and enjoy the partial debt relief arising from the exercise of this option. In
this manner these households could possibly achieve higher consumption. How-
ever, as we observe in the left panel of figure 1.4 households in this state choose to
borrow more and move to a higher level of negative net worth without defaulting.
This behaviour confirms that unemployed households are willing to live in a state
of limited consumption while maintaining their access to credit.
Figure 1.4: Net Savings for Employed and Unemployed: The left panel of this
figure displays net savings for unemployed households under two different realizations of labour
earnings shocks. The right panel of the figure displays net savings for employed households
under two different realizations of labour earnings shocks. The realization is denoted as yLow,
yHigh and is located on the north-west part of both figures.
In that sense, access to credit appears to be more valuable for households in
a bad state. Since the probability to remain unemployed is slightly above five
times the probability to remain employed, unemployed households perceive their
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current status as more “permanent”. Thus, they are not willing to take the risk of
defaulting and loose their access to credit market. They are more concerned about
the continuation of a bad state realization, under which they will not achieve even
the lowest level of consumption if being excluded from credit. Hence, they adopt
the strategy of accumulating more debt bearing its extra cost until a good state is
realized in the future. These households only default when reaching the borrowing
limit or more precisely when they lie very close to it. Essentially they are willing
to borrow as long as someone is willing to lend them, mainly aiming to subsidise
their consumption.
The finding of low default rates amongst the more financially distressed house-
holds, can shed light on why lenders rarely renegotiate loan modifications with
very high risk borrowers. This is because most of them continue to pay. (see
Adelino et al. (2013)). Furthermore, these results provide theoretical support to
new empirical evidence introduced by Gerardi et al. (2015). They find that the
vast majority of borrowers with very low ability to pay avoid default and prefer
to decrease their consumption to subsistence levels.
At the opposite end, households that are employed and face a higher labour
income shock as observed in the right panel of figure 1.3 default for almost any
non-positive value of net worth . Interestingly, even if it is not apparent in figure
1.3 since we do not plot the highest income shock, they would be willing to default,
if they were given the option, even for slightly positive values of net-worth.
This indicates that indirect cost of defaults for higher labour income employed
households is not as large compared to the low income or unemployed households.
This is because these households have enough earnings to support their consump-
tion, even when being excluded from credit market.
We further argue that high labour income households will continue to borrow
even for positive values of net worth to increase their consumption. This can
be seen in the right panel of figure 1.4. Households with positive net worth and
good realization of earnings shock, choose to borrow up to a net worth to income
ratio of 1. However, and since in our framework positive net-worth households
are not allowed to default, thus are forced to repay, they do not achieve perfect
consumption smoothing. Clearly default option could serve as a means to smooth
your consumption.
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Consumption policy functions for employed and unemployed states are graph-
ically illustrated in figure 1.5. Consumption exhibits spikes and higher volatility
for positive values of net worth. Recall that, default is not an option for agents
that hold positive net worth. Therefore, these borrowing households that would
optimally decide to default and are not allowed, would be forced to reduce their
consumption in order to repay. This would hinder their consumption smoothing,
since the default option and not only borrowing/saving functions as a consump-
tion insurance mechanism.
In the right panel of figure 1.5 it is evident that consumption is constantly
larger for higher income employed households compared to lower income employed
households up to a certain point of net worth. Above a level of net worth to income
ratio around 1.5, consumption for both low and high labour income employed
households is almost equivalent.
This can be explained by the fact that beyond a certain level of wealth the
marginal propensity to consume from labour earnings is less than the marginal
propensity to save. In support of this argument is figure 1.4. It is apparent that
net savings is an increasing function of net worth independently of any labour
earnings realization. Furthermore, households being in a higher income state
tend to save more.
Finally, when a household is in an unemployed state while having positive net
worth saves less compared to an employed household with equal net worth, since
it finds necessary to subsidise his consumption.
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Figure 1.5: Consumption Levels for Employed and Unemployed: The left panel of this
figure presents optimal consumption for unemployed households under two different realizations
of labour earnings shocks. The right panel of the figure presents optimal consumption for
employed households under two different realizations of labour earnings shocks. The realization
is denoted as yLow, yHigh and is located on the north-west part of both graphs.
1.7.2 Default Regions
To give a clear illustration of the our previous discussion regarding defaults, we
present in figure 1.6 the default regions for a combination of employed/unemployed
state and high/low earnings realization. Default regions are defined as the area in
which value of default is higher than value of repayment. This is the area covering
the left side of the intersection of the two value functions in all graphs presented
below.
In the right bottom panel of figure 1.6 it is clear that employed households
with high realized earnings, default in all levels of negative net worth up to −0.25.
Employed households with low realized earnings default only above−0.85 negative
net worth. This illustrates the finding that higher income households feature
larger incentives to default compared to the lower income ones.
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Figure 1.6: Default Regions for Employed/Unemployed and yLow and yHigh earn-
ings: The left panel of this figure presents default regions for an unemployed/employed state
when a low labour earnings shock is realised yLow. The right panel of the figure presents default
regions for an unemployed/employed state when a high labour earnings shock is realized yHigh.
To specify the default regions we compare value of repayment V R to value of default V D as
depicted in the north-west part of all graphs.
We claim that this result occurs due to symmetric default penalties that are
present in our model. In this sense, both high and low income households face
the same default penalty, namely a temporary exclusion from credit market. Our
results are in conflict with findings of some other studies.
For instance, Arellano (2008) in a sovereign debt and default framework, finds
that default sets are stronger the lower the endowment is. In other words, de-
faults are higher in a low realized income state. We claim that this result is
present due to an asymmetric default cost in her model. More precisely Arellano
(2008) assumes that default entails some direct output costs only when output
is above a certain threshold. Definitely this mechanism, unlike in the consumer
bankruptcy framework, is fairly valid when studying defaults at a country level.
In particular, it would be bizarre to assume that high income households face an
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extra cost compared to those with low income, especially when studying defaults
in unsecured debt.
It is also evident in figure 1.6 that unemployed households default more than
employed households. This follows naturally from our previous discussion, since
these households have even less earnings, namely they only receive an unemploy-
ment benefit. Their behaviour is similar to employed low income households.
In particular, unemployed households default only above a negative net worth
to mean income ratio of −1.1. More generally, we could argue that low income
or unemployed households tend to default only when they are heavily indebted,
in the sense of featuring very negative worth. It is not clear however whether
this very low income unemployed households would even default at this level of
negative net worth, if they were a facing a less tight borrowing constraint.
To conclude this section, default is more costly in our model in the lowest
states (i.e unemployment state or low earnings realization), even if post defaults
savings remain an option. However, in a very low state, this option cannot even
be exercised, unlike when being in a high state. This is reasonable since low
earnings are hardly sufficient to support consumption. Indeed in our model very
low earnings or unemployed households choose to have almost zero savings in the
post-default era. Essentially, being in a constrained state does not enable them
to benefit from the outside savings option.
Contrariwise, high earnings households find optimal to default and trade no-
credit involved contracts across the post-default path. This allows them to attain
a higher consumption bundle, since the outside option is both attractive and
feasible for them. In a simpler way, their earnings are adequate to both maintain
a satisfactory level of consumption, although choosing high positive savings.
1.7.3 The Case of Asymmetric Default Costs
In our benchmark model economy we assume that default costs are symmetric, in
the sense that every household, independently of the idiosyncratic earnings shock
realization and the level of indebtedness, will be equally penalised. Both high
and low income households will suffer the consequences of default, and will be
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temporarily excluded from credit market. To prove the strength of asymmetric
default costs assumption, we modify our benchmark model in the following way.
Our model employs twelve idiosyncratic earnings states. We assume that
households facing a high income state, while choosing to default, will face a higher
punishment relative to those households in low states. This punishment takes the
form of an earnings loss or alternatively a wage garnishment. This loss intends
to capture the pecuniary costs of default.
In our framework, we further assume that this pecuniary cost is dependent
on the level of income. The direct costs of default in our modified framework,
similarly to Arellano (2008), takes the following form:
χ(y) =
{
wy if wy ≤ wγ
wγ if wy > wγ
(1.16)
where γ is an exogenous parameter capturing the rate of labour income gar-
nishment as in Chatterjee et al. (2007). The rationale behind the theory of pecu-
niary costs is the notion of a bad credit rating, which will bear a loss of reputation
in the credit market. We assume, as in Chatterjee et al. (2008) that this pecuniary
cost stems from the loss of one’s reputation in the credit market.
Nevertheless, this cost will not be applicable if your labour income realization
is below a certain threshold.
49
Figure 1.7: V o for Employed and Unemployed with γ = 0.75 : The left panel of this
figure presents V o for unemployed households under two different realizations of labour earnings
shocks. The right panel of the figure presents V o for employed households under two different
realizations of labour earnings shocks. The realization is denoted as yLow, yHigh and is located
on the north-west part of both graphs.
This assumption is in line with the Federal Wage Garnishment Law and the
Consumer Credit Protection Act III. Title III of CCPA limits the amounts of an
individual earnings that may be garnished and further protects an employee from
being fired.
It is administrated by the U.S Department of Labour’s Wage and Hour Divi-
sion and applies in all fifty states. More importantly, if the disposable earnings
of the individual are less than 217.5$ per week, there can be no garnishment.
Based on this law we do not allow wage garnishment to take place, as presented
in the previous equation when your realized labour earnings are below wγ. In this
manner, the default penalty becomes larger for households facing high earnings
shock.
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Figure 1.8: Net Savings for Employed and Unemployed with γ = 0.75: The left panel
of this figure presents net savings for unemployed households under two different realizations
of labour earnings shocks. The right panel of the figure presents net savings for employed
households under two different realizations of labour earnings shocks. The realization is denoted
as yLow, yHigh and is located on the north-west part of both graphs.
Claiming that this mechanism has significant impact in the results of our
model, we are expecting to see major changes in value, policy functions and
equilibrium outcomes compared to our benchmark economy. We should state
that all results presented in this section are based on a calibration of parameter
γ = 0.75. This implies that 25%25 of labour earnings will be garnished if you are
at a high income state.
Indeed, as we observe in figure 1.7 and in contradiction to the results of our
benchmark model, households with higher labour income default less compared
25Title III of the CCPA sets the maximum amount that could be garnished in any working
week or pay period. This is independent to the number of garnishments orders that might be
received by an employer. For ordinary garnishments orders including bankruptcy, any state
or federal tax normally this rate would not exceed 25% of the employee’s disposable earnings.
There exist a few limitations or exceptions for cases of child support, alimony, non-tax debt
owed to federal agencies, defaulted federal student loans, but 25% is in most cases the upper
bound.
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to those with lower. In the left panel of figure 1.7 is evident that employed
households facing a high income shock default when their net worth to income
ratio is below −0.7 while those facing a low income shock default when their net
worth is below −0.55.
The results are similar for unemployed households, in the sense that house-
holds with higher earnings realization default more. Nevertheless, unemployed
households as observed in the left panel of figure 1.7 default only when are highly
indebted, or more precisely when their net-worth to income ratio is below −1.0
and very close to the model’s borrowing limit.
This result remains unchanged compared to our benchmark model, since these
households as previously discussed are willing to sacrifice a part of their consump-
tion to repay their debts and consequently maintain their access to credit market.
This is due to their fear that a bad state will continue to be realized in the
future and without access to borrowing, consumption might turn below subsidence
level and very close to zero. In other words, “survival” is a key element in the
decision making of these households.
For a better illustration of our results we present figure 1.8 where is clear that
employed households under a high income realization and positive net worth do
not choose to borrow. This is different compared to the results of our benchmark
model in figure 1.4. This is because default option is not any more so attractive,
particularly for high income households.
With symmetric default costs, these households were enjoying the benefits of
defaults, without facing an extra cost. In this manner, they would prefer to bor-
row more and default, when they were given the option, while their high labour
earnings would remain unaffected. With asymmetric default costs and when in-
corporating wage garnishment, labour earnings would be affected after default,
since a part of them will be garnished and essentially lost from the household’s
budget set.
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Figure 1.9: Consumption Levels for Employed and Unemployed with γ = 0.75: The
left panel of this figure presents optimal consumption for unemployed households under two
different realizations of labour earnings shocks. The right panel of the figure presents optimal
consumption for employed households under two different realizations of labour earnings shocks.
The realization is denoted as yLow, yHigh and is located on the north-west part of both graphs.
Precautionary savings motives for high earnings households strengthen, since
borrowing and defaulting do not appear to be an optimal strategy to maximize
consumption utility. For consumption smoothing purposes precautionary savings
are less risky and guarantee that no earnings loss will be realized.
In a way, the introduction of this asymmetry dampens the strategic default
motives and make default option appealing more in a bad state realization, when
a household will have very little to lose and no option to borrow more, due to the
model’s constraint.
Turning to optimal consumption behaviour we realize that in presence of asym-
metric default costs, consumption of high income employed households is on av-
erage less compared to the benchmark case of symmetric default costs. The right
panel of figure 1.9 shows that consumption is smoother and on average lower com-
pared to the right panel of figure 1.5. The same holds for unemployed households.
53
Figure 1.10: Default Regions for Employed/Unemployed and yLow and yHigh earn-
ings with γ = 0.75 : The left panel of this figure presents default regions for an unem-
ployed/employed state when a low labour earnings shock is realised yLow. The right panel of
the figure presents default regions for an unemployed/employed state when a high labour earn-
ings shock is realizes yHigh. To specify the default regions we compare value of repayment V
R
to value of default V D as depicted in the north-west part of all graphs.
However, we should mention that optimal consumption behaviour of low-
income or unemployed households resembles closely the results of our benchmark
model. This however is not the case for high-income employed households, exactly
due to the extra costs being apparent when choosing to default.
Essentially high income households prefer to live in a state of lower consump-
tion, while expanding their savings buffer. The asymmetric default cost is inter-
nalized and the post default state features such high costs that becomes unde-
sirable. In this respect, high income households strictly prefer to achieve perma-
nently a lower consumption bundle, rather than enjoy a higher borrowing-boosted
consumption temporarily and finally face a permanent earnings loss.
To conclude this section, we present the default regions in figure 1.10. Firstly
it is apparent that our benchmark model’s defaults result reverts as is depicted
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from the V o in figure 1.7. Defaults occur more in the low idiosyncratic state,
and as in Arellano (2008) default incentives are stronger the lower the income
realization. This serves as a proof that the assumption of asymmetric default
cost is very strong and can alter the results.
However, this assumption does not appear to hold in data, especially when
studying consumer bankruptcies with unsecured debt. We should further com-
ment that this result in our model is only feasible for very high values of wage
garnishment. For this reason we have chosen to calibrate this parameter to the
highest possible value that could have an empirical support.
Nonetheless, Chapter 7 bankruptcy which is closely resembled in this chap-
ter does not induce a wage garnishment. This can only be met in Chapter 13
bankruptcy code. Chapter 13 Bankruptcy code provides debtors an opportunity
to save their assets (i.e. houses) from foreclosure, by allowing to enter a new
payment plan. During this payment plan a portion of your income is garnished
as a contribution towards your repayment instalments.
1.7.4 Properties of the Model Economy
In this section we discuss the equilibrium outcome of our benchmark model. It
matches fairly well key statistics of the United States economy. Table 1.4 reports
statistics derived from our model economy and compares with their counterparts
in the data. As we can observe our model successfully replicates some macro and
distributional statistics26.
To motivate the importance of (1.) defaults (2.) NMAR earnings process and
the (3.) the employment-unemployment risk, we also report equilibrium values
26Most of the U.S statistics used for comparison with our model results are averages. In partic-
ular, capital-to-output ratio denotes the average from 1929-2014, consumption-to-output-ratio
denotes the average value from 2006-2014, Negative and Non-Positive Net Worth Households are
findings provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, while these findings defer slightly
across different surveys (i.e. SCF,PSID and SCE), Wealth, Income GINI and other measures of
inequality are reported from quadrini rios rull .... Default Rate stands for the value calculated
by the Research and Statistics Group-Microeconomic Studies of Federal Reserve Bank of New
York. This value denotes the 90+ day delinquency rates for credit cards. Finally, Households
with Bad Credit Record are households with very bad credit scores, specifically < 620, as cal-
culated by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York using the Equifax Risk Score. The value
reported is the average between 2006 and 2014.
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for three other models for comparison. The last three columns of the table report
these results. The first model that we use for comparison is our benchmark
model with simple Gaussian AR(1) shocks instead of the NMAR process but
with employment risk. The column titled Model-AR(1) reports the obtained
equilibrium values. It is clear that compared to the benchmark model, this model
performs poorly in matching U.S. data. The capital to output ratio is much lower
while the consumption to output ratio is a lot higher. Importantly, this model
over-predicts the mass of agents who have negative networth compared to the
data. This is primarily because in equilibrium the default rate is an implausibly
high value of 30%. Examining the results of two other models without defaults,
reported in the last two columns, it is clear that the presence of defaults is a
necessary ingredient to matching U.S. data statistics. For both the no-default
models, the capital to output ratios are significantly higher. The absence of default
implies that there is no loss of assets or in other words capital in these economies.
Agents accumulate capital for precautionary reasons and this is reflected in higher
levels of aggregate savings relative to the economies with defaults. Furthermore,
these economies are also characterized by a zero mass of agents with negative
networth contradicting data evidence.
Our base model that includes the NMAR earnings process, has employment-
unemployment risk and the option of defaults replicates almost perfectly the share
of non-positive net worth households in the US. We find that 18.9% of households
in our model feature negative or zero net worth.
Across different surveys, this value varies from 18−19%. The Survey of Consumer
Expectations, being held by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York estimates this
value around 18.1%, while Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) reports a
value of 19.4%. We further calculate the probability to default in our economy and
we compare with the ratio reported by New York Fed regarding credit cards being
in above 90 days delinquency. Our model finding is 7.4%, while the corresponding
value in data is 7.6%.
We should clarify that credit cards in the above described status serves as
a good proxy for defaults in our model, since we are only studying unsecured
loans. In data these loans are mainly comprised by credit card loans, student
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Table 1.4: The Benchmark Model Economy
Economy U.S (Data) Model Model-AR(1) ND-NMAR ND - NMAR+ Emp.
K/Y ratio 2.9 2.67 1.78 3.17 3.23
C/Y ratio 0.69 0.80 1.01 0.88 0.88
Negative NW (%) 14 11.6 19
Non-Positive NW (%) 18.1 18.9 0.49
Default Rate(%) 7.6 7.4 30
Bad Credit Record (%) 29 28.7
Net Interest Rate (%) 8.97 14 6.17 6.15
Wealth Gini 0.85 0.795
Income Gini 0.55 0.64
Location of Mean Wealth(%) 83 70
Location of Mean Income (%) 73 77
Coefficient of Variation in Wealth 6.35 6.25
Coefficient of Variation in Income 3.45 4.9
Variance of the log Income 0.92 3.2
Variance of the log Wealth 4.65 4.39
Mean/Median Income 1.70 2.55
Mean/Median Wealth 6.42 10
Notes: This table reports the equilibrium results of our benchmark economy and com-
pares with values of the relevant variables in the U.S. economy. The second column
contains the values from empirical data on the U.S. economy, the third column reports
values obtained for the main model, the other columns report values for other versions
of the model. ND stands for no defaults. The three models used for comparison are
(1.) the base model with defaults but with AR(1) Gaussian earnings process instead of
NMAR; (2.)no-default version of the model with only the NMAR earnings shocks; and
(3.) no-default model with both NMAR and emp. risk shocks.
and auto loans. The corresponding value for student loans with an above 90 days
delinquency status is slightly higher.
From a distributional aspect our model underpredicts the wealth GINI index
and over-predicts the income Gini index. Our model generates a wealth gini of
0.795 while its counterpart in data is 0.85 as reported in Quadrini and R´ıos-
Rull (2015). Our model over-predicts the income GINI by around 16%. This is
primarily due to the assumption that interest rate is the same for both borrowing
and lending activities. Since the total income for any agent in our economy
is the sum of exogenous labour income and income from asset returns, agents
who accumulate savings will end up getting higher returns on their capital and
agents who are indebted will face high repayment costs. The net effect is that
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this constant return assumption adversely impacts the income distribution with
bigger tails thereby over-predicting the income GINI Index. In the second chapter,
we will introduce a financial intermediary to price loans differently from deposits
and we observe that the Income GINI Index drops down to 0.50. It is clear that
the highly persistent (ρ = 0.99) exogenous NMAR process might accelerate this
mechanism but is not the main driving process.
We also report other types of wealth and inequality measures following the
literature, see Quadrini and R´ıos-Rull (2015). These measures include the per-
centage location of mean wealth (income), the coefficient of variation in wealth
(income), variance of log wealth (income) and mean/median wealth (income).
The observed pattern is similar to the GINI indexes. Our model in general cap-
tures better the inequality measure of wealth, namely the coefficient of variation
and variance of logs, than the measures of income.
Importantly, the model delivers that 28.7% of households have a bad credit
record. Bad credit record in our model suggests that household have at least
defaulted once. In other words we measure the mass of households being con-
strained in equilibrium, namely do not have full access to financial markets. We
find that these households account for 28.7% of the population. The empirical
equivalent of this finding is households that feature bad credit score. Specifically
we compare our result with households that have a credit score below 620. It
is fair to assume that these households do not have full access to credit market
or at least have very limited access to it. In data this households with a bad
credit score represent on average 29% of the population. Bad credit households
are the mass of agents in the constrained state (the sum of constrained probability
distribution) which is an endogenous equilibrium outcome and do not arise from
any calibrated targets. Similarly, negative net worth households are calculated as
the total measure (sum) of the distribution of households who have a net asset
position that is lower than zero, which is again an equilibrium outcome and not
a calibrated target.
The underlying assumption that assists us capturing these statistics is that we
have only one interest rate. In this manner we assume that there are no trans-
actions costs and no financial intermediary is present. In this case, households
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borrow from one to each other, depending on their net asset position and market
price. Our model delivers an interest rate of 8.97%.
For equal interest rates on debt and assets, households will always accumulate
as much debt as possible. Thereby, households are characterized by strong precau-
tionary borrowing motive, while precautionary savings channel is not shut-down
especially for households that face high labour income shocks. In a simpler way,
we could argue that interest rates are not high enough to discourage borrowing
and not low enough to deter households from savings.
A feature that is absent in our model is financial intermediaries. We assume
that interest rate is the same for both borrowing and lending unlike Chatterjee
et al. (2007) or Li and Sarte (2006) who explicitly model a risk neutral zero profit
financial intermediary that charges a premium to risky loans ensuring that savings
are safe.
A common interest rate for all households would imply that there is a cross-
subsidization effect, wherein the highly indebted agents are subsidized by agents
with low debt. This consequently creates a higher proportion of agents with
negative net worth in equilibrium. The market clearing interest rate that we
obtain is thus higher than an equivalent Aiyagari economy absent any default
choice.
To acquire a better illustration of the distributional properties of our model
we show in figure 1.11 the share of aggregate mean wealth that each quintile of
households holds. Our model successfully captures the percentage of mean net
wealth in the first and second quintile, and underestimates the share of mean net
wealth in the fourth and fifth quintile.
According to U.S. data the first quintile of households holds negative net
wealth representing −0.01 of the total mean net wealth, while the second quintile
holds slightly positive net wealth representing −0.008 of total mean net wealth.
The values generated from our model, as can be observed in 1.11 are −0.02 and
0.01 respectively.
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Figure 1.11: Wealth Distribution Quintiles: This figure presents the quintiles of the
wealth distribution generated by our model. Values depict the share of aggregate wealth held
by each quintile of households in our economy.
Nevertheless, we fail to capture the share of net wealth in the third, fourth and
fifth quintiles. In data, these quintiles are respectively, 0.033, 0.10 and 0.86. The
fact that our model captures well the lowest 40% of agents and not the top 60%
is not surprising. In data, the portfolio holdings of positive net worth household
include not just savings but also other financial assets. This would mean that
the actual wealth of our model economy agents would be comparatively lower.
However, for the negative net worth households, who have a higher debt relative
to assets, this difference between our model and data does not apply. These agents
do not possess any assets neither in the data nor in our model.
In figure 1.12 we present the net wealth histogram as a fraction of average
households labour income. We exclude the right tail which comprises about 20%
of the population. For households with bad credit record the model delivers a
distribution which is right skewed and features a peak at zero, while a significant
mass of household is located around zero.
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This is reasonable since these households have defaulted and are consequently
excluded from borrowing. Additionally, those are mainly households hit by bad
labour income shocks or are unemployed. In this sense their labour income is not
sufficient to increase their savings. The distribution of households with bad credit
record is very similar to the findings of Chatterjee et al. (2007) that construct a
much richer model, characterized by a schedule of loan prices rather than a single
price.
Figure 1.12: Wealth Histogram - Good vs Bad Credit History Households: This
figure depicts the net wealth to average income distribution of households with Good Credit
History (i.e. No Default) and the distribution of households with Bad Credit History (i.e
Default). On x− axis we express net wealth as a ratio of average income, while on y− axis the
mass of households at each level of wealth is depicted. Note that households in our economy
have measure 1.
On the contrary our model implied distribution for households with good
credit record, or equivalently households that are unconstrained is different from
Chatterjee et al. (2007). In our model these households are mainly those facing a
high labour income shock and are employed. Firstly, due to the fact that in our
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model there exists a common interest rate for borrowing and lending, that in equi-
librium is relatively high, specifically around 9%, households with high disposable
income are willing to save heavily and their optimal savings frequently meets the
bound. This provides a good explanation regarding the fact that a significant
mass of unconstrained households are characterized by relatively high wealth as
a fraction of average income. We further observe in figure 1.12 that a significant
mass of unconstrained households feature negative net worth. In particular these
households represent 11.6% of the total population in our economy.
Figure 1.13: Wealth Histogram - Unemployed vs Employed Households: This
figure presents the net wealth to average income distribution of employed (right panel) and
unemployed (left panel) households. On x − axis we express net wealth as a ratio of average
income, while on y − axis the mass of households at each level of wealth is depicted.
This value is very close to findings across different surveys in United States.
The range of these values in data is between 12% and 14%. Overall we could
argue that our model successfully replicates the left part of the distribution of
households, along with the mass of households with bad credit record while fails
to generate accurately the right part of the distribution.
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As previously explained this result arrives due to our assumption of one com-
mon interest rate. Lastly we present figure 1.13 which describes the wealth distri-
bution as a ratio of average income among unemployed and employed households.
In the left panel of figure 1.13 is evident that unemployed households, as expected
do not feature high level of wealth and they are mostly concentrated around zero
and slightly positive or slightly negative net worth. Note that the unemployment
rate that our model generates is 7.25%. This explains why a smaller mass of
households is represented in the left panel of figure 1.13.
Employed households feature much higher disposable income. In that respect,
and given the appealing equilibrium interest rate, they are able to accumulate
more wealth. Indeed, we observe in figure 1.13 that a significant mass of house-
holds lies in the right side of employed household’s distribution. Furthermore, a
considerable mass of employed households lies at zero. This can be partly ex-
plained by the presence of default option. A defaulting household is forced to
move to zero net worth, while also facing an exclusion from credit market. In
the degree that default arises as an equilibrium outcome, it is anticipated that a
considerable mass of households will lie at zero level of net worth.
1.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we accomplished the following results. Firstly, we developed a
theoretical framework that captures salient features of wealth distribution, con-
sumer bankruptcy and the prevalence of a significant number of negative net worth
households. The existence of a substantial mass of negative net worth households
explains the rise in wealth inequality observed in the aftermath of the crisis in
US.
Secondly, we introduced a novel feature in our model wherein indebted house-
holds are allowed to default on a part of the debt, specifically the outstanding
debt that exceed their liabilities. Consequently, endogenous equilibrium defaults
are partial and not full.
Thirdly, our benchmark model in contrast with the literature but consistent
with recent empirical evidence produced lower default probabilities for low income
states. Fourthly, our results bring into question the importance and relevance of
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the asymmetric default costs in this class of models. Our analysis indicates this
use is mostly a convenient approach to generate low defaults for high income
agents.
Finally, our model includes an additional idiosyncratic state (employment vs.
unemployment) and applies a mixture of autoregressive process that matches
higher order moments of the earnings distribution, two technical features that are
absent in most of the heterogeneous agents literature.
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1.A NMAR Process
This appendix discusses the discretization method of calibrating a markov pro-
cess with non zero skewnesss and high kurtosis. Civale et al. (2016) extends
Tauchen (1986) AR(1) discretization to normal mixture autoregressive processes
and thereby capture the skewness and high kurtosis observed in earnings data.
Bloom et al. (2018), Guvenen et al. (2015) and Bachmann et al. (2017) find
empirical patterns that cannot be captured by a simple AR(1) process. On the
other hand, standard economic models that attempt to mimic the data patterns
stick mostly to Gaussian shocks and Tauchen (1986) discretization method. Our
model is an attempt to fill this gap in the literature by using a rich NMAR earnings
process in a modified Aiyagari type model where borrowing is defaultable under
different pricing kernels.
A first order autoregressive process with normal mixture innovations (NMAR)
is given by the following equation:
yt = ρyt−1 + ηt (1.17)
where
ηt ∼
{
N (µ1, σ21), with probability p1
N (µ2, σ22), with probability 1− p1
(1.18)
In the above process y denotes log-earnings, ρ the persistence of the log-
earnings process, and ηt stands for the Gaussian innovations. The moments of
y are determined by ρ and η. In the first step of the exercise, the value for η is
calibrated using the General Method of Moments (GMM). Civale et al. (2016)
finds that the variance of η is independent of the skewness and kurtosis of η.
This allows Civale et al. (2016) to produce the pair of values for skewness and
kurtosis of η. They report different combinations of skewness and kurtosis of η
and compare them with their empirical counterparts reported by Bloom et al.
(2018), Guvenen et al. (2015) and Bachmann et al. (2017).
In the second step, they select different values of ρ so as to be able to map the
pair of skewness and kurtosis of η to the observed skewness and kurtosis of the
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log earnings data by Guvenen et al. (2015) and Bloom et al. (2018). They report
results for different values of ρ = {0.8, 0.9, 0.99}.
There are six parameters (ρ, p1, µ1, µ2, σ1, σ2) that govern the NMAR process.
Civale et al. (2016) fix ρ = 0.99, p1 = 0.9 while imposing that µ2 =
−p1µ1
1−p1 to
ensure that E(η) = 0.27
Hence the remaining three parameters (µ1, σ1, σ2) are left free to match the
targeted data moments of Guvenen et al. (2015). In our model, the NMAR
calibration that they find is used. This is reported in 1.2.
We now describe in brief the method that they use to discretize this NMAR
process. They call it the Extended Tauchen (ET) method. A set of moments are
first chosen from the data, Civale et al. (2016) uses Guvenen et al. (2015) earnings
moments. The moments of the NMAR process conditional on an assumed set of
parameters are then mapped to these data moment targets. A distance measure is
minimized with an appropriate weighting matrix to find optimal parameters. The
weighting matrix is chosen such that the distance between the model moments
and the data moments is equal to the sum of squared percentage deviations of
each moment from its target. The deviations are thus percentages and scale
independent. Each moment condition is weighted equally. The moments of the
markov chain can be analytically calculated and this allows easier mapping from
the continuous process to the data targets.
Detailed description of this approach including the analytical moment equa-
tions and the process of discretization can be found in Civale et al. (2016) ap-
pendix.
27This is because the unconditional expectation is E(η) = p1µ1 + p2µ2.
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Chapter 2
Distributional and Default
Implications from Risk-Neutral
Pricing
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we resolve some of the limitations put forward by the model intro-
duced in our first chapter. Similar to our previous chapter, we analyse a general
equilibrium model that allows for unsecured consumer credit, in the presence of
defaults. Defaults in this model, unlike the previous one, closely resemble the
Chapter 13 bankruptcy law in the United States.
Furthermore, we explicitly model a financial intermediary that gives loans to
households that are willing to borrow and takes deposits from households that
are willing to save. The financial intermediary makes zero profits and prices loans
based on three key factors. Firstly, prices depend on the size of the loan as in the
paper of Chatterjee et al. (2007). Secondly, we extend this approach by allow-
ing prices to depend on two more important factors, which are the idiosyncratic
earnings realization and the employment-unemployment status.
Similar to our previous chapter, where we successfully tried to match the
higher moments of the earnings distribution in United States, we employ the
discretization technique of NMAR processes, proposed by Civale et al. (2016) to
match the moments of the earnings distribution found by Guvenen et al. (2015).
Our economy is characterized by limited commitment and thus markets are
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endogenously incomplete. The main question that we pose in this chapter is the
following:
Do the presence of a financial intermediary alter household deci-
sions and macroeconomic aggregates?
In our previous chapter trade was taking place amongst households via a one-
period not contingent bond and price does not depend on the size of borrowing,
even though a large loan would reasonably be linked with a higher probability to
default compared to a smaller loan. Under this assumption, a cross subsidisation
effect comes forward, that is, small (loan size) borrowers subsidize large borrowers.
Furthermore, the underlying assumption of our previous chapter was that
borrowing and savings induces the same price. Apart from the unrealistic nature
of this assumption, from a theoretical perspective we found that this directly
drives defaults incentives through an over-attractiveness of the outside option. To
overcome these shortcomings, we use a risk neutral pricing approach, modelled
via the existence of a financial intermediary.
We find that this market arrangement is important in multiple ways. Credit
suppliers, represented in our economy by financial intermediaries price their loans
taking into account the probability of default. An extra refinement in our model is
that probability of default and the loan price schedule is dependent on the current
states of employment and earnings and importantly on the amount of borrowing.
In this manner, financial intermediaries are compensated for the objective default
frequency of households with these certain state realizations.
2.2 Contribution and Results
The main contribution of this chapter is in the way the risky loans are priced. We
have an endogenous loan price schedule extending the single price assumed in Li
and Sarte (2006). Thus, we account for the employment/unemployment state of
the agents and his/her earnings realizations. The presence of this loan schedule
means that our endogenous bankruptcy filings are almost the same as in the data.
Our approach of pricing is thus closer to Chatterjee et al. (2007). The difference
in our model relative to Chatterjee et al. (2007) is in the assumption that this
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loan price is conditional on the earnings process and the employment status of
the agent.
We turn now to the findings of this chapter. We answer the above posed
question with an emphatic Yes, the presence of a financial intermediary
results in lower defaults and a more realistic income distribution .
Although the wealth GINI is under-predicted, the top quintiles of the aggregate
wealth share is now closer to empirical data than the previous chapter.
Our model generated distribution resembles much better the quintiles of the
U.S. empirical wealth distribution. In particular, the fifth quintile of our model
generated wealth distribution holds 67% of total wealth as opposed to around
85% of its data counterpart.
Furthermore, the model generated income inequality is much closer to the ob-
served income inequality in US. More specifically, our model generates an income
Gini index of 0.50 with its data counterpart being 0.55.
We now turn to our results related to defaults. Firstly, our model closely
resembles the bankruptcy filings in United States in the period of 2009 − 2010.
Our model generated filing rate is 0.64% while its empirical counterpart is 0.65%.
This finding is also of a theoretical interest in the following way.
The presence of a financial intermediary that takes into account the probability
of default on every credit given and optimally prices these contracts based on
the idiosyncratic income and employment level of the borrower results in a lower
default rate in equilibrium. This is despite the fact that borrowing and hence total
debt is higher compared to a no intermediary economy. This further highlights
the importance of appropriate screening, from the side of financial intermediaries
in reality. Mispricing of loans or miscalculation of default probabilities might bear
serious consequences for the economy. Price is a crucial determinant of default
incentives.
In this chapter we also highlight the link between price schedules and the
attractiveness of the outside option, claiming that these are the major drivers of
default incentives. We find that for some levels of debt and some idiosyncratic
states, given the risk-free interest rate in our economy, that is relatively low,
households prefer to borrow and repay, rather than borrow, default and then
exercise the outside option. This is because in an economy characterized by low
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deposit rates, borrowing incentives exceed savings incentives, thus default become
a less appealing option, and economy continuously accumulates debt.
This mechanism also sheds light on the current increase in household debt
observed in different countries, and mainly in the United States. This has raised
major concerns amongst the policy makers, since along with the fact that around
15% of households in the U.S. have negative net worth, might become a triggering
factor for a next crisis. Our model successfully replicates the fraction of households
with negative and non positive net worth and also delivers a high for the standards
of general equilibrium heterogeneous agents models, household debt to GDP ratio,
around 9.8%.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2.2 we review the
literature related to asset pricing, in various theoretical models. In particular we
discuss asset pricing in a representative agent economy, asset pricing in hetero-
geneous agents economies, as well as the link between asset pricing and defaults.
We then describe our model economy in Section 2.3, presenting the market struc-
ture and the households’ problem, for both the constrained and the unconstrained
group. In Section 2.4 we describe the problem and the role of the financial inter-
mediary in this economy and we present the results of its first order conditions.
In Section 2.5 we provide a brief description of the stationary recursive compet-
itive equilibrium and state the market clearing conditions for our economy. We
discuss the calibration strategy in Section 2.6. In Section 2.7 we present the key
results obtained from the computational solution of the model, and we discuss
the characteristics of the economy in equilibrium and the related model statistics.
We conclude this chapter in Section 2.8.
2.3 Literature Review
In this section we will review the literature related to this chapter. Firstly we
discuss studies which are relevant to the notion of asset pricing in general and in
particular in the case of a representative agent economy.
We then turn to asset pricing in models where agents are heterogeneous. We
provide useful explanations introduced by the literature related to the pricing
kernel and its difficulties in such model environments.
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Finally, we present the part of the literature which is closely related to this
chapter, that is, literature in asset pricing in the presence of default options.
We discuss both models related to consumers’ bankruptcy and also to sovereign
defaults.
2.3.1 Representative Agent Asset Pricing
The seminal paper of Lucas (1978) provides useful insights in the notion of as-
set pricing in an exchange economy with a representative agent and examines
equilibrium prices. Lucas (1978) derives a functional equation, describing the
dependence of prices on the marginal utility of consumption, in the so called
Consumption based Asset Pricing model.
The underlying assumption in this economy is that prices reflect all available
information in the economy. In other words, Lucas (1978)’s study is within the
framework of rational expectations as defined by Muth (1961). The advantage
of a simple representative agent model is that equilibrium quantities can be eas-
ily calculated. Thus, the only remaining challenge is to determine equilibrium
prices. He suggests that price should be expressed as a function of the state of
the economy.
On the one side, individual consumers take prices as given to solve their max-
imization problem, deciding optimally their policy functions. On the other side,
this optimal individual behaviour results to the market clearing conditions of the
economy, which consequently determine the price. In a simpler way, there exists
a bidirectional relation, where the market clearing price is consistent with the in-
dividual decision rules, and decisions rules are consistent with the market clearing
price.
This result can become more comprehensible by the means of an example.
We pose the following question: How one can price a one period risk free bond,
within the representative agent framework? The pricing equation indicates how
price changes in response to expected growth of consumption. In general agents
would be willing to borrow more to increase their consumption level and prices
would depend on the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. With
high elasticity even small changes in expected growth would trigger large changes
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in equilibrium price. The pricing kernel in this case will be expressed as follows:
mt+1 = β
u′(ct+1)
u(ct)
(2.1)
where mt+1 denotes the pricing kernel.
We have analysed the case of a risk free asset. However, in real life most assets
are risky. Thus, it is interesting to know how price would be adjusted, when the
asset in the economy is for instance a one period defaultable bond. In this case
price can be expressed as follows:
qt = βE
u′(ct+1)
u(ct)
dt+1 (2.2)
where dt+1 denote the payouts.
This equation can be generally transformed as follows:
qt =
Edt+1
1 + rf
+ cov(mt+1, dt+1) (2.3)
where the second term captures the covariance of marginal utility and payouts.
Note that in the limited case of risk neutral agents this last term disappears and
consequently price is given only by the first component.
However, following the seminal work of Mehra and Prescott (1985), who sug-
gested that the pricing implications of the representative agent general equilib-
rium model are not consistent with observed U.S. data, economists realized that
an alternative modelling approach would be necessary. This puzzle that Mehra
and Prescott (1985)’s study revealed is the so called “equity premium puzzle”.
Essentially, this puzzle can be summarized in the following question. Why stocks
feature such a higher return if they are not so risky?
Our inability to address this question in a representative agent economy, led
us to the conclusion that a departure from the frictionless Arrow-Debreu setup is
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indispensable. In particular, heterogeneous agents models equipped with liquidity
or borrowing constraints, transaction costs etc. appear to be the appropriate
workhorse models. But how does the pricing kernel look like when heterogeneous
consumers populate the economy?
2.3.2 Heterogeneous Agents Asset Pricing
Asset pricing difficulties frequently arise in heterogeneous agents models, due to
the non-tractability of the pricing kernel. Only in some cases and under specific
assumptions the pricing kernel can be analytically pinned down and prices can
consequently be easily calculated.
The fundamental building block of finance is that financial markets do not
allow for any arbitrage opportunities that are not risky. Following this assump-
tion and the contributions of Ross (1976) and Harrison and Kreps (1979) one can
argue that there exists a positive random variable mt which satisfies the following
moment condition:
pt = E(mt+1Xt+1) (2.4)
where pt denotes a vector of asset prices and Xt represents a vector o payoffs, on
a set of assets. As explained in our previous discussion mt is known as the pricing
kernel.
The common characteristic of the pricing kernel amongst all the heterogeneous
agents models is that it is agent specific. In particular, it is given by the agent
specific intertemporal marginal rate of substitution. Telmer (1993) explains that
if individuals are at interior solutions to their allocation problems then this kernel
should satisfy equation 2.4.
For instance, Telmer (1993) studies asset pricing in a complete market hetero-
geneous agents economy and shows that individuals are able to diversify their risk
by riskless borrowing and lending. He further suggests that when restrictions are
applied in the pricing kernel, incomplete markets cannot explain the properties
of abnormal asset returns.
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Duffie et al. (1994) state that the joint hypothesis of incomplete consumption
insurance along with agents’ heterogeneity can enrich the implications of the
representative-agent model. A few studies supported the argument that economies
with uninsurable income risk and borrowing, can possibly replicate or come very
close to the case of complete-risk sharing.
Aiyagari and Gertler (1991) found that consumers in economies with unin-
surable risk could replicate the complete markets perfect risk sharing, even when
one accounts for transaction or other borrowing costs. However, Duffie et al.
(1994) suggested that when one relaxes the stationarity assumption of labour
to aggregate income, and without the use of borrowing constraints, transaction
costs, or unrealistic assumptions on bond supply, could change the implications
of a representative agent economy.
Lucas (1994) finds that when asset markets are closed entirely, the model can
replicate both the risk free and the equity premium. More findings of her study
suggests that asset prices will be similar to the representative agent economy.
We should note that the paper examines the above discussed ideas in an infinite
horizon model.
All the discussion of asset pricing in different contexts and alternative model
frameworks is of great interest, since it has major applications in different research
fields in economics. However, and as noted before, finding the general equilibrium
price, or pinning down the pricing kernel is not a trivial task in heterogeneous
agents and always requires a lot of assumptions. Frequently to face these dif-
ficulties, economists are forced to use computational techniques. For instance,
in the previous chapter we have used an iterative bisection method to solve for
the general equilibrium interest rate, since no closed form expression could be
available.
More importantly, in the particular class of models which are related to de-
faults or consumer bankruptcies the structure of the markets along with the pric-
ing equation, can significantly alter the generated model results. In the following
section we present a few studies with alternative pricing approaches along the
lines of this literature.
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2.3.3 Asset Pricing and Defaults
Krueger and Perri (2006) addresses the relation of consumption and income in-
equality. Their analysis takes place in a framework in which agents can trade a
full set of contingent consumption claims, while facing endogenously arisen con-
straints due to limited enforcement. Since households in this model trade a full
set of Arrow securities and markets are complete, prices are state and time depen-
dent, that is, they depend on the labour endowment history and time, reflecting
changes in the income process. Since in their framework assets are Arrow secu-
rities, that is, state contingent zero coupon bonds, the non arbitrage condition
implies that households should be indifferent between saving in risk-free capital
or constructing a risk-free asset by using the full set of Arrow securities. In their
framework price is described by the following relation:
qt(y
t, yt+1) =
pi(yt+1 | yt)
1 + rt+1
(2.5)
where pi(yt+1 | yt) denotes the transition probabilities of the Markov chain related
to the idiosyncratic part of the labour endowment process.
However, when financial markets are incomplete, agents cannot expunge com-
pletely the idiosyncratic risk (see Alvarez and Jermann (2000)). Due to this
reason, pricing kernels feature higher volatility compared to complete markets.
Thus, these models strongly depend on the available assets and they have limited
tractability, since fixed point theorems become very complicated when an infinite
number of agents and a lot of assets are present.
Furthermore, Alvarez and Jermann (2000) explain that in model economies
that agents have the option to default, risk sharing might be reduced since agents
with low income, will only borrow at most the amount that they will be able to
repay. Due to the introduced solvency constraints, default does not arise as an
equilibrium outcome. More importantly under their assumptions and the resulting
equilibrium definition, prices of securities are characterized by a simpler and more
intuitive representation.
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An important property of their pricing kernel is that one period contingent
claims are priced by the agent with the highest marginal rate of substitution. Prices
can be described by the following relation:
qa,t(z
t, z′) ≡ max
i∈I
β(z)
u′(ei,t+1(zt, z′))
u′(ei,t(zt))
pi(z′ | zt) (2.6)
This agent is essentially the non-constrained agent. In this manner, the price of
an Arrow security equals to the highest marginal valuation amongst all the agents.
Alvarez and Jermann (2000) finally show that interest rates are necessarily lower
when solvency constraints are present.
Arellano (2008) extends the approach of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and de-
velops a stochastic general equilibrium model with endogenous default risk. Her
model studies default events in a representative agent framework and loans are
supplied by international risk neutral lenders. Risk neutral pricing implies that
lenders break even in expected value in every bond contract. In particular, lenders
choose the amount of loans they will supply taking prices as given. The price of
a discount bond in this framework is equal to the risk adjusted opportunity cost.
This reflects the risk neutral compensation for a lower expected payoff. Price in
this environment depends on the size of new borrowing and the aggregate state.
In this manner price can be expressed in the following form:
q(B′, y) =
(1− δ(B′, y))
1 + r
(2.7)
where δ stands for the default probability that similarly to price depends on the
size of the loan and the aggregate state.
Different pricing approaches are also adopted in models that study consumer
bankruptcies. For instance Li and Sarte (2006) evaluates the effects of a reform
on bankruptcy legislation in United States. They use a general equilibrium model
with production where default option is available to households and markets are
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incomplete. They suggest that the complete elimination of bankruptcy would
induce welfare losses and output decline.
In Li and Sarte (2006)’s environment households can hold positive and neg-
ative assets, or more specifically they can have deposits and take loans. Default
on borrowing is strategic and the interest rate charged on debt it is assumed that
features a risk premium which prices the default probability. Contrariwise, de-
posits are safe and risk free. Furthermore, the presence of financial intermediary
that breaks even guarantees that an equilibrium with a positive endogenous risk
premium exists.
One drawback of their approach is that financial intermediaries price every
loan with the same price. Loan prices or alternatively their endogenous risk
premium does not depend neither on the size of the loan supplied nor on the
idiosyncratic income state.
Along the lines of the consumer bankruptcy literature, Chatterjee et al. (2007)
study a general equilibrium economy where households smooth consumption using
unsecured loans and a riskless asset. Financial intermediary is also present in their
economy, although the problem that it solves is different compared to the economy
of Li and Sarte (2006).
In Chatterjee et al. (2007)’s model, price is a function of the size of the loan
and some ex-ante individual household characteristics. Financial intermediaries
choose the number of loan contracts that will supply to households and they also
process capital that they rent to firms. Interestingly, in their model, price does
not depend on the idiosyncratic state of labour earnings.
However, in reality interest rates on loans depend on the size of the loan and
more importantly on a household’s labour income. Furthermore, deposit rate also
depends of the size of the deposit. Thus, it is interesting to model these features
in a general equilibrium production economy where default option is present.
In what follows, we try to bridge this gap in the existing literature by imple-
menting an Arellano (2008) type pricing, where in an analogous way even if the
framework is different bond prices also depend on the aggregate state. Her model
equivalent, adjusted to the heterogeneous households framework, would require
price to depend on the idiosyncratic income state.
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2.4 The Model Economy
Our model builds on the model of our previous chapter. In particular, we employ
an alternative way of asset pricing. We assume the presence of a financial inter-
mediary in the economy, that prices loans based on the size of a loan similarly
to Chatterjee et al. (2007). We extend the approach of Chatterjee et al. (2007)
by further allowing the price to depend on the idiosyncratic earnings state. This
implies that each loan is priced individually, based on its size and the current
realization of the idiosyncratic earnings shock.
Time in our model is discrete indexed by t ∈ (0, 1, . . . ,∞). Economy is pop-
ulated by a continuum of ex-ante identical infinitely lived households that are
distributed uniformly over [0, 1]. In the beginning of the period all households are
identical, since no ex-ante heterogeneity is present in our model. All households
face two types of risks, that is, unemployment risk and also conditional on being
employed they face acyclical earnings risk1. When households are unemployed
we assume they receive unemployment benefits which are defined as a fraction of
their potential labour earnings2. Households have time-separable preferences over
streams of consumption.
U(c0, c1, c2, . . .) = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct), (2.8)
where for each period t, ct is restricted to belong in C, the per period consumption
feasibility set of any individual household, which specifies non-negative consump-
tions. The discount factor β ∈ (0, 1) is common across all households. The period
utility function u(ct) is continuous, concave, strictly increasing, continuously dif-
ferentiable and satisfies the Inada conditions.
Households do not value leisure, and the time endowment is normalized to 1.
Since households face unemployment risk, we denote their employment status by
1More details regarding unemployment risk can be found on Krueger et al. (2016) and also
our previous chapter.
2This stems from the assumption that if a government was present in our model it would
implement a balanced budget unemployment insurance system.
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s ∈ S = {u, e}, where u denotes unemployment and e denotes employment. Let
pi(s′ | s) denote the transition of probabilities of the associated Markov chain. We
should note that these probabilities are iid across households.
Furthermore households face idiosyncratic labour earnings risk y ∈ Y that
follows a 12-state first order Markov process, with finite support Y . Let pi(y′ | y)
denote the transition probabilities from state y today to state y′ tomorrow. Note
that these probabilities are firstly iid across households and secondly independent
from the probabilities associated with unemployment risk. We further assume
that a law of large numbers holds, so that our problem is well defined (see Uhlig
(1996)).
There is one single good produced in the economy according to an aggregate
Cobb-Douglas production function that can either be consumed or invested.
Y = KαN1−α, (2.9)
where α captures the share of capital income in output and δ ∈ (0, 1) captures
the depreciation rate of capital, when it is used in production.
Furthermore the aggregate resource constraint in this economy could be ex-
pressed as follows:
F (K,N) = C + I = C +K ′ − (1− δ)K, (2.10)
where C denotes aggregate consumption, K represents the aggregate capital stock,
N is the labour input and δ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the depreciation rate of capital when
used in production.
2.4.1 The Market Structure
Firstly, markets are perfectly competitive. The real wage is given by w and the
rental rate on capital is given by r. Furthermore, households feature borrowing
and lending opportunities. They can take unsecured loans of different sizes. Sim-
ilarly to Chatterjee et al. (2007) we treat these loans as distinct financial assets.
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Households can default on their loans at any point of time, while default as in
our previous chapter is strategic. In this sense, it arises as a result of an optimal
household choice.
The default risk varies with the size of the loan. Furthermore, it varies with the
labour earnings idiosyncratic state and the individual employment or unemploy-
ment state. In this manner, we extend previous work in the consumer bankruptcy
literature and we differentiate from models as Li and Sarte (2006) and Chatterjee
et al. (2007). The model of Li and Sarte (2006) does not allow price to depend
on the size of the loan, while the model of Chatterjee et al. (2007) does not allow
price to depend on the idiosyncratic earnings state or unemployment state.
Households can take borrowing or saving decisions every period. However,
unlike in our previous chapter trade does not take place amongst households
directly, due to the presence of a financial intermediary. Households can purchase
a one-period non-contingent discount bond with a face value in the finite set
L ⊂ R.
We turn now to the description of the contract types. A purchase of a discount
bond with positive face value `′ implies that the individual household has entered
into a contract under which it will receive with certainty `′ units of consump-
tion good next period. In this sense deposits are assumed to be risk-free and
guaranteed.
We next discuss the risky borrowing contract. A purchase of a discount
bond with negative face value `′, individual labour earnings y and employment-
unemployment state s indicates that the individual household has entered into
contract under which, it will receive q(`′, y, s)(−`′) units of consumption good to-
day, promising to deliver, conditional on not defaulting −`′ units of consumption
good tomorrow.
It is important to note that the total financial assets available in the market
are NL · NY · NS where N denotes the cardinality of the associated sets. As we
mentioned before trade does not take place amongst households, thus households
can only purchase these bonds from financial intermediaries. We further assume
that households are indifferent between investing in physical capital, or investing
in bonds with positive face value. The underlying assumption of our statement is
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that unlike in Chatterjee et al. (2007)’s economy, financial intermediaries in our
model do not own capital and consequently do not rent capital to firms.
This structure implies that loan contracts are unenforceable, that is, any bor-
rower can default on his loan at any time period. Furthermore, default induces
a punishment that similarly to our previous chapter is described as temporary
exclusion from the credit market. A defaulted household will regain full access
to the credit market, with probability 1− θ ∈ (0, 1) and remain in a constrained
state with probability θ.
Furthermore, any household that has agreed on a loan contract with a finan-
cial intermediary decides whether to default or not based on the following value
functions:
V o(`, y, s) = max
{
V R(`, y, s), V D(0, y, s)
}
, (2.11)
where V R(`, y, s) is the value associated with repayment, V D(0, y, s) is the value
associated with defaulting, while V o(`, y, s) depicts the value of the option which
is always the maximum.
It is important to mention that households are still allowed to hold deposits
after the default event, or in other words they are allowed to save in a risk-free
asset. However, following the default event a proportion of a household’s labour
income will be seized. This could be simply modelled as a wage garnishment.
This default type resembles Chapter 13 bankruptcy in United States.
Under Chapter 13 bankruptcy law, a repayment plan is developed for around
five years. Monthly instalments are scheduled and being supported by a wage
garnishment. This garnishment simply acts as wage tax. In reality courts make an
estimation of five-year income based on current earnings. For simplicity we assume
that the amount of garnishment will be captured by a parameter γ ∈ (0, 1). In
line with the Federal Wage Garnishment Law and the Consumer Credit Protection
Act III, we assume that the amount of earnings that could be garnished cannot
exceed 25%.
Since our model differs only in the pricing approach and the default type,
compared to the model used in our previous chapter, we will only briefly describe
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the household’s problem. The reader for further details can refer to section 1.4.7
of our previous chapter.
2.4.2 Household’s Problem
The individual household’s problem is essentially to maximize expected discounted
lifetime utility derived from consumption subject to the associated budget and
borrowing constraints.
When households solve their optimisation problem, they take prices as given,
that is, the loan price, the wage and the deposit rate. Note that we only study
stationary recursive competitive equilibria. In this sense the distribution across
different states should be invariant, thus policy function will be time invariant.
We will first describe the problem of the unconstrained households and the
problem of constrained households3 will follow.
2.4.2.1 The Unconstrained Households
The states for an unconstrained household can be described by the level of loans or
deposits denoted by ` ∈ L ⊂ R, the labour earnings draw denoted by y ∈ Y ⊂ R+
and employment-unemployment draw denoted by s ∈ S ∈ [0, 1].
We denote by V R(`, y, s) the value function of a household that repays his
loan in the current period. We denote by V D(0, y, s) the current value associ-
ated with defaulting. Finally,we denote V o(`, y, s) the value of the option to be
unconstrained.
Let c be consumption in the current period and `′ denote the amount of loans
or deposits that a households optimally chooses. Furthermore, w is the household
wage, q(`′, y, s) is the price for a loan or a deposit, while 1s=u is an indicator
function which takes the value 1 when household is in the unemployed state4 and
0 otherwise. Following these definitions, the unconstrained household’s problem
could be presented as follows:
3The terms unconstrained and constrained households are described in detail in our previous
chapter. More details can be found in the studies of Li and Sarte (2006) and Athreya (2002)
4In this case labour earnings are equal to the unemployment benefits, which are defined as
a fraction of the average labour earnings, thus b(y) = ρwy.
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V R(`, y, s) = max
{c≥0,`′}
{u(c) + β
∑
(y′,s′)∈(Y,S)
pi(s′|s)pi(y′|y)V o(`′, y′, s′)} (2.12)
subject to
c+ q(`′, y, s)`′ = wy [1− (1− ρ)1s=u] + `
`′ ≥ −B (2.13)
Let now V C(`, y, s) denote the value function of a household that defaulted
on its loan and is currently borrowing constrained. In this case household is only
allowed to hold deposits while also facing the wage garnishment. In other words a
γ proportion of its labour earnings is garnished, thus the household only receives
1−γ. Following these definitions, the problem associated with the value of default
could be presented as follows:
V D(0, y, s) = max
{c≥0,`′≥0}
{u(c) + β
∑
(y′,s′)∈(Y,S)
pi(s′|s)pi(y′|y)V C(`′, y′, s′)} (2.14)
subject to
c+ q(`′, y, s)`′ = [1− γ]wy [1− (1− ρ)1s=u]
`′ ≥ 0 (2.15)
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2.4.2.2 The Constrained Households
We now turn to the problem of borrowing constrained households, that is, house-
holds that have defaulted in some previous period. Recall that we denote by θ
the exogenous probability related to the household remaining in the borrowing
constrained state5. Following these definitions the problem of constrained house-
holds could be presented as follows:
V C(`, y, s) = max
{c≥0,`′≥0}
{u(c) + β
∑
(y′,s′)∈(Y,S)
pi(s′|s)pi(y′|y)θV C(`′, y′, s′)
+(1− θ)V o(`′, y′, s′)}
(2.16)
subject to
c+ q(`′, y, s)`′ = [1− γ]wy [1− (1− ρ)1s=u] + `
`′ ≥ 0 (2.17)
where c denotes consumption in the current period and `′ denotes the amount
of deposits that a households optimally chooses. Furthermore, w is the household
wage, θ is the probability that a household will remain in the constrained state
and 1s=u is an indicator function which takes the value 1 when household is in
the unemployed state and 0 otherwise.
5The term borrowing constrained in this framework is related to no access to credit markets,
or in a simpler manner no ability to get loans.
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2.5 The Financial Intermediary
The financial intermediary in this economy is closely related to Chatterjee et al.
(2007)’s financial intermediaries with the difference that price also depends on the
idiosyncratic earnings and unemployment shocks (y, s). The intermediary chooses
the number of contracts n`t+1,yt,st ≥ 0 of type (`t+1, yt, st) to sell in each period, so
to maximize the present discounted value of current and future cash flows. The
maximisation problem can be presented as follows:
max
∞∑
t=0
1
1 + r − δpit (2.18)
where pit denotes profits at time t. Every period cash flow is given by the following
equation:
pit = `
+
t+1 − (1 + r − δ)`+t +
∑
`t,yt−1,st−1
n`−t,yt−1,st−1
`−t (1− p`t,yt−1,st−1)
+
∑
`t,yt,st
q`t+1,yt,stn`−t+1,yt,st
`t+1
(2.19)
Note that we have departed from the notation used in the previous pages of
this chapter, since it is more intuitive to think of the problem of the financial
intermediary in terms of time subscript t.
The probability that a loan of type (`t+1, yt, st) where obviously `t+1 < 0 will
default is plt,yt−1,st−1 . Deriving the first order conditions with respect to n`t+1,yt,st
we get the following result:
q`t+1,yt,st =

1
1 + r − δ if `t+1 ≥ 0
(1− p`t,yt−1,st−1)
1 + r − δ if `t+1 < 0
(2.20)
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2.6 Stationary Recursive Competitive Equilib-
rium
In this section we describe the equilibrium in our economy. As discussed before
we only consider stationary equilibria in the sense that the distribution of agents
across states is time invariant. However in the context of incomplete markets, un-
like in the complete markets case, households can still move across the earnings
or wealth distribution.
Description of Equilibrium
A stationary recursive equilibrium in our economy is a set of strictly positive
prices w∗,r∗, a non-negative loan price vector q∗, a non-negative default vector p∗
and strictly positive quantities of labour N∗ and capital K∗. Furthermore equi-
librium is characterized by a set of decisions rules `
′∗, d∗, c∗ for the unconstrained
group and a set of decision rules `
′∗, c∗ for the constrained group, a set of value
functions V R, V D, V C , V o and a set of probability measures µuc, µc such that:
(i) Taking prices as given, households policy functions solve their maximization
problems.
(ii) The labour market clears and N∗ is given by
N∗ = (1− Π∗(u))
∑
y∈Y
yΠ∗(y)
(iii) The goods market clears
Y ∗ = C∗ + δK∗ − γw∗
∫
L+×Y×S
ys dµc
where C∗ is given by
C∗ =
∫
L×Y×S
c∗(`, y, s)dµuc +
∫
L+×Y×S
c∗(`, y, s)dµc
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(iv) The asset markets clears and K∗ is given by
K∗ =
∫
L×Y×S
`′dµuc +
∫
L+×Y×S
`′dµc
Given the above stated conditions and since N∗ and K∗ are strictly positive,
the first order conditions for the firm imply:
w∗ = (1− α)
(
K∗
N∗
)α
r∗ = α
(
K∗
N∗
)α−1
− δ
and the first order conditions for the financial intermediary imply:
q∗`′,y,s =
(1− p∗`′,y,s)
1 + r∗ − δ
where the default probability is zero when `′ > 0. When `′ < 0 and the
optimal option is to choose default it is given by
p∗`′,y,s =
∫
pi(s′ | s)pi(y′ | y)1(`′ < 0, V o = V d)
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2.7 Calibration
The calibration in this model follows the strategy in the first chapter. Certain
parameters are left free while the others are calibrated to match key data statistics.
The risk aversion parameter, the capital share and the depreciation rate of capital
are all left free and have the same values as in the first chapter. These values are
given by σ = 3, α = 0.33 and δ = 0.035. All the calibrated parameter values are
reported in Table 2.7.1.
The time preference rate, β is calibrated to achieve a capital to output ratio
of 3. Our model delivers 2.97 with a β of 0.953. The probability of remaining
constrained, θ, and the labour garnishment rate, γ, is calibrated to match both the
mean exclusion period outside the market and the yearly Chapter 13 bankruptcy
filings.
According to the Fair Credit Reporting Act, bankruptcy filing remains on a
defaulted household’s record for 10 years. Furthermore, the US Courts admin-
istrative data for the personal cases during the 12 month Period ending Decem-
ber 31, 2009 gives a total bankruptcy filing amount of 1,420,000.6 The total
adult population, over the age of 20 years, measured from the US Census Bureau
Current Population Survey for the year 2009 is 215 million. Consequently, the
bankruptcy filing rate in the economy is 0.65%.
6http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports
89
Table 2.7.1: Calibrated Parameters
Description Parameter Value
Preferences
Households Discount Factor β 0.953
Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion σ 3
Technology
Capital Share α 0.33
Depreciation Rate of Capital δ 0.035
Defaults
Probability of Remaining Constrained θ 0.90
Labour Earnings Garnishment γ 0.20
Notes: This table reports the calibrated parameters for our benchmark model economy.
The calibrated value of θ and the labour garnishment rate γ that delivers
these statistics is 0.90 and 0.20. These values deliver a mean exclusion period of
10 years, equilibrium default rate of 0.64% and imply that 20% of your potential
earnings are taken away post-default.
The garnishment rate is consistent with the Federal Wage Garnishment Law
and the Consumer Credit Protection Act III which limit the income garnished at
25%.
The bounds for the debt/asset levels are motivated by the precautionary sav-
ings literature. Equilibrium in these models require the property that β(1 + r∗ −
δ) < 1.
As long as this constraint on the effective discount rate is satisfied, the mean
level of assets converges implying that an upper bound on the assets exists, lmax.
The debt limit lmin can be set to any value less than or equal to the largest debt
level that could be repaid by the employed household in the highest earnings state
facing the lowest possible interest rate, i.e., lmin ≤ [ymaxwmax].
Similarly to the first chapter, the unemployment/employment transition prob-
abilities are taken from the job finding and job losing rates in Current Population
Survey. The transition matrix is presented below and the calculation is based on
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average probabilities spanning the 2006 to 2014 time period.
piuu piue
pieu piee
 =
0.1700 0.8300
0.0420 0.9580

The earnings risk conditional on employment, as before, is discretized using a 12
state Markov chain following Civale et al. (2016) and is calibrated to match higher
order moments of log earnings estimated by Guvenen et al. (2015).
Finally the period utility function used for the computational solution of our
model is assumed to be a CRRA:
u(c) =
c1−σ
1− σ , (2.21)
where the parameter σ measures the degree of relative risk aversion.
2.8 Results
In this section we discuss key results obtained from the computational solution of
our model. Firstly, this involves a detailed discussion of the loan price schedule,
default probabilities and spreads. We further discuss the results related to sav-
ings policy functions and we establish the link between borrowing, defaults and
consumption behaviour.
In the second part of this section we discuss the behaviour of our economy in
equilibrium and the extent to which our generated model statistics could match
empirical facts in the U.S. economy. We provide arguments that support the idea
that our results are explainable in the light of our new pricing approach, that is,
the introduction of a financial intermediary in our economy. Finally, we highlight
all the distributional aspects of our model, by presenting the wealth distributions,
amongst different groups in our economy, namely employed households versus
unemployed households, as well as households with good credit record versus
households with bad credit record.
91
2.8.1 Loan Prices, Defaults and Policy Functions
Figure 2.8.1: Loan Price Schedule: This figure displays the loan price schedule for two
different realizations of labour earnings shocks for unemployed and employed households. The
realization is denoted as yLow, yHigh and is located on the north-west part of both graphs.
Figure 2.8.1 plots the price schedule which actually determines the set of loans that
each borrowing household can choose every period. The plot displays two different
realizations of labour earnings shocks, both for the employed and unemployed
state.
Firstly, we should observe that loan prices are an increasing function of assets.
In other words, the more indebted a household the lower the loan price, and the
higher the implied loan interest rate. This indicates that the cost of borrowing
is much higher for a household that already holds large amounts of debt. Impor-
tantly, the low income households face lower loan prices, thus higher borrowing
interest rates, compared to those households with higher income. This is because,
households with low income are considered as more risky from financial intermedi-
aries, since they face higher probability to default. Since in our model loan prices
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depend on three factors, that is, the size of loan, the idiosyncratic income state
and the employment/unemployment state, the result presented in figure 2.8.1 is
anticipated.
Financial intermediaries are risk neutral and loan prices are based on the
probability that a household with certain income characteristics and employment
status will default. In the right panel of figure 2.8.2, it is evident that default
probability is much higher for households being in a low income state. Amongst
heavily indebted households, that is households that hold above 160% of their
income in debt, those with low income face 2.5 times higher probability to default.
Figure 2.8.2: Loan Spread and Default Probability: The right panel of this figure
displays default probability for two different realizations of labour earnings shocks. The left
panel of this figure presents the loans spread for two different realizations of labour earnings
shocks. The realization is denoted as yLow, yHigh and is located on the north-east part of both
graphs.
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Figure 2.8.3: Savings Function Employed Vs. Unemployed: The right panel of this
figure displays the optimal savings,conditional on not defaulting, for employed households as a
function of assets to income ratio for two different realizations of labour earnings shocks. The
left panel presents optimal savings for unemployed households. The realization is denoted as
yLow, yHigh and is located on the north-west part of both graphs.
We further observe that households having a debt to income ratio less than
140% face high prices, that is, the loan interest rates are very low. Financial
intermediaries perceive that these households is highly unlikely to default, hence
they are offering loan contracts with a very low spread, as can be observed in the
left panel of figure 2.8.2.
Indeed households with debt to income ratio less than 140% do not default in
our model. This is because the service cost of debt is very low. Thus, the value of
repayment under any income realization or any employment status, exceeds the
value of default. In contrast to our previous chapter model, savings (deposits) are
not risky, thus the generated return is much lower, around 3%.
The outside option is not appealing when the interest rate charged for a loan is
very close to savings rate. Note that in our model framework, defaulted borrowers
are allowed to save following the default event. However, savings with low interest
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rates do not appear to be an appealing alternative, when the service cost of debt
is very low. This directly lessens the default incentives of households and thus
results in less default decisions.
Note that our model delivers countercyclical debt limits, in the sense that
higher income households borrow less than their lower income counterparts, as
we can see in figure 2.8.3. In support of this argument is the observed fact
that households with almost zero assets and high earnings choose to save, while
low income households with the same asset level still choose to borrow. This
is because precautionary borrowing serves as a means of consumption smoothing
for households in the low income state. Contrariwise, high-income households
develop a precautionary savings behaviour.
High spreads for heavily indebted households in the left panel of figure 2.8.2
reflect their high default risk captured by the high default probability. Indeed
these households in our model optimally decide to default. This is because the
service cost of debt becomes extremely high and consequently triggers defaults.
Essentially a borrowing household in our model has two instruments to control
his consumption path. Firstly, a household can borrow in bad times, that is,
periods in which unemployment or a low income state is realized so to maintain
its consumption in a satisfactory level. Secondly when interest rates become very
high and indebtedness is deep, a household should default, to achieve even the
minimum level of consumption.
For a better illustration of our argument, we can think of a heavily indebted
household that faces either bad income realization or transits to unemployment.
In this case, household’s wealth would be very small. In particular, in our model
environment, wealth would be negative. In other words, no savings that could
be utilised to boost consumption are available. The optimal behaviour of the
borrowing household would be to borrow heavily in order to restrain his con-
sumption. Indeed, as confirmed by figure 2.8.3, low income households choose to
borrow more even when they are heavily indebted.
However the willingness of the household to borrow might not be accompanied
by the availability of such financial contracts. This is the case in our model
environment when a household is close to the borrowing limit. Household’s only
alternative under such circumstances is to default. This further explains why in
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these class of models default incentives are lower in low states and higher in high
states. Low income households would be willing to borrow as long as supply of
credit is available to them and postpone defaulting to the future, when better
income shocks might be realized. Thus, we could argue that the marginal dis-
utility of default is higher for low income households compared to those with
high income. In a simpler way, in consumption terms default is less costly for
households with high disposable income, under the model assumption that a good
state is more persistent, i.e. when a household is currently, the probability that
will remain employed next period, than the probability to become unemployed.
2.8.2 Equilibrium Economy and Model Statistics
An interesting feature of our model is that it matches very well key statistics of
the U.S. economy. The model successfully reproduces macro, distributional and
households bankruptcy statistics. It is important to mention that our alterna-
tive pricing approach employed in this chapter, had significantly enhanced the
distributional results of our model.
In particular, by adopting the assumption that borrowing/savings does not
take place via the trade of a bond amongst households, yet with the presence of
a financial intermediary, we achieved to generate different borrowing and savings
rate in our economy and make savings risk free. This had a significant effect, for
instance in the accuracy of our generated statistics related to the last quintile of
our net worth distribution.
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Table 2.8.1: The Benchmark Model Economy
Economy U.S Data Model II Model I
Capital-to-output-ratio 2.9 2.97 2.67
Consumption-to-output-ratio 0.69 0.74 0.80
Negative Net Worth Households (%) 14 17.9 11.6
Non-Positive Net Worth Households (%) 18.1 19 18.9
Wealth Gini Index 0.85 0.76 0.795
Income Gini Index 0.55 0.50 0.64
Bankruptcy Filings(%) 0.65 0.64 7.4*
Household Debt-to-GDP-Ratio(%) 17.7 9.8
Notes1: This table reports the equilibrium results of our benchmark economy, called Model
II, the chapter I model results called Model I, and compares with values of the relevant
variables in the U.S. economy. For the variable Bankruptcy filings, we have reported the
default rates for Model I. We do not distinguish between debt and assets in Model I so there
is no equivalent value for the household debt/GDP ratio.
Notes2: Household Debt-to-GDP-Ratio is calculated in U.S. Data, by using consumer credit
to GDP ratio in the U.S. This ratio in the last 10 years ranges between 17% and 18%. The
ratio reported in the above table refers to 2012.
Figure 2.8.4: Wealth Distribution Quintiles: This figure presents the quintiles of the
wealth distribution generated by our model. Values depict the share of aggregate wealth held
by each quintile of households in our economy.
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Figure 2.8.4 plots the obtained wealth distribution quintiles. In comparison
with the first chapter, the third, fourth and fifth distribution quintiles are now
much closer the data. In data, these quintiles are respectively, 0.033, 0.10 and 0.86.
This better fit is because, in this model, deposit rate is much lower, compared to
our previous chapter, since deposits are safe and guaranteed by the financial inter-
mediary. In figure 2.8.4 we observe that the last quintile of the model generated
wealth distribution holds around 67% of total wealth, while its empirical counter-
part is around 86%. A better fit is possible if we enrich the household’s portfolio
with other financial and durable assets. This would ensure that agents belonging
to the top part of the distribution would have enough savings alternatives and
thereby higher wealth relative to the negative net worth households.
It is apparent from Table 2.2 that the inclusion of financial intermediaries and
risk-neutral pricing had an impact more on the default or bankruptcy filings and
not the wealth/income distribution quintiles. Despite the improvement in income
GINI, the wealth GINI now under-predicts actual inequality in the data. 7
With low deposit rate, households firstly do not have strong incentives to de-
fault and secondly the precautionary savings channel for households with a low
income realization weakens. The outside option, namely the option to save follow-
ing the default event is not so appealing, given the low deposit rate environment.
This explains why less households are located in the last quintile of the distri-
bution, and thus long right tails are present. This results in the high share of
aggregate wealth being owned by households in the last quintile of the wealth
distribution.
The model generates a household debt/gdp ratio of 9.8% while its empirical
counterpart is 17.7%. Note that in our economy there exist earnings and debt
states, where the interest rate charged from the financial intermediary equals the
risk free interest rate. When households find themselves in these states they find
optimal to borrow and not to save. Indeed, real world observations show that
a very low interest rate environment fosters borrowing and thus accumulation
of debt. In other words, when borrowing is very cheap everyone has stronger
7This means that a better calibrated NMAR process controlling for the persistence parameter
ρ could shed some light on getting better fit of the wealth distribution.Calibration of an adequate
NMAR process relevant to mimic the U.S. wealth distribution is left for future work.
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incentives to borrow, while when borrowing is very expensive default incentives
increase for heavily indebted households, and the outside option becomes more
appealing.
Furthermore our model successfully replicates defaults in U.S., and in particu-
lar, bankruptcy filings. Our model generates filings of 0.64% while its counterpart
in data is 0.65%.8 From a theoretical perspective, it is interesting to note that
this model delivers relatively low defaults in equilibrium. This can primarily be
explained due to the presence of a financial intermediary, that prices optimally
every loan, handling it as a distinct financial asset.
As we have previously explained, the vector of prices depends on the size of
the loan, and the two idiosyncratic states. This implies that the intermediary
prices in all the available information, and offers a loan contract under a price
that essentially reflects the default probability of this particular loan contract, or
in other words the default probability of the specific household. As a consequence
defaults are minimized in equilibrium.
The second mechanism that underlies our model, affecting default incentives
and contributing to the low defaults in equilibrium is the outside option. The
risk-free interest rate/ deposit rate generated in equilibrium is 3%. This implies
that the returns on savings are not high, while borrowing in some idiosyncratic
states and levels of indebtedness is very cheap. This urges households to increase
their borrowing and also strengthens their repayment incentives, making default
option less attractive.
8The bankruptcy filing rates are genuine model predictions obtained endogenously in equi-
librium and not a results of calibration.
99
Figure 2.8.5: Wealth Histogram - Good vs Bad Credit History Households: This
figure depicts the net wealth to average income distribution of households with Good Credit
History (i.e. No Default) and the distribution of households with Bad Credit History (i.e
Default). On x− axis we express net wealth as a ratio of average income, while on y− axis the
mass of households at each level of wealth is depicted.
In addition our model has a good performance with respect to income in-
equality, measured by the associated gini index. In particular, the model delivers
a Gini index of 0.50 while the associated value in data is 0.43. This result is
mainly driven by the fact that our earnings process is exogenously specified to
match the moments of Guvenen et al. (2015). However, in our income definition
there exists an endogenous part, namely the asset returns. In this sense, we could
argue that our model does not distort the earnings inherent to our exogenously
specified earnings process, while also correctly identifies the appropriate asset
returns so that the Gini index will be close to the observed data values.
We finally turn to the discussion related to the wealth distribution amongst
households with good credit history, that is, households that have never defaulted,
and bad credit history, namely households that are constrained in equilibrium. The
shape of our model generated wealth distribution closely resembles the distribu-
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tion of Chatterjee et al. (2007). The distribution for households with good credit
history is right skewed and features a long right tail. Unconstrained households
experience higher values of wealth to income ratio compared to the constrained
households that are concentrated around zero. Our model suggests that a signif-
icant amount of the population has very low wealth. Note that a considerable
amount of the population, 17.9% has negative wealth. In this manner, our model
successfully replicates novel empirical findings which suggest that around 14% of
the population in United States has negative net worth. This issue raises major
concerns to the policy makers, since these households are very vulnerable to any
unanticipated shock. Furthermore, it is evident that a small fraction of house-
holds holds most of wealth as also witnessed by the wealth quintiles presented
in figure 2.8.4. We further find that around 5.35% of households is constrained
in equilibrium, which indicates that a significant fraction of households in the
economy do not have or have very limited access to credit, due to their bad credit
history.
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Figure 2.8.6: Wealth Histogram - Unemployed vs Employed Households: This
figure presents the net wealth to average income distribution of employed (right panel) and
unemployed (left panel) households. On x − axis we express net wealth as a ratio of average
income, while on y − axis the mass of households at each level of wealth is depicted.
Since we are also interested in the composition of this wealth distribution by
employed and unemployed households, we present Figure 2.8.6. Clearly, unem-
ployed households have on average less wealth than employed households. This
can be mainly seen as a low income effect. Unemployed households experience
much lower income levels compared to employed. Thus accumulation of wealth
is arduous, since unemployment benefits might even not be sufficient to attain
a low level of consumption. This indicates that idiosyncratic shocks are impor-
tant determinants of wealth inequality, indebtedness or very low wealth levels.
Households that experience “life events” captured in our model from employment-
unemployment status, are usually financially distressed, have negative levels of
wealth and are willing to live in a state of limited consumption such that they
maintain their access to credit. These households that represent in our model
economy a significant fraction of the population, also borrow under very high in-
102
terest rates, since their default probability is very high. This combination of very
high interest rates, heavy indebtedness and bad “life events”, explains the failure
of policy makers to tackle inequality successfully.
2.9 Conclusion
In this chapter we accomplished the following goals. Firstly we overcame some
of the limitations inherent to the model of our previous chapter, by introducing
a risk-neutral financial intermediary. By allowing the price vector to depend on
the size of the loan, the idiosyncratic income state, and the employment status of
the households, we generated different interest rates for savings and borrowing.
We introduced a novel feature, that is, financial intermediaries take into account
the households characteristics, captured by the two idiosyncratic shocks.
Secondly, we have showed that this model serves as a successful variant of the
model developed in our previous chapter, since it successfully replicates key U.S.
statistics related to wealth inequality, income inequality, bankruptcy filing rates,
as well as main macroeconomic aggregates in the U.S. economy. It particularly
delivers good results related to the share of wealth that each quintile of the wealth
distribution holds, as well as the income Gini Index.
Thirdly, we construct an equilibrium in which the risk-free interest rate is low,
thus default incentives are lower, due to the less attractive outside option. This
mechanism delivers much lower default rates in equilibrium and is of particular
interest, since it highlights the importance of meticulous pricing from the side of
financial intermediaries.
Our results in the first two chapters indicate that non-collateralized debt and a
risk-neutral financial intermediary can capture well the left-tail of the distribution.
However, for an adequate description of the right tails, the number and type of
assets available for households needs to be enriched. A richer model of portfolio
holdings possibly with durable assets like housing and an appropriately calibrated
NMAR process will be better suited for this task. This is left as a future exercise.
Finally, our results can serve as a theoretical pillar to the increasing wealth
inequality and the large fraction of households in the United States that experience
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negative wealth, while economy accumulates debt and precautionary borrowing
behaviour is present.
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“The unified character of
mathematics lies in its very
nature; indeed, mathematics is the
foundation of all exact natural
sciences”.
David Hilbert (1862-1943)
This Appendix is meant to formalize the mathematical properties of our model
economy in the first and second chapters. We restate the definition of the equi-
librium in a more formalized way and describe its existence. We then proceed to
the details of the computational algorithm used in the first two chapters along
with the conditions for robustness.
2.A Existence of the Equilibrium
This section characterizies the conditions under which an equilibrium exists in
our model economy. There are three markets in our model: the labor market, the
asset market and the aggregate goods market. Equilibrium in the labor market is
trivial since the aggregate labor supply is exogenous and labor demand is strictly
decreasing in wages. Equilibrium in the resource constraint follows directly from
the equilibrium in the other two markets by Walras’ law (also proved in Chatterjee
et al. (2007)). Before we discuss the asset market equilibrium conditions, we first
specify the sets, functional spaces and the underlying measure used in our model.
These would help understand the properties of our equilibrium. Where necessary,
we also briefly describe the mathematical theorems used. The material detailed
here would be self-sufficient to understand all the mathematical properties of our
model.
The individual in our economy is characterized by the pair (`, y, s) - the in-
dividual states. Let µ be the distribution of agents across states, this includes
both the unconstrained and constrained types, µ = µuc + µc. For the purposes of
our model, we need this measure to be a probability measure. We now describe
a mathematical structure which would produce this desired measure.
Define ` ≡ [−B, `max] as the compact set of possible asset holdings. The
minimum bound, or the debt limit, is defined as any value less than or equal to the
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maximum earnings of the luckiest household (ymax.smax.w) so this is the largest
debt level that could be repaid by the luckiest household facing the lowest possible
interest rate. The maximum bound exists as long as the effective discount rate is
less than unity. This upper bound arises due to the fact that increasing wealth
implies that the coefficient of variation of income goes to zero and thereby the
role of consumption smoothing disappears. Define Y ≡ {y1, y2, y3 . . . yN1} and
S ≡ {s1, s2, s3 . . . sN2} as countable sets containing the stochastic endowments
of labour earnings and unemployment risks, respectively.9 A finite cardinality of
these countable sets implies that we are dealing with finite state Markov processes.
The state space of the model is defined as the Cartesian product of these three
sets, S ≡ L×Y ×S with Borel σ algebra B and a typical subset (L×Y×E). The
space (S ,B) is a measurable space, and for any set S ∈ B, µ(S) is the measure
of agents in the set S. The set of all probability measures over (S ,B) is denoted
as χ.
To understand how individuals transit across the asset, earnings and unem-
ployment states over times, we need to define a transition function. We define
Q((`, y, s),L × Y × S) as the probability that an individual agent with current
state (`, y, s) transits to the set L×Y ×S next period. In other words, following
Stokey et al. (1989), the transition function can be explicitly defined as follows:
Theorem 2.A.1. Transition Function: Let (S ,B) be a measurable space. A
transition function is a function Q : S × B → [0, 1] such that:
(i.) for each ` ∈ S , Q(`, .) is a probability measure on (S ,B); and
(ii,) for each L ∈ B, Q(., L) is a B measurable function.
In our model, the transition function is expressed as follows:
Q((`, y, s),L × Y × S) =
∑
y′∈Y,s′∈S
1{`′(`, y, s) ∈ L}pi(y′|y)pi(s′|s) (2.22)
where 1 is the indicator function which takes the value 1 when the optimal
savings policy `′(`, y, s) lies inside the asset set, L, and 0 otherwise. The transition
9A set is called countable (or countably infinite) if it has the same cardinality as N. Equiv-
alently, a set A is countable if it can be enumerated in a sequence, i.e., if all of its elements can
be listed as a sequence a1, a2, . . .. A set is called uncountable if it is infinite and not countable.
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probabilities for the two idiosyncratic states are denoted by pi(y′|y) and pi(s′|s).
Thus Q is the transition function defined on the measurable space (S ,B).
Any transition function in this space is associated with an operator defined on
the probability measures over this space. Formally, for any probability measure
µ on (S ,B), the operator T ∗ associated with it gives:
µ′(L × Y × S) = T ∗(µ) =
∫
L×Y×S
Q((`, y, s),L × Y × S)dµ(`, y, s) (2.23)
Our definition of a stationary recursive competitive equilibrium then
requires that this probability measure of agents in the economy be invariant, i.e.,
for all (`, y, s) ∈ B, the invariant probability measure satisfies
µ∗(`, y, s) =
∫
L×Y×S
Q((`, y, s),L × Y × S) (2.24)
We have now established the mathematical structure of our model, the exis-
tence of an equilibrium here depends on three key properties:(1.) Compactness
of the state space (2.) Continuity of the measure with respect to the interest rate
(implying continuity of supply) and (3.) Monotonicity of the asset supply. We
start our analysis by specifying the demand and supply functional that clear our
asset market.
Compactness- Demand for Capital. The necessary condition for optimal
choice of the firm gives us the aggregate capital,
K(r) = F−1k (r + δ)
The Cobb-Douglas production function ensures that the demand for capital is a
continuous, strictly decreasing function of the interest rate:
K(r) =
( αL
δ + r
) 1
1−α
Supply of Capital.The aggregate supply of capital is the sum of assets sup-
plied by the measure of unconstrained and constrained agents:
K =
∫
L×Y×S
`′(`, y, s; r)dµuc +
∫
L+×Y×S
`′(`, y, s; r)dµuc (2.25)
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The existence of the equilibrium then depends on proving the continuity of the
two supply functions in the right hand side of the above equation. Convergence
properties for the policy functions is best understood by examining the first order
optimality conditions for the general model:
u′(ct) = β
(1
q
)
Et[u
′(ct+1)] + λt (2.26)
where λt denotes the Lagrangian multiplier on the borrowing constraint. This
condition implies the Euler equation
u′(ct) ≥ β(1 + r)Et[u′(ct+1)], 1 + r = 1/q (2.27)
Inspecting the Euler equation it is clear that the asset accumulation is going
to be shaped by two forces: the effective rate of time preference β(1 + r) and
labor income risk. The higher the rate of time preference, β(1 + r), the more
agents prefer to accumulate wealth since they prefer future consumption. The
idiosyncratic labor income risk fuels further their accumulation motives to insure
their consumption against bad income realisations in the future.
The time horizon in our model is infinite, if T is finite, the boundedness of
both ct and a
′
t is trivial since the effective rate of time preference for any t > T
is zero. In the case of infinite horizon, the convergence properties as described
above depends on both the effective rate of time preference and the nature of
risk. In the absence of risk, when income fluctuations are deterministic, the Euler
equation clearly implies convergence of both consumption and savings as long as
β(1 + r) < 1. In the presence of stochastic income, we need to rely on a useful
supermartingale theorem.
Multiplying both sides of eq. (2.27) by βt(1 + r)t and defining Mt ≡ βt(1 +
r)tu′(ct) > 0, the Euler eq. (2.27) can be written as
Mt ≥ EtMt+1 (2.28)
which asserts that Mt follows a supermartingale (a ≤ bounded martingale).We
can then apply Doob’s supermartingale convergence theorem for non-negative
stochastic processes.
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Theorem 2.A.2. Let (S ,B, µ) be a probability space and X = (Xn)n≥0 be a su-
permartingale which is bounded in L1, i.e., supnE[|Xn|] <∞. Then Xn converges
a.s. towards an a.s. finite limit.
By this theorem, the nonnegative stochastic process converges almost surely
to a non-negative random variable M , i.e.,
lim
t→∞
Mt = M <∞
Existence of a Stationary Distribution µ∗- To understand the continuity
of the asset supply function, we need to first clarify under what conditions does
the invariant measure expressed in eq. 2.24 exists or in other words the associate
operator T ∗ defined by
(T ∗(µ))(L × Y × S) =
∫
L×Y×S
Q((`, y, s),L × Y × S)dµ(`, y, s) (2.29)
has a unique fixed point. This requires firstly that the transition function Q to
satisfy the Feller property.
Theorem 2.A.3. Feller Property-: A transition function Q on (S ,B) has
the Feller property if the associated operator T maps the space of bounded
continuous functions on S into itself; that is T : C(S ) → C(S ), where C(.)
denotes continuous functions.
This property basically means that the operator maps a continuous and bounded
function into itself. Since the domain of the asset space is compact, the savings
policy function `′(`, y, s) is continuous and bounded implying that the Feller prop-
erty is easily satisfied. However, the Feller property is not sufficient in ensuring
the uniqueness of the invariant distribution. We have to resort to the Monotone
Mixing Condition to guarantee this.
Continuity and the Monotone Mixing Condition- This condition essen-
tially means that there should exist a positive probability to transit from `max,
the highest asset level to some intermediate asset level in a finite N periods and
an equally high probability to transit from the minimum asset level (−B) to an
intermediate asset level in N periods.
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The theorem, stated by Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992), in a simplified version
is as follows:
Theorem 2.A.4. Monotone Mixing Condition- If Q is a transition function
and it is increasing on the (ordered) measurable space (S ,B), there exists T ∗ ∈
S , δ > 0 and N such that
PN(d, {T : T ≤ T ∗}) > δ and PN(c, {T : T ≥ T ∗}) > δ (2.30)
then the operator T ∗ has a unique fixed point µ and for all µ0 ∈ χ the sequence of
measures defined by
µn = (T
∗)nµ0 (2.31)
converges weakly to µ.
An underlying assumotion behind this theorem is that (S ,≥) is an ordered
space, where the order is defined as
T ≥ T ′ iff
{(T1 ≥ T ′1 ) and (T2 = T ′2 )
or (T ′ = c = (−`′, y1, s1))
or (T = d = (`max, yN , sN))}
(2.32)
This closed order along with the Euclidean metric is a compact metric space,
where we have denoted ≥ as a closed order, c ∈ S and d ∈ S are the smallest
and the largest elements in S , under order ≥, and (S ,B) is a measurable space.
Furthermore, we have defined PN{T ,S } as the probability of transiting from
state T to S in N steps. From our previous discussions, the first statement, that
Q is a transition function, of this theorem is direct. The assumption that this
function is also increasing means that in Stokey et al. (1989)’s words
Theorem 2.A.5. Monotonicity of Transition Function: A transition func-
tion Q on (S ,B) is monotone if the associated operator T has the property that
for every nondecreasing function f : Z → R, the function Tf is also nondecreas-
ing.
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it is monotonic and coupled with the fact that the savings policy function is
increasing in the state space leads us to conclude that the transition function is
also increasing. Convergence is then given by
Theorem 2.A.6. Monotone Convergence Theorem: If {fn} is a monotone
increasing sequence of functions in a space of nonnegative measurable real valued
functions on (S ,B, µ) converging pointwise to f then∫
fdµ = lim
n→∞
∫
fndµ
In an informal sense, the monotone mixing condition is satisfied in general
dynamic models which require invariant distributions whenever the agent starting
from a low level of assets gets hit by a sequence of long stream of bad shocks,
the agent will deleverage debt until some neighbourhood of the lower bound is
reached. The motive for the agent to decumulate assets comes from the agent’s
information that this low sequence of income realisations is well below average,
permanent income is higher and consumption follows the permanent income.
The conclusion of the Monotone Mixing Condition Theorem is that existence
of an invariant measure can be guaranteed by iterating on the operator T ∗.
The Default Decision and Existence of Equilibrium- Our discussion un-
til now was in a more general sense, to standard Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari (BHA)
models, and we did not consider the influence of default decisions. However,
our model as in Chatterjee et al. (2007) extends these BHA models to include
the possibility of defaults. Agents can choose optimally whether to repay their
debt obligations or default on them. These decisions are made period by period.
The presence of discrete decision making means that our mappings are not func-
tions but correspondences. Informally, discrete choices imply that agents can be
indifferent between different states such as being in the unconstrained or the con-
strained state. In other words, the value functions and policy functions map the
state space system not to a point but a set. Chatterjee et al. (2007) proves that
the optimal policy in these models is compact valued and upper hemi-continuous.
This means that the measurable selection theorem of Stokey et al. (1989) can be
applied to guarantee the existence of measurable policy functions for consumption,
asset holdings and default decisions. Transition functions and the existence of an
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invariant measure of agents can be implemented by the appropriate construction
of measurable spaces and continuity arguments.
Now that we have completely described the mathematical structure our model
is based on, we move on to the details of our computational algorithm.
2.B Computation of the Equilibrium
In this section, we describe the numerical procedures used to compute the gen-
eral equilibrium in our model. Our model involves a continuum of agents facing
idiosyncratic uninsurable shocks who have to decide their level of consumption,
savings and default decisions bsaed on an infinite time horizon. The inherent
non-linearities and the theoretical complications involved in the existence of a
unique equilibrium means that we have to resort to numerical procedures. We
use a variety of standard tools to achieve this task. The high dimensionality of
our model implies that it is computationally cumbersome. We modify existing
procedures to accommodate the complexities and to lower the processing time
while not sacrificing on accuracy and robustness.
Our algorithm involves a number of steps. We start by discretizing the state
space S and then proceed to value function iteration to get the optimal pol-
icy functions. These optimal policy functions along with the exogenous markov
processes are used to obtain the invariant distribution of agents in the economy.
Finally, we implement a modified bisection method to capture the market clearing
prices.
2.B.1 Discretization of the state space
The state space S of our model is discretized into finite intervals in a grid. The
bounds of the grids are motivated by the theory discussed in the previous section.
Minimum and maximum bounds for assets are chosen to ensure the convergence
of asset supply. The exogenous shocks are discretized using a finite state Markov
process. The labor endowment shocks have a cardinality of N = 12 while the
unemployment/employment state naturally have 2 states. The associated proba-
bilities for the employment/unemployment transition matrix is obtained from the
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empirical data as described in the main text while that of the endowment shock
is discretized by approximating the NMAR process as described in Civale et al.
(2016). The number of points in the grid is chosen optimally ensuring that the
aggregates do not change when it is any more finer. Furthermore, we include more
points in the borrowing part, especially in the neighbourhood of zero since the
defaulted agents are reallocated to this point in the state space. Consequently,
we expect and deliver a substantial mass of agents with zero assets validating our
approach.
2.B.2 Numerical Algorithm
Our model as in other Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari models, solution involves a num-
ber of steps, which we present below.
(i) Value Function must be solved in order to obtain the optimal policy rules
(ii) Optimal policy functions and the exogenous Markov process, are used for
the approximation of the steady-state agents’ distribution.
(iii) Using some moments (usually only the mean) of the distribution we find
the aggregate variables.
(iv) Market clearing conditions are assessed under a given price.
(v) If market clearing does not hold, the process from (i)-(iv) is repeated for
different prices, until general equilibrium is found.
The challenge of this algorithm is that every step involves numerical errors. For
instance if numerical errors occur in the value function solution, this in turn will
affect the convergence of the agents’ distribution, where if we achieve convergence
more errors will accumulate, causing convergence difficulties for price iteration
and hence general equilibrium.
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Computation of the Stationary Equilibrium
For computing the stationary equilibrium of our economy, we modify the al-
gorithm presented in Heer and Maußner (2005) for the computation of stationary
equilibrium of an Heterogeneous-Agents economy. Our modified algorithm is as
follows
(A) Compute the invariant labor supply.
(B) Make an initial guess for the interest rate r.
(C) Place a grid on asset space such that more points exist in the negative
interval of the grid.
(D) Compute wage rate w and the capital stock K.
(E) Compute household’s decision functions including the default probabilities
and the loan pricing schedule.
(F) Compute the invariant distribution of agents for all the idiosyncratic states.
(G) Compute aggregate asset holdings and check the aggregate consistency con-
ditions.
(H) Update the interest rate if the market does not clear.
Step1: Dicretized Value Function Iteration and Optimal Policy Func-
tions
The algorithm for discretized value function iteration is trivial and it is does
not involve any difficulties in achieving convergence of the value function and ob-
tain the policy rules.
Step2: Computation of the Invariant Density Function
The approximation of the agents distribution function relies upon the dis-
cretization of the state space. The asset grid should be finer, than the one used
for the value function iteration for finding the policy rules. The algorithm can be
described as follows
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(A) Place a grid on the asset space A such that the grid is finer than the one
used to to compute the optimal decision rules.
(B) Set i = 0. Choose initial discrete density functions f0(, a) where  is the
idiosyncratic shock and a the asset holdings evaluated on the constructed
grid.
(C) Set fi+1(, a) = 0 for all  and a. For every a ∈ A and every idiosyncratic
shock , compute the optimal next period wealth aj−1 ≤ a′ ≤ aj. In turn,
for all a′ ∈ A and ′ compute the following sums
fi+1(
′, aj−1) =
∑

∑
a∈A
aj−1≤a′≤aj
pi(′|) aj − a
′
aj − aj−1fi(, a)
fi+1(
′, aj) =
∑

∑
a∈A
aj−1≤a′≤aj
pi(′|) a
′ − aj−1
aj − aj−1fi(, a)
(D) Iterate until f converges.
This algorithm requires almost half computational time compared to the clas-
sical algorithm, where we aim to compute the invariant distribution via the com-
putation of the inverse of the decision rule. Furthermore, computing the inverse of
decision rule does not guarantee convergence in complex models like ours (where
the optimal decision rules are computed via VFI and not Euler equation, due to
the presence of the discrete default choice).
Step3: Calculate Aggregate Variables and Evaluate Market Clear-
ance
Having calculated the stationary agents’ distribution of assets we are able to
find the aggregate variables in economy. We achieve that by taking the weighted
sum using the above found distribution as weights. The evaluation of market
clearing is just the evaluation of asset market clearing condition, just requiring
the related error to be less than a very low value.
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Evaluating the market clearance can be implemented using two methods, a
bisection method and a grid search method. These algorithms are described in
the following section.
Algorithm I - Bisection for Asset Market Clearing Bisection methods
are used to solve function equations of the form f(x) = 0 for x ∈ [a, b], where the
function is assumed to be continuous and as long as f(a) and f(b) are of opposite
sign, the intermediate value theorem says that there is a x∗ in the interval of a to
b such that f(x∗) = 0. Essentially, the bisection constructs a series of shrinking
intervals Ij, j = 1, 2, . . . that bracket the solution to a desirable degree. The
problem of finding an interest rate that would clear the asset market in our model
can be naturally mapped to the bisection approach.
Continuous and monotonic asset demand and supply functionals imply that
intervals of switching signs are easily obtained. Prices can be naturally adjusted
according to excess demand or excess supply criterion. A higher interest rate
would increase savings and thus asset supply while lowering capital demand and
vice-versa.
The Bisection method unlike other approaches such as Newton-Raphson or
Gauss-Seidel is derivative free and hence widely applicable and easier to imple-
ment. The purpose of this algorithm is to approximate a solution to the market
clearing conditionK(r)−`′(r) = 0 for interest rate r in the interval [−δ, 1/β−1+δ].
The following steps describe the algorithm used.
1. Number of price iterations is set to N , a convergence tolerance is set to a
very low value ε and an error in convergence is defined as .
2. We start with an initial guess for the interest rate r0 corresponding to the
complete markets case.
3. Aggregate assets for both unconstrained and constrained type agents are
obtained from the invariant distribution µ induced from the optimal savings
policy function `′.
4. We then compute the error in market clearance as ε = |K(r)− `′(r)|.
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5. Check for convergence: If ε <  then stop the bisection procedure and save
results else go to the next step.
6. Update the interest rate according to the bisection rule:
r1 = g(r0) + (1− g)((Fk(A(r0)), N)− δ)
7. Update initial interest rate r0 = r1 and then go back to step C and keep
iterating until the convergence criterion is met.
It should be noted that in step 4, we have checked for quantities, instead
we could check for convergence in interest rates directly. Both ways produces
robust results as long as the tolerance criterion is low enough. The parameter
g indicates the dmapening coefficient and for fairly general models a value of
0.5 would suffice. However, high dimensional models such as ours with discrete
default choices makes the supply of assets a highly non-linear function extremely
sensitive to price movements and thus require the g value to be endogenous. It
should be noted that as the error, ε gets smaller and smaller, the dampening
coefficient g needs to go higher and higher meaning that more of the old interest
rate should be weighed. The solution to this is to let g be free for sufficiently
big error values and once it gets close, the dampening should increase on the ,
i.e., such that g′(1/) > 0. Instead of explicitly specifying a functional form, it is
useful to experiment with several and choose the most optimal one.
An alternative although time consuming approach is to specify a grid of inter-
est rates in the interval and find the market clearing through a costly grid search.
An advantage of this approach is that the possibility of multiple equilibrium can
be investigated. Our application of this computational procedure, however, did
not produce any other feasible interest rates that could be a candidate for an
equilibrium.
Algorithm II - Grid Search for Asset Market Clearing
1. Place a grid for interest rates10 r = 1, . . . , nr.
10There is no need the grid to be very fine in the beginning of the procedure, as we just need
to find an approximate region where the price lies, even if this results to a larger error in the
market clearance, than the one we aim to achieve.
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2. Given r we solve the VFI to get optimal policy functions.
3. Given r we iterate on the distribution to find the agents’ distribution.
4. Given r we integrate to get the aggregate variables and evaluate market
clearance.
5. If we find an r which makes the error of market clearance relatively small(but
even a little higher than 10−4) we understand that an equilibrium could
possibly exist in this price region.
6. We go back to step (A) and make the r grid smaller and more dense. In
particular, having obtained a rough idea from step (E) where the interest
rate lies, we construct a grid in this region with more grid points. In turn,
we repeat the process form (B)-(E).
7. If market clearance conditions for two consecutive points on the r grid switch
sign, the price which has the lowest absolute error is an -equilibrium price.
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Chapter 3
The Global Financial Crisis:
Causes and Effects
3.1 Introduction
The recent global financial crisis of 2008− 2009 made clear that economists and
macroeconomic models should give a more prominent role both to financial shocks
and financial frictions. Any attempt to understand the causes and effects of the
financial crisis would require an analysis of the interaction between economic or
financial shocks and the enforcement issues regarding financial contracts. Impor-
tantly, agent heterogeneity is essential to understand the adverse impact of these
shocks on the distributional aspects of the economy.
It is widely believed that the balance sheet adjustment in the household sec-
tor was the prominent feature of the Great Recession. A considerable group of
economists believe that balance sheet re-adjustment by households was the main
cause that held back the cyclical recovery of the U.S. economy. Furthermore, this
recession missed the usual business cycle recovery path and was characterized by a
prolonged period of persistent output below its trend, see Kozlowski et al. (2019).
In this chapter, we construct a general equilibrium model, where households
are ex-post heterogeneous by facing idiosyncratic earnings and unemployment
risk, asset markets are endogenously incomplete due to limited enforcement of
financial contracts and economy features production via a representative firm. We
use the same model as in the second chapter but we do not focus on the case of
a stationary equilibrium where the distribution is invariant. Instead, we compute
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the non-stationary state of an economy and examine the transitional dynamics
when it is subject to financial shocks.
In this context, we attempt to answer the following two research questions:
1. How does a credit boom/credit crunch affect real activity of the economy?
2. What is the differential impact of a credit boom/credit crunch on the short-
run versus the long-run? or Can a credit boom (crunch) result in an output
drop (growth) in the long run?
Due to the presence of idiosyncratic shocks, households seek to smooth in-
tertemporal consumption, subject to borrowing constraints. A financial interme-
diary operates in the economy by taking deposits and supplying loans. Deposits
in this economic environment are safe and their return is the risk free rate. Con-
trariwise, loans are risky, since households every period can exercise their default
option. Default is strategic and induces a temporary exclusion from the credit
market. During the exclusion period households are credit constrained, but can
trade along the post default path contracts that involve no credit. Essentially,
they can supply deposits to the financial intermediary. Firms own capital, and
households are indifferent between having deposits or investing in physical capi-
tal implying that the return to capital and the safe deposit rate are the same by
arbitrage arguments.
Financial intermediaries treat every loan as a distinct financial asset and thus
they price it differently. Price depends on the size of the loan as in our Chapter 2
and in Chatterjee et al. (2007). Furthermore, price also depends on the individual
household characteristics, that is, in the employment-unemployment status of
the individual household, as well as in its current earnings realization. When
households default except for the exclusion of the credit market, they also face
a wage garnishment similar to our previous chapter. To conclude, our model
remains the same as in the second chapter with the only difference being that we
are interested in out of steady state dynamics.
We solve our model computationally to find a recursive competitive equi-
librium with transition, namely, an equilibrium where a sequence of aggregate
prices, quantities and probability measures is defined. We study two types of
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shocks that trigger this transition and that both affect the households’ borrowing
capacity, and consequently the individual household’s balance sheet.
Firstly, similar to Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017) we study an unanticipated
permanent drop in the households’ borrowing limit, that we call credit
crunch. We model this unanticipated drop in the borrowing limit as a gradual
process that takes place over a period of six quarters mimicking the duration of
economic downturn in U.S.
Secondly, we model credit easing as an unanticipated permanent expan-
sion in the households’ borrowing limit. Similarly to the credit crunch, the
growth in borrowing limit is a gradual process taking place over a period of twenty
eight quarters or seven years. This reflects the long expansionary path followed
by the U.S. economy during the years of 2000Q1− 2006Q4. We now turn to the
contribution and main results of this chapter.
3.2 Contribution and Results
The way we model the shocks in borrowing limits is similar to the approach of
Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017). Our model is a production economy with endoge-
nous credit defaults while Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017) assumes no production
and no default option. However, households in their framework can supply labour
endogenously and secure debt using durable assets. Despite these differences, our
results are consistent with their findings in the following way. We both find that
a credit crunch will cause a recession in the short run. However, the presence of a
positive supply of assets or capital in equilibrium means that for the agents in our
model, the recession is only a short/medium run phenomenon while in the long
run we observe an output growth. Precautionary motives arising from uninsured
idiosyncratic risk are stronger in the long run implying higher savings/capital and
higher output at the new equilibrium.
We rationalize this finding by disentangling the two effects on output, the
“consumption effect” and the “capital and defaults effect”. In short run the
consumption effect is predominant, since consumption declines due to repayment
incentives that are developed by the low wealth and income households in our
model, output experiences a drop. In the same time capital experiences a boost,
122
due to the increase in savings driven by precautionary motives, since the deposits
in our economy represented by a one period discount bond with positive face
value, through the asset market clearing condition become productive capital.
This endogenous mechanism along with low defaults accompanied with less debt
results in an output growth in the long run. This is the first result of this chapter.1
The credit easing shock triggers an economic boom, during which the “con-
sumption effect” generated by easy credit and more borrowing, will cause an
increase in output. In the short run, movements in consumption dominate the
“capital and defaults mechanism”. Default rates gradually increase, due to the
rapid accumulation of debt, predominantly utilised by low-income and negative
wealth households. The credit driven consumption will gradually collapse, since it
is not be accompanied by an increase in economic fundamentals, namely increase
in the productive capital in the economy. Households debt to GDP will almost
triple during this period, while default rates will double, and households with
negative net-worth will rise up to almost 18%. The “capital and defaults effect”
will finally dominate since economies in the long run revert to fundamentals, and
economy will experience a large scale recession of almost −1.6% while aggregate
consumption will decline by almost −1.4%. This is the second result that we
obtain in this chapter.
Our model thus generates both a short run boom (recession) and a long run
recession (boom) from credit easing (crunch) shocks. We claim that the two mech-
anisms proposed, consumption and capital-defaults, can account for the causes
and effects of both the pre-crisis and after-crisis period. The interaction of defaults
and financial shocks, in the light of households’ balance sheet readjustment, pro-
vides valuable insights useful for optimal fiscal/macro-prudential policy-making.2
1While examining the transition dynamics, we restrict our analysis to just equilibrium ag-
gregates of the economy. It goes without saying that we can also report distributional changes
like GINI indexes for wealth and income along the transition path. However, we focus here
mostly on the aggregate level of economic activity rather than the distributional properties of
the economy.
2Kozlowski et al. (2019) is a recent work that studies the persistence of GDP below pre-
crisis trends after the Great Recession. The usual business cycle recovery was not observed
in the after recession U.S. output data. These authors argue that agents are ignorant of the
true distribution of the shocks and the implied learning dynamics results in output persisting
below the trend levels for an extended period. Our stationary equilibrium model assumes no
aggregate shock and thus examining growth trends is beyond the scope of this chapter. Our
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The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. In Section 3.2 we review the
literature related to credit crises, liquidity traps and financial shocks. In Section
3.3 we describe the model environment and we present the individual household’s
problems. We then turn to the problem of financial intermediary in Section 3.5.
In Section 3.6 we define the recursive equilibrium with transition of our economy.
Section 3.7 provides a brief description of the calibrated strategies and values that
we used to computationally solve our model. We then describe in Section 3.8 the
concept of the shocks to the borrowing limit and explain the adjustment path
that these shocks are following. In Section 3.9 we provide and explain the results
of this chapter both in the case of credit crunch and the case of credit easing. We
conclude this chapter in section 3.10.
3.3 Literature Review
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, economists show in-
creasing interest in understanding the dynamics of credit crises along with their
resulting effects in aggregate and individual activity. In particular, economists
are interested in the micro-level of the economy, that is, how households adjust
their consumption, borrowing or saving behaviour in periods of credit crunch or
periods of recessions and also credit shocks might affect the firms balance sheet
and investment spending. There exists a large body of literature, which initiated
a few decades ago and has been revisited following the event of global financial
crisis trying to shed light on these questions.
In this section we review and present the literature related to credit crises, liq-
uidity traps, recessions and generally the interaction between credit constraints,
asset prices and thus the macro economy. Different studies follow various ap-
proaches to address this set of questions. In the rest of this section we discuss the
various mechanisms and interactions proposed by the literature.
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) study the role of credit constraints and their in-
teraction with the aggregate economy. They propose a mechanism that links the
model enriched with an aggregate productivity shock in the lines of Krusell and Smith (1998)
might be better able to deal with this.
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credit limits and the returns on assets. They find that via this mechanism am-
plified spill overs to different sectors of the economy might be triggered. Their
model exhibits limited commitment, since borrowers cannot force lenders to repay
their debts, unless these debts are collateralized.
Their economy features credit constrained and non credit constrained firms.
Land is in fixed supply and serves a twofold role. Firstly, can be used as production
factor and secondly can be used as a collateral to secure a loan. More importantly
when they introduce lumpy investment to firms, economy adjusts in a slower pace
while exhibiting damped oscillations. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)’s approach gives
a good flavour of the effects that a credit crunch could have in the aggregate
economy.
Bernanke et al. (1999) introduced the concept of financial accelerator in a
business cycle framework, aiming to highlight the role of credit market frictions
in aggregate fluctuations. Their framework departs from the underlying assump-
tions of the famous Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem, which in short implies
that the structure of financial markets is irrelevant to the real economic activity.
An alternative view has been proposed by Gertler and Hubbard (1988). They
suggested that credit market conditions might have significant effects in economic
activity. For instance, an increase in bankruptcies or increasing debt in some
economic sector might cause recessions and affect the real economy in multiple
ways.
These ideas have been revisited by Gertler and Hubbard (1988), Bernanke
(1983) and Bernanke et al. (1999). Nevertheless, they date well back in the
past, as early as the Great Depression. For instance, Fisher (1933) approached
the causes of the Great Depression, proposing that the malfunction of financial
markets often results in over-indebtedness and can cause great output declines,
that are followed by a period of deflation.
Bernanke et al. (1999) suggest that the mechanism propagating and amplifying
shocks to macroeconomic activity is the link between the external finance premium
and the borrowers’ net worth. They explain that external finance premium will be
countercyclical, thus generating investment, consumption and production swings.
Finally, by introducing price stickiness into their model further analyse the effects
of monetary policy, in an economy that exhibits credit market frictions.
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Earlier studies tried to comprehend the effects of global financial crisis, by
introducing different mechanisms and choosing alternative stances towards the
sectors that contributed to it. Brunnermeier (2009) analyses financial crisis from
various perspectives. He suggests that the series of events unfolded during the
crisis period, emerged due to a series of financial shocks that amplified leading to
a liquidity crunch and thus a full-fledged financial crisis. Indeed, raising money
by selling assets was difficult during the crisis period.
Brunnermeier (2009) defines this concept as market liquidity while also high-
lights the role of funding liquidity. He claims that even a small shock can cause a
liquidity freeze, while he also discusses the effects on the borrowers’ balance sheet.
However, it was not only borrowers but also lenders that were affected during the
financial crisis. As a result of the lower capital supply, lending was restricted.
Banks had fears that they will also face interim shocks, thus adopted the strategy
of precautionary hoarding, which finally led to a sharp increase in the interbank
market rate and a credit crunch.
Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) precisely show that in periods of a credit
crunch or equivalently forced rapid deleveraging, aggregate demand is enfeebled.
In particular, they construct a flexible endowment economy, in which patient
agents lend impatient agents, while also a debt limit is introduced. They explore
the effects of a sudden decrease in the debt limit. They find that net borrowers
are forced to decrease their spending which will eventually drive the economy
towards the zero lower bound.
However in their paper, borrowing is caused by patience and impatience and
not by idiosyncratic shocks, as in the seminal work of Bewley (1983), Huggett
(1993) and Aiyagari (1994). Furthermore, Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) ex-
plain how deleveraging can affect both prices and output. Interestingly in their
paper, deleveraging implies larger drop in investment and durable consumption
as compared to regular consumption.
Along the same lines but using a different theoretical model, for instance Gold-
berg (2011) studies the effects that a limited firm’s borrowing ability would have
on the economy. In particular, the author studies the effects of credit crunch on
an economy that features uninsured idiosyncratic investment risk. Under these
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circumstances, consumption becomes riskier and the risk free rate declines. Fur-
thermore, with a relatively high elasticity of intertemporal substitution, the credit
shock causes a drop in aggregate capital. The model further features limited en-
forcement and the set of financial contracts is constrained. Due to this, collateral
constraints arise wherein entrepreneurs require a high equity premium.
From the perspective of the households’ balance sheet, Guerrieri and Lorenzoni
(2017) study the consequences of credit tightening on consumer spending in the
framework of a heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets economy. They
assume that credit crunch occurs by the means of an unanticipated cut in the
borrowing capacity of consumers. As a result, those that are heavily indebted
and close to the borrowing limit, are forced to repay their debts, while households
that are not constrained are characterized by a precautionary savings behaviour.
The mechanism works through the indebted consumers in their model, that are
forced to readjust their positions to lower levels of debt.
In this environment, they firstly analyse the dynamics of interest rates and
find that an initial fall takes place, while later a lower steady state is attained.
This is because the agents located to the lower part of the distribution set a higher
wealth target and increase their savings. Secondly they examine the responses
of aggregate economic activity, particularly the output response. Guerrieri and
Lorenzoni (2017) find that in the setting of flexible prices output decreases by
1.1% as a response to the credit crunch. However, throughout their approach
they do not take into consideration defaults and bankruptcy that are clearly
very important features during the adjustment to an environment with a tighter
credit limit.
Hall (2011) also highlights the importance of tightening the households bor-
rowing constraint as a means to explain and understand the financial crisis of
2008− 2009 in the United States. He argues that in a market-clearing economy,
when demand from one specific sector declines, output does not decline since
other sectors might expand. However, in cases where the economy experiences
low inflation, interest rates cannot lower, due to the presence of zero lower bound.
In the Great Depression, the presence of deflation caused a hike in interest
rates while in the Great Slump, commenced the last months of 2007, low inflation
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resulted in a slightly negative real interest rate, even if the presence of unemploy-
ment and the anaemic demand, were asking for a much lower interest rate in the
economy. In the above discussed framework Hall (2011) concentrates on three
different, yet interrelated factors that could possibly cause declines in demand.
These are the excess accumulation of consumer and housing durables, the rise
in consumer debt that was financing this accumulation, and finally the various
financial frictions that emerged from the decline in prices.
Mian and Sufi (2011) also attempt to explain the household leverage crisis in
the United States by examining the home-equity based borrowing channel. They
use a dataset which comprises from individual credit files and follow a random
sample of around 74, 000 home owners. The data used span the period of 1997 to
2008. They estimate how borrowing of households that owned a house responded
to the rise in house prices, aiming to identify the subset of homeowners that
experienced the sharpest response.
Mian et al. (2013) investigate the consumption channel of housing market
collapse in the United States. They pose the following question: What is the
response of consumption when households face high negative shocks to their net
worth? Additionally they aim to explain how households located in different
positions across the wealth distribution experience different marginal propensities
to consume, when they loose one dollar. They suggest that a representative agent
model is not able to capture the salient features of data. For instance, marginal
propensity to consume declines in wealth, and heterogeneity matters. Mian et al.
(2013) answer these questions to shed light on times of severe recessions. They
show that more leveraged households experience higher marginal propensities to
consume.
Furthermore, Mian and Sufi (2014) explain via the housing net worth channel
that the huge shrinkage of households balanced sheets resulted in an employment
decline in the United States during the period of 2007 to 2009. In particular the
employment to population ratio dropped from 63% in 2007 to 58% in 2009 which
essentially means that around nine millions jobs were lost.
Their empirical approach is the first that takes the advantage of a detailed
cross-sectional variation to capture the employment effects due to deterioration
in the household balance sheet. Their work serves as a pillar for other theoretical
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studies, that explore and explain the decline in real activity via the weakening
of household balance sheet. A few related studies are those previously discussed,
that is, the paper of Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017), the study of Eggertsson and
Krugman (2012) and the study of Hall (2011).
Other related studies is the paper of Farhi and Werning (2016) and the study of
Midrigan and Philippon (2011). Farhi and Werning (2016) put forward a theory of
macro-prudential and monetary policy in financial markets. Their study focuses
on economies, where monetary policy is constrained from the zero-lower bound
and feature nominal rigidities in goods and labour markets.
Essentially their paper provides an appropriate framework that combines mon-
etary and macro-prudential policies. The motivation of the paper stems from the
fact that when market incompleteness is introduced into an Arrow and Debreu
(1954) framework, creates a pecuniary externality, that cannot be internalized
by agents, and thus the equilibrium allocations in general are constrained
inefficient. In this sense, there is room for improvement. Hence, interventions
are meaningful and macro-prudential policies have a role.
Midrigan and Philippon (2011) suggest that regions having experienced the
largest changes in household leverage, are those that have also experienced the
highest declines in output. They model an economy with a cash in advance con-
straint, in which collateralized borrowing and public money are used for transac-
tions.
In this framework house prices constrict the cash in advance constraint and
this causes recessions.Interestingly, their findings suggest that real activity is very
vulnerable in liquidity shocks. Monetary policy in their model can be exercised
to mitigate the severity of recessions caused by credit.
In particular their model is built along the lines of Lucas Islands Model (see
Lucas (1972) and Lucas (1973)), that is, there exists a continuum of islands that
trade between each other. Every island can produce both tradable and non-
tradable goods, while tradable goods are imperfectly substitutable.
Their model departs from other standard cash-in-advance models in the liter-
ature, in the sense that except for the supply of public money, households enjoy
an extra line of credit. Furthermore, a collateral constraint is incorporated into
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the model, in the sense that households are allowed to borrow up to a certain
fraction of their house value.
In this manner, houses play a twofold role. They firstly provide liquidity and
secondly housing services. In this model house prices have an effect on the level
of nominal balances that are utilised to finance consumption. This is exactly the
channel via which nominal credit shocks can generate business cycles.
Their model predicts a decline in employment of 5.5%, a decline in non-durable
consumption of 3.8% and durable consumption of 14%, that successfully matches
the relevant values in the U.S. economy. Their last contribution is the extension
of their analysis towards capturing the role of credit constraints and not only
liquidity constraints.
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) built a canonical framework to study the effects
of credit market frictions in real activity. Furthermore, they explore the role of
credit market interventions to access their effectiveness in the mitigation of a
crisis. They suggest that there are two aspects of financial crises that have not
been captured in the literature.
Firstly, the literature developed prior to financial crisis, put more emphasis on
credit market constraints of borrowers, excluding the financial sector borrowing.
Secondly, it has been observed that during the crisis period, various unconven-
tional policy measures have been employed, as a way to tackle the effects of an
economic downturn and the financial crisis itself. These policies do not resemble
the traditional approaches followed before the crisis period. In particular, central
banks supplied imperfectly secured loans to financial intermediaries, while fiscal
authorities in cooperation with the central banks were giving liquidity injections
into “big” banks aiming to improve the availability of credit in the market.
A lot of economists around the world argue that these novel policies halted
the rapid decline of economic activity. Taking this newly developed economic
and policy environment into account, Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) developed a
model that incorporates financial intermediation in business cycles absent of fric-
tions, addressing the following questions. Firstly, how disruptions in financial
intermediation can trigger a financial crisis that will cause effects in real activity.
Secondly, how policy interventions conducted by the central bank, could work in
toning down the direct and indirect effects of a crisis.
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Del Negro et al. (2011) introduce liquidity frictions into a DSGE model, that
features nominal and real rigidities. They question whether a shock in liquidity
can explain the decline in short-term interest rates and the resulting recession. In
this framework they try to shed light into 2008 financial crisis and the recession
that followed soon after that. Their paper is a departure from irrelevance result
introduced by Wallace (1981), by incorporating frictions introduced by Kiyotaki
and Moore (2012). They suggest that both the shock in liquidity and also liq-
uidity policy can have large effects. In particular, the shock to the “resaleability
constraint” accounts for more than half of the output drop observed in data, while
fully explains the drop in inflation. In absence of any intervention they find that
recession would be even larger.
On the contrary, when non- standard open market operations are also con-
sidered economy “escapes” from recessions. Interestingly, when they introduce
flexible prices, financial frictions can only generate a drop in investment, while
output does not change, since consumption counterbalances the drop in invest-
ment. This consumption boom forces the natural rate of interest to drop sub-
stantially while the loss of liquidity raises the premium that agents are willing to
pay. Thus unconventional policies take a role, since they can directly target the
loss of liquidity paper.
Justiniano et al. (2015) suggest that the leveraging and deleveraging cycle
observed in 2000 − 2007 and 2008 onwards respectively, cannot be explained by
the relaxation and tightening of the loan to value ratio in mortgage markets. They
arrive at this conclusion by a DSGE model, calibrated using micro data from the
Survey of Consumer Finances.
Their model suggests that direct effects in house prices can explain the credit
cycle. Interestingly, they find that aggregate effects of households’ leveraging and
deleveraging are minor, since the responses of borrowers and lenders fade out in
the aggregate level.
Justiniano et al. (2015) adds on the debate on the causes and effects of lever-
aging cycles. In particular, their model features heterogeneous households where
borrowing and lending gives a role to debt. Motivated by the U.S. economy
characteristics where debt was primarily held via mortgages, they add collateral
constraints that force debt to be a fraction of the house value. They focus on two
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main drivers of the leveraging cycle, that is, firstly a change in credit limits, given
the value of houses, and secondly a change in the house value for a given credit
limit. They deduce that a large increase in house prices will lead to a considerable
rise in debt. When house prices fall, collateral value features a dive, while debt
does not decrease. Therefore, the debt to collateral ratio increases as observed in
the data in United States. Finally, they conclude that the macroeconomic effects
of a leveraging cycle are relatively small, independent of the source of the shock.
Christiano et al. (2014) augment a monetary DSGE model by introducing a
BGG (see Bernanke et al. (1999)) mechanism. They fit the model to the U.S.
data allowing for a time-varying cross sectional idiosyncratic uncertainty. They
draw the important conclusion, that is, the most important factor that drives the
business cycle is the variation of risk.
More specifically they introduce the concept of effective capital, by assuming
that when an entrepreneur purchases K units of capital, then Kw units of the
initial capital become effective. They name the random variable w an experi-
ence shock. When w is realized the financial intermediary cannot observe the
realization, except if it decides to undertake monitoring, that is obviously costly.
They define risk to be the cross-sectional standard deviation of the logarithm of
w. Fluctuations in this risk trigger responses of their economy that mimic the
business cycle. They find that the degree of cyclical measures of uncertainty are
very similar in both data and the model.
To conclude our literature review section, we discuss a recent influential study
by Mian and Sufi (2016) that supports and provides new evidence towards the
credit supply view of financial crisis and the consequent recession in the United
States. They suggest that the large increase in credit supply, not accompanied by
an analogous evolution of the economic fundamentals or productivity caused the
household boom and bust. Supporting the supply view,try to explain the default
crisis as mainly driven by households that had very bad credit score.
The boom that U.S. experienced from 2000 to 2007 ended up in an unprece-
dented delinquency rate on debt that has surpassed 10%. This is partly
explained due to distributional issues of the financial sector, when transforming
savings from individuals located in the higher end of the wealth distribution into
loans to individuals belonging to the lower part of the wealth distribution. Their
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approach is clearly in contrast to the passive view towards the financial sector.
This essentially states that finance and capital structure plays no role. The credit
supply view suggests that equity-based contracts might work towards the reduc-
tion of the magnitude of the real estate booms and thus make busts less dramatic.
Naturally, this gives a further support in views discussed throughout this
section that assign role to macro-prudential policies that for instance target
household-debt-to-GDP ratios. Theoretical work that supports this argument
had been done by Farhi and Werning (2016) or Korinek and Simsek (2016).
Mian and Sufi (2016) use a number of data sets to perform their analysis. The
main data set is the individual level Equifax Credit Bureau Data. This dataset
is based on a 0.45% random sample of individuals in 1997 that were residing
in zip codes, in which the Fiserv Case Shiller Weiss data are also available.
The aggregate debt patterns that for this specific sample match fairly well the
aggregate debt from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds.
They conclude that asset price bubbles depend on the evolution of credit
growth and support the causal relationship of this credit expansion in explaining
the 2008 − 2009 financial crisis, preceded by a steep increase in house prices.
This credit expansion played a very important role in the default crisis that was
observed during the recent economic downturn.
However, they admit that there are still open questions regarding the funda-
mental driver that boosted credit supply. Different stands exist in the literature
that explain the increase in credit supply adopting alternative approaches. Some
researchers support the idea of the increase in global savings, alternatively called
the “Global Savings Glut”. Some others, such as, Shin (2012) give alternative ex-
planations. Shin (2012) states that the culprit for easy credit before the burst of
financial crisis in United States is driven by the “Global Banking Glut”. Research
by Rey (2015) or Bruno and Shin (2015) propose that monetary policy might also
serve as an important driver of rapid changes in credit supply. In this chapter we
try to shed light on some of the issues discussed throughout this literature review.
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3.4 The Model Environment
Consider an economy with infinite horizon that is populated by a continuum of
households that face two different types of risks, that is, countercyclical unemploy-
ment risk and conditional on being employed acyclical earnings risk. Households
are infinitely lived and uniformly distributed over [0, 1]. Time in our model is
discrete and thus indexed by t ∈ (0, 1, . . . ,∞).3
At the beginning of time all households are identical, that is, ex-ante hetero-
geneity is beyond the structure of our model in this chapter. It is important to
note that households under the unemployment status receive unemployment ben-
efits. These benefits, following Krueger et al. (2016) are defined as a fraction of
each household’s potential earnings growth. In this sense, unemployed households
carry with them the idiosyncratic income state even though it does not really af-
fect their current labour earnings, since they are under the unemployment status.
Households have time separable preferences over streams of consumption,
while deriving utility solely from consumption, since they do not value leisure
and the time endowment is normalized to unity. Thus, households’ preferences
are represented by the following utility function:
E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu(cit)
]
, (3.1)
where for each period t, cit denotes consumption of household i and is restricted
to belong in C, that is, the per period consumption feasibility set of any individual
household specifying non-negative consumptions.
The discount factor β ∈ (0, 1) is common across all households and the period
utility function u(cit) is continuous, concave, strictly increasing, continuously dif-
ferentiable and satisfies the Inada conditions. The functional form assumed for
3Unlike the previous two chapters, all variables here are time-varying and thus indexed with
their time indexes.
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the period utility in our model is a typical CRRA, that is characterised by con-
stant relative risk aversion and can be expressed by:
u(cit) =
c1−σit
1− σ , (3.2)
where the parameter σ measures the degree of relative risk aversion, embedded
in our utility function.
We denote the employment status of each household i in the economy as
s ∈ S = {u, e} where u stands for unemployment and e represents employment.
Therefore, the associated transition probabilities can be defined as pi(st+1 | st)
consistently to the underlying Markov chain. We further assume that transition
probabilities are iid across all households in our economy.
We now turn to idiosyncratic labour earnings risk, that every employed house-
hold in our economy faces. We denote it, by y ∈ Y and it follows a 12 state first
order Markov process, with finite support Y . Let now pi(yt+1 | yt) denote the
associated transition probabilities that describe the transition from the current to
the future earnings state. These probabilities are iid across all households in the
economy and also independent from the corresponding transition probabilities re-
lated to unemployment risk. This assumption is important for the computational
tractability of our model. We should further assume that a low of large numbers
holds4 so that our formulation is well-defined.
In the economy operates one representative firm that produces output every
period, utilising a neoclassical production function
Yt = F (Kt, Nt), (3.3)
where in every period t, Yt denotes the total output, Kt represents the capital
input, and Nt denotes labour input.
The representative firm takes factor prices wt and rt as given and chooses op-
timally Kt and Nt. The functional form that we used for our production function
4see Uhlig (1996).
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is a typical Cobb-Douglas that features constant returns to scale and can be rep-
resented by the following expression:
Yt = K
α
t N
1−α
t , (3.4)
where α captures the share of capital income in output. We further assume
that capital depreciates every period, when used for production at a constant
rate δ ∈ (0, 1). Every period production takes place, and a single good is being
produced that can either be consumed or invested.
Our economy also features a risk neutral financial intermediary. The inter-
mediaries role is trivial, namely it collects savings, in the form of deposits from
households that are able and willing to save, while giving loans to households
that are able and willing to borrow. The intermediary in our economy makes zero
profits.
In this manner, households are facing borrowing and lending opportunities in
an economy that is characterized by perfectly competitive markets. Different size
loans are supplied by the intermediary to households. These loans are assumed
to be unsecured, in that no collateral is pledged, since our model does not feature,
for instance, houses or land.
Each unsecured loan supplied by the intermediary is considered as a distinct
financial asset. This assumption is similar to Chapter 2, and closely related to
Chatterjee et al. (2007).
Households every period solve their constraint maximization problem and de-
cide the following policy functions. In the beginning of the period, idiosyncratic
shocks are realized and then households decide how much they consume, how
much they will borrow or save, and conditional on carrying a loan from the pre-
vious period, households decide if they will default on their loan or not. In the
framework of this chapter, default is only strategic and cannot occur by luck.
Due to the presence of limited commitment in our model, intermediaries face
default risk. More importantly default risk varies with the size of the loan and
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the set of idiosyncratic states of each household, defined by their earnings and
unemployment status.
Trade amongst households and the financial intermediary takes place via an
one-period non-contingent discount bond with a face value defined in the finite
set L ⊂ R. A purchase of a discount bond with positive value `t+1 > 0 implies
that household i entered into a contract under which, household will receive with
probability one, `t+1 units of period t+ 1 consumption good. This holds because
an implicit assumption of our model’s structure is that depositing in the financial
intermediary does not involve any risk, that is, deposits are secure.
A purchase of o discount bond with negative face value `t+1 < 0, individual
labour earnings yt and employment-unemployment state st implies that household
i has entered into a contract under which, household will receive q(`t+1, yt, st)(−`t+1)
units of period t consumption good, promising to deliver, conditional on not de-
faulting −`t+1 > 0 units of period t+ 1 consumption good.
The financial assets available in the market are NL ·NY ·NS where N denotes
the cardinality of the associated sets. We further assume that every household i is
indifferent between investing in physical capital or depositing in the the financial
intermediary, namely investing in a bonds with positive face value.
The choice of default induces a punishment that similarly to our previous
chapters is modelled as a temporary exclusion from the credit market. Households
that choose to default at current period t, will remain in the credit-constrained
state with exogenous probability θ and thus will restore full access to financial
markets with probability 1− θ.
Following the default event, households are allowed to trade contracts that
involve no-credit. In other words they are allowed to save, in the form of deposits
with the intermediary but they are not allowed to borrow. When the individual
household defaults the outstanding amount of his/her loan is erased from his/her
budget constraint. However, from this period onwards the individual household
faces a loss of income, that takes the form of a wage garnishment. In particular
every period a specific fraction of household’s labour income denoted by γ ∈ (0, 1)
will be confiscated and the remaining fraction of the household’s labour income
will remain disposable for consumption and investment.
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Financial markets are endogenously sequentially incomplete (SIM) due to the
presence of limited commitment and the aggregate recourse constraint reads every
period
F (Kt, Nt) = Ct + It = Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt, (3.5)
where Ct denotes aggregate consumption at period t, Kt represents the aggregate
capital stock at period t, Kt+1 denotes the aggregate capital stock at period t+1,
Nt is the labour input at period t, and δ denotes the depreciation rate of capital
when used in production. All aggregate variables are denoted by capital letters.
This setting is a generalization of the model of Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017)
in two ways. Firstly their model does not account for capital and they just set
bond supply exogenously, calibrating it as the sum of all liquid assets hold by the
household sector.
Secondly, their model lacks a crucial feature that could help us in understand-
ing the effects of a credit crunch in the aggregate level, and this is the presence
of limited commitment, namely the option of a household to default.
Finally, our model does not aim only to shed light in periods of credit crunch,
but also in periods of credit expansion, which could give us useful insights in
understanding how we ended up in the financial crisis of 2008− 2009.
3.5 The Household’s Problem
Households solve a typical maximization problem, that is, they maximize their
expected discounted lifetime utility, subject to the associated individual budget
and borrowing constraints. Households take prices as given and they can find
themselves being into two distinct endogenous states.
Firstly, a household can be unconstrained, namely it has full access to financial
markets and secondly a household can be credit constrained, that is the household
has defaulted in some past period and currently does not have access to the credit
market, in other words households cannot borrow.
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In what follows we present two distinct optimization problems, each of them
related to the unconstrained and credit constrained households respectively.
3.5.1 The Unconstrained Household
The states for an unconstrained household can be described by his level of loans or
deposits denoted by `t ∈ L ⊂ R, his labour earnings draw denoted by yt ∈ Y ⊂ R+
and his employment-unemployment draw denoted by st ∈ S ∈ [0, 1].
We denote by V Rt (`t, yt, st) the value function of a household that repays his
loan at period t. We denote by V D(0, yt, st) the value of default at period t and
finally, we denote as V o(`t, yt, st) the value of the option to be unconstrained in
the current period.
Let also ct denote consumption in the current period and `t+1 represent the
amount of loans or deposits that a households optimally chooses. Furthermore, wt
is the household wage at time t, q(`t+1, yt, st) is the price for a loan or a deposit,
while 1st=u is an indicator function which takes the value 1 when household is
in the unemployed state5 and 0 otherwise. Following these definitions the uncon-
strained household’s problem could be presented as follows:
V Rt (`t, yt, st) = max{ct≥0,`t+1}
{
u(ct)+β
∑
(yt+1,st+1)∈(Y,S)
pi(st+1|st)pi(yt+1|yt)V ot+1(`t+1, yt+1, st+1)
}
(3.6)
subject to
ct + qt(`t+1, yt, st)`t+1 = wtyt [1− (1− ρ)1st=u] + `t
`t+1 ≥ −B
(3.7)
It is useful to note that, unlike in the notation followed in our previous chap-
ters, the value and policy functions are also a function of time since aggregate
prices are time-varying.
5In this case labour earnings are equal to the unemployment benefits, which are defined as
a fraction of the average labour earnings, thus b(y) = ρwy.
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3.5.2 The Value of Default
Prior to presenting the problem associated to the value of default, we should de-
note the value function of credit constrained households as V cct (`t, yt, st). This is
the value function associated with a household that has defaulted some previous
period and is currently credit constrained. Following these definitions the prob-
lem associated with the value of default could be presented as follows:
V Dt (0, yt, st) = max{ct≥0,`t+1≥0}
{
u(ct)+β
∑
(yt+1,st+1)∈(Y,S)
pi(st+1|st)pi(yt+1|yt)V cct+1(`t+1, yt, st)
}
(3.8)
subject to
ct + qt(`t+1, yt, st)`t+1 = [1− γ]wtyt [1− (1− ρ)1st=u]
`t+1 ≥ 0
(3.9)
At any given time, an unconstrained household can choose either to repay or
to default. Therefore, the value of the option to default can be described by the
following equation.
V ot (`t, yt, st) = max
{
V Rt (`t, yt, st), V
D
t (0, yt, st)
}
, (3.10)
where V Rt (`t, yt, st) is the value associated with repayment and staying in the
contract, V Dt (0, yt, st) is the value associated with defaulting, while V
o
t (`, yt, st)
as clearly shown can take either of the two values, representing the value of the
option accordingly.
3.5.3 The Credit Constrained Household
Finally we describe the problem of a credit constrained household, that is, a
household that have defaulted in some previous period and is currently excluded
140
from the credit market. We denote by θ the exogenous probability related to the
household remaining in the credit constrained state. Therefore, the problem of
credit constrained households could be presented as follows:
V cct (`t, yt, st) = max{ct≥0,`t+1≥0}
{
u(ct) + β
∑
(yt+1,st+1)∈(Y,S)
pi(st+1|st)pi(yt+1|yt)
θV cct+1(`t+1, yt+1, st+1)+
(1− θ)V ot+1(`t+1, yt+1, st+1)
}
(3.11)
subject to
ct + qt(`t+1, yt, st)`t+1 = [1− γ]wtyt [1− (1− ρ)1st=u] + `t
`t+1 ≥ 0
(3.12)
3.6 The Financial Intermediary
The role of the financial intermediary is the same in Chapter 2, and resembles the
role of intermediary in the study of Chatterjee et al. (2007). The main difference
is that in our economy the intermediary does not sell capital to firms.
The intermediary chooses the number of contracts n`t+1,yt,st ≥ 0 of type
(`t+1, yt, st) to sell in each period, so to maximize the present discounted value
of current and future cash flows. The maximisation problem can be presented as
follows:
max
∞∑
t=0
1
1 + r − δpit (3.13)
where pit denotes profits at time t. Every period cash flow is given by the following
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equation:
pit = `
+
t+1 − (1 + r − δ)`+t +
∑
`t,y
t−1,st−1
n`−
t,yt−1,st−1
`−t (1− p`t,yt−1,st−1)
+
∑
`t,y
t,st
q`t+1,yt,stn`−
t+1,yt,st
`t+1
(3.14)
The probability that a loan of type (`t+1, yt, st) where obviously `t+1 < 0 will
default is plt,yt−1,st−1 . Deriving the first order conditions with respect to n`t+1,yt,st
we get the following result:
q`t+1,yt,st =

1
1 + r − δ if `t+1 ≥ 0
(1− p`t,yt−1,st−1)
1 + r − δ if `t+1 < 0
(3.15)
This completes the problem of the financial intermediary in this economy.
3.7 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium with Tran-
sition
In this section we provide a description of the equilibrium for this economy, con-
sidering also the time dimension of the transition. Since the transition is char-
acterized by a sequence of aggregate prices and quantities, the definition of a
recursive competitive equilibrium as described in the previous chapters should be
modified.
Description of Equilibrium
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Given a sequence of interest rates and wages {rt, wt}∞t=0, a non-negative se-
quence of loan prices {qt}∞t=0 and a non-negative sequence of defaults {pt}∞t=0, a re-
cursive competitive equilibrium is a sequence of value functions {V Rt , V Dt , V cct , V ot }∞t=0
and optimal policy functions {`t+1, dt, ct}∞t=0 for unconstrained households, a se-
quence of optimal policy functions {`t+1, ct}∞t=0 for credit constrained households,
optimal firm choises {Lt, Kt}∞t=0 and a set of distributions {µuct , µcct }∞t=0 such that
for all t:
(i) Given prices {rt, wt, qt}∞t=0, the policy functions {`t+1, dt, ct}∞t=0 solve the un-
constrained households problem and the policy functions {`t+1, ct}∞t=0 solve
the credit constrained households problem.
(ii) Given prices {rt, wt, qt}∞t=0, the firm chooses optimally its capital Kt and its
labour Lt and the first order conditions imply:
wt = (1− α)
(
Kt
Nt
)α
rt = α
(
Kt
Nt
)α−1
− δ
(iii) The labour market clears and Nt is given by
Nt = (1− Π(u))
∑
y∈Y
yΠ(y)
(iv) The goods market clears
F (Kt, Lt) = Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt − γwt
∫
L+×Y×S
ys dµcct
where Ct is given by
Ct =
∫
L×Y×S
ct(`t, yt, st)dµ
uc
t +
∫
L+×Y×S
ct(`t, yt, st)dµ
cc
t
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(v) The asset markets clears and Kt+1 is given by
Kt+1 =
∫
L×Y×S
`t+1dµ
uc
t +
∫
L+×Y×S
`t+1dµ
cc
t
(vi) For all L × Y × S the probability measure µuct+1 satisfies
µuct+1 =
∫
L×Y×S
Qt((`t, yt, st),L × Y × S)dµuct
where Qt is the transition function defined as
Qt((`t, yt, st),L×Y×S) =
∑
yt+1∈Y
∑
st+1∈S
1{`t+1(`t, yt, st) ∈ L}pi(st+1|st)pi(yt+1|yt)
(vii) For all L+ × Y × S the probability measure µcct+1 satisfies
µcct+1 =
∫
L+×Y×S
Qt((`t, yt, st),L+ × Y × S)dµcct
where Qt is the transition function defined as
Qt((`t, yt, st),L+×Y×S) =
∑
yt+1∈Y
∑
st+1∈S
1{`t+1(`t, yt, st) ∈ L+}pi(st+1|st)pi(yt+1|yt)
(viii) The first order conditions for the financial intermediary imply that:
qt =
(1− pt)
1 + rt − δ
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3.8 Calibration
This model is characterized by inherent non-linearity which makes its analytical
solution impossible. Therefore we construct a numerical algorithm to find the
initial and final equilibrium of the economy and then solving backwards we can
compute the transitional dynamics of our economy, when a shock to the borrowing
limit is realized. We depart from other papers in the literature, for instance
Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017), by examining two distinct cases. Firstly we
examine the case of credit crunch , i.e., a tightening in the borrowing limit that
households face, and secondly the case of credit easing, i.e, an increase in the
borrowing limit that households face.
To analyse the model we are forced to migrate to numerical simulations.
Therefore, we need to specify preferences and also choose the values for a set
of parameters. Preferences are described in section 3.4 and the period utility is
assumed to be a CRRA
u(c) =
c1−σ
1− σ , (3.16)
where σ is the parameter capturing the relative risk aversion.
The time period of the model is set to be one quarter. The discount factor
β is chosen to be 0.9428, targeting a yearly interest 4.15% in the initial steady
state. The coefficient of relative risk aversion is set to be σ = 3. The coefficient
of relative risk aversion plays a crucial role in driving the precautionary motives.
However, different experiments that we have done with values between 2 and 4
do not alter qualitatively our results. Therefore, we have chosen the value that
generates quantitatively better results. The earnings process is approximated, by
the use of a 12-state Markov chain and similarly to the previous chapters, we
have utilized the discretization method proposed by Civale et al. (2016), using an
NMAR process, namely a first order autoregressive process with normal mixture
innovations, in order to match the moments of Guvenen et al. (2015).
Transitions between employment and unemployment, similarly to our previous
chapters were calculated in quarterly frequency following the approach of Shimer
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Table 3.8.1: Calibrated Parameters
Description Parameter Value
Preferences
Households Discount Factor β 0.9428
Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion σ 3
Employment
Transition to Unemployment pie,u 0.057
Transition to Employment piu,e 0.882
Unemployment Benefit ρ 0.4
Technology
Capital Share α 0.33
Depreciation Rate of Capital δ 0.025
Defaults
Probability of Remaining Constrained θ 0.95
Labour Earnings Garnishment γ 0.20
Notes: This table reports the calibrated parameters for our model economy.
(2005) and Krueger et al. (2016). We used CPS data for the measurement of job
finding and separations rates.6 By following this strategy we calculate the average
probabilities from 2000Q1 to 2014Q4, since we are interested in including the
period of the global financial crisis of 2008. The probability of a household
remaining on the constrained state following default, has been chosen to match
an average exclusion period of 5 years. Labour earnings garnishment is set to
γ = 0.20 so to guarantee that its value is below the upper permissible bound of
25%, as introduced by Federal Wage Garnishment Law and the Consumer Credit
Protection Act III.
6We download the following series from CPS: The unemployment level (UNEMPLOY -
Thousands of Persons, Monthly, Seasonally Adjusted), the short term unemployment level
(UEMPLT5 - Number of Civilians Unemployed for Less Than 5 Weeks, Thousands of Persons,
Monthly, Seasonally Adjusted ) and the employment level (CE16OV - Civilian Employment
Level, Thousands of Persons, Monthly, Seasonally Adjusted).
Denoting by ut the unemployment rate and by u
s
t the short term unemployment rate, we
define the job finding rate 1−
(
ut+1 − ust+1
ut
)
and the separation rate
ust+1
1− ut .
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3.9 Shocks to the Borrowing Limit
In this chapter we address two important questions. We firstly explore what is
the response of the economy when experiencing a credit crunch aiming to explain
the period of the recession following the financial crisis. This exercise is similar to
Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017), though their model does not feature a production
economy and also does not incorporate limited commitment. The economy starts
at t = 0 in a steady state with a borrowing limit of −Bt=0 = 3.0. At t = 1 a
permanent unanticipated shock in the borrowing limit will be realized and will
tighten the borrowing limit to −Bt=T = 1.5.
Following Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017) we assume that economy does not
adjust to the the new borrowing limit in one period, namely in our model in one
quarter. In particular, we assume that the borrowing limit −Bt follows a linear
adjustment path as follows:7
−Bt = max
{−Bt=T ,−Bt=0 −∆B · t} (3.17)
Similarly to Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017) we choose ∆B such that the ad-
justment of the economy last six quarters. Our motivation to follow the approach
is firstly that in reality debt has much longer maturity than a quarter. Further-
more, the recession in the United States lasted almost 6 quarters following the
blow up of the financial crisis.
We further explore in a similar manner the response of the economy when
experiencing a credit easing. A big bulk of literature aims to explain the financial
crisis by looking at the consequences that followed the actual event. However, a
more interesting question is what led to the financial crisis, and if we could predict
the recession. To gain useful insights regarding this question we should explore
the period during which economy was booming, namely 2000− 2007. One of the
7This is a pure unanticipated shock in the sense that the agents inside the economy do not
incorporate eq. 3.17 in their decision making process and thus cannot predict how or if the
borrowing limit will change in the next period.
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facts is that during this period, access to credit was easy and credit supply was
huge. We claim that our model could provide useful insights in addressing this
question.
Therefore we model credit easing as follows. The economy starts at t = 0 in
a steady state with a borrowing limit of −Bt=0 = 3.0. At t = 1 an unanticipated
shock in the borrowing limit will be realized and will increase the borrowing limit
permanently to −Bt=T = 4.5.
Again we assume that the borrowing limit −Bt follows a linear adjustment
path as follows:
−Bt = max
{−Bt=T ,−Bt=0 + ∆B · t} (3.18)
In this case since we are interested in the period before crisis, and particularly
in the period from 2000 − 2007 we choose ∆B such that the adjustment of the
economy last 28 quarters, or in other words 7 years which the duration from
2000− 2007. During this period supply of credit increases progressively towards
the new borrowing limit which as explained before is set to −Bt=T = 4.5 so to
represent an increase of 50% in credit supply. In this framework we study the
effects of these two shocks, namely the credit crunch and credit easing and we
study their effects into real activity.
3.10 Results
In this section we discuss the key results obtained from the computational solution
of the transitional dynamics of our economy, when facing a credit easing and a
credit crunch. Our presentation does not involve any discussion of the properties
of the initial and final stationary equilibrium since detailed description of the
equilibrium can be found for similar models in our first and second chapter.
We discuss in detail the effects of both shocks in the aggregate quantities
and prices of our model. In particular we present results related to the response
of output, consumption, Household-Debt-to-GDP, ratio and aggregate capital.
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Furthermore, we look at the responses of default rates, interest rates, and the
proportion of households that feature negative net worth.
3.10.1 Credit Crunch
Figure 3.10.1: Output, Consumption and Debt responses: This figure displays the
responses of output, consumption and household debt to GDP ratio, following a tightening of
the credit limit of 50%. The adjustment of the borrowing limit is displayed in the upper left
panel of the figure. Furthermore, output and consumption responses are expressed in terms
of percentage deviation from the initial steady state, while Household-Debt-to-GDP ratio is
expressed in actual values that by definition are ratios.
Figure 3.10.1 illustrates the response of our economy to an unanticipated decline
to the households’ borrowing limit, or as referred to in the literature as a credit
crunch. In the upper left panel of our figure we present the exogenous adjustment
of the borrowing limit that after six periods has a drop of 50% compared to the
initial stationary equilibrium. In the upper right panel of our figure we show the
response of the household debt to GDP ratio following the aforementioned shock.
In the lower left panel of our figure we present the response of aggregate con-
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sumption to the decline of borrowing limit. It is presented in terms of percentage
deviations from the initial steady state. Finally, the lower right panel of our figure
illustrates the response of aggregate output to the debt limit contraction. This
figure is also presented in terms of percentage deviation from the initial steady
state, as this gives us a better illustration of the results.
Firstly we should stress that the qualitative properties of the results presented
are not sensitive to any reasonable change of the calibration. This finding is in
strong agreement with the study of Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017), that utilise
a much simpler model, where firstly the option of default is absent, and secondly
the supply of bonds in the economy is fixed, since their economy does not feature
production, thus there is no link between the assets of the households’ sector and
the production side of the economy.
When one observes figure 3.10.1, it is evident that the consumption effect on
output is very large. Following the decline in the borrowing limit, households
that are heavily indebted are forced to adjust towards the new borrowing limit.
One could expect that this could be achieved in our model framework via the
mechanism of defaults. However, as one can observe in the right panel of figure
3.10.2 the default rate in the economy drops following the realization of the shock.
In view of this result, we should also observe the behaviour of the risk free interest
rate in the economy. Interest rate drops for almost 30 basis points. Guerrieri
and Lorenzoni (2017) also identifies an interest rate overshooting after a debt
contraction.
The mechanism that works in our model can be explained as follows. Firstly,
when the borrowing limit tightens, households in the lower left part of the wealth
distribution, are forced to adjust. Households that are far away from the bor-
rowing limit, are not so affected from the shock. Note that households perfectly
anticipate the path that the borrowing limit will follow. Therefore, with the de-
cline in the risk-free interest rate the outside option does not give them higher
utility and thus they do not decide to default. Recall that in our model default is
strategic and households are allowed to save during the post default path. Highly
indebted households prefer to maintain their access to credit market, since the
outside option is not attractive, due to the interest rate decline. Furthermore,
for consumption smoothing purposes access to borrowing is more valuable for
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households that face lower income. Households with low income in our model
mainly represent the borrowers in our model. In this sense, these households are
adjusting to the new borrowing limit by repaying their debt and maintaining their
access to the credit market. However, for repayment to be feasible a sacrifice in
consumption terms is necessary. This is exactly the reason that drives the drop
in consumption that one can observe in figure 3.10.1. Consequently the drop in
consumption leads to a temporary recession, that we can view in this model via
the output drop. The magnitude of this recession is almost 1% drop in GDP,
which is consistent with the empirical evidence in recession following the financial
crisis in the United States, and also in agreement with the results of Guerrieri
and Lorenzoni (2017).
Figure 3.10.2: Interest Rate and Default Rate responses: This figure displays the
responses of interest rate and default rate following a tightening of the credit limit of 50%. In
left panel of the figure we display the response of the risk-free-interest rate following the shock.
In the right panel of the figure we show the response of the default rate in the economy following
the shock.
A second very interesting finding is that the economy after almost 14 quarters
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features a slow recovery and finally ends up to a better equilibrium in which
output is slightly above 1.5% higher compared to the initial steady state.
Figure 3.10.3: Negative Net Worth and Capital responses: This figure displays the
responses of households with negative net worth in the economy and also aggregate capital
following a tightening of the credit limit of 50%. In the left panel of the figure we show the
change of the percentage of households with negative net worth following the shock. In the right
panel of the figure we present the response of aggregate capital to the shock. It is expressed in
terms of percentage deviations from the initial steady state.
We disentangle the output behaviour into two effects. In the “short run”,
output features the “consumption effect” which causes the drop via the mecha-
nism that we have previously discussed. However in the long-run output growth
is driven by the “capital and defaults effect”. For a better illustration of this
argument we can observe in figure 3.10.3 the capital response. Capital features
a significant increase following the credit crunch, that amounts to almost 5%
compared to the initial steady state. This because in this class of models the
precautionary savings motive is very strong. Following the decline in the borrow-
ing limit, households that experience good earnings shocks save more. Aggregate
borrowing drops due to the tighter constraint, as observed in the top-right panel
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of figure 3.10.1. This generates a positive effect in the economy, since less house-
holds are now defaulting, more households are saving, and slowly the economic
fundamentals enhance, as witnessed from the increase in the aggregate productive
capital in the economy. This in turn boosts up consumption and economy expe-
riences a boom in the long run, in which experiences higher capital, less defaults,
more consumption and thus higher output.
An interesting side result of our model as one can see in the left panel of the
figure 3.10.3 is that a credit tightening decreases the percentage of households in
the economy that face negative net worth. This finding has policy implications
related to the allocation of loans from the banks. For instance, households being
in the lower part of the wealth distribution are those that ask for credit in order
to boost their consumption. In other words, these loans are allocated for non-
productive purposes, thus this does not improve the economic fundamentals and
just leads to a consumption boom that as we will later see can trigger in the long
run a recession. Contrariwise, when less credit is allocated to households in this
part of the distribution, both capital increases and also the households that were
willing to borrow up to the borrowing, simply they cannot, which consequently
leads to an better steady state in long run, since these households are forced to
not to live beyond their economic abilities, via an easy and cheap access to credit.
3.10.2 Credit Easing
Most of the existing literature related to the financial crisis of 2008−2009 aims to
understand how the severe financial shock led to a full-fledged recession. However,
less studies examine how we ended up in such a severe financial crisis, which
consequently had all this adverse effects in real activity. In this section we examine
the case of a credit easing, or in a simpler a gradual relaxation of the borrowing
limit, that results in an increasing households’ borrowing capacity.
Similarly to the previous part we study the effects of this relaxation of the
borrowing constraint on macroeconomic aggregates, that is, aggregate quantities
and aggregate prices.
Figure 3.10.4 summarises the response of our economy to an increase to the
households’ borrowing capacity, representing the notion of “credit easing”. In the
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upper left panel of figure we present the exogenous adjustment of the borrowing
limit after 28 quarters or equivalently 7 years with an increase of 50% compared
to the initial steady state. In the upper right panel of our figure we show the
response of the households debt to GDP ratio on the same shock. In the lower
left panel of the figure we display the response of aggregate consumption, that
is expressed in terms of percentage deviations from the initial steady state. The
lower right panel of the figure illustrates the response of aggregate output to the
debt limit expansion, that is also presented in terms of percentage deviations from
the initial steady state.
Figure 3.10.4: Output, Consumption and Debt responses: This figure displays the
responses of output, consumption and household debt to GDP ratio, following an easing of
the credit limit of 50%. The adjustment of the borrowing limit is displayed in the upper left
panel of the figure. Furthermore, output and consumption responses are expressed in terms
of percentage deviation from the initial steady state, while Household-Debt-to-GDP ratio is
expressed in actual values that by definition are ratios.
Following the increase in the households’ borrowing capacity, there is a jump
in aggregate consumption. This is the effect that one can observe in bottom left
panel of figure 3.10.4. Via the channel that previously defined as the “consumption
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effect” output experiences an analogous increase in the short run. This is because
easier borrowing incentivise households with low and negative wealth to borrow
more so to subsidise their consumption and derive a higher level of utility. This
causes a boom in the economy in the short-run. However, any boom that is not
based on the economic fundamentals unavoidably leads to a bust. Indeed we
observe in figure 3.10.6 that capital increases in the short run, but as defaults
increase (see figure 3.10.5) and interest rate hikes, a negative effect appears.
Defaults in our model have social costs, since the defaulted amount of assets
is deducted from the amount of capital that will be available in the economy
the following period. Therefore, when the cumulative effect of defaults exceeds
a certain threshold, economy experiences capital losses which in turn will lower
aggregate output and aggregate consumption.
Figure 3.10.5: Interest Rate and Default Rate responses: This figure displays the
responses of interest rate and default rate following an easing of the credit limit of 50%. In left
panel of the figure we display the response of the risk-free-interest rate following the shock. In
the right panel of the figure we show the response of the default rate in the economy following
the shock.
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Figure 3.10.6: Negative Net Worth and Capital responses: This figure displays the
responses of households with negative net worth in the economy and also aggregate capital
following an easing of the credit limit of 50%. In the left panel of the figure we show the change
of the percentage of households with negative net worth following the shock. In the right panel
of the figure we present the response of aggregate capital to the shock. It is expressed in terms
of percentage deviations from the initial steady state.
In particular, when credit is abundant in the economy, lower wealth and in-
come households are willing to borrow to the limit. This fact, along with the fact
that this type of credit is just used to increase the level of consumption of low
income households gives an illusionary sense of prosperity that triggers a credit-
driven boom that is orthogonal to the economic fundamentals. The huge level of
borrowing will rise gradually the default rate in the economy which in turn will
cause a drop in aggregate capital. One can see the major importance of defaults
and the causal relation between defaults capital and output, when observing the
shape of the line in figure 3.10.5. In the short run we can observe that the non
smoothness of default rate is also reflected in the bottom panel of figure 3.10.4.
The non-monotonicity of output and consumption response in the first periods,
following the credit easing is exactly due to the non- monotonic adjustment of
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the default rate, that is caused by the household heterogeneity and the various
default incentives in this framework, depending on the position of the household
across the wealth distribution.
Households with negative net worth as can be observed in the left panel of
figure 3.10.6 decline in the short run and steadily increase soon after. This spike
can be explained by the excess borrowing that economy features as also can be
seen in the upper right panel of figure 3.10.4. The household debt to GDP ratio
increases almost three times in the long run, while the risk free interest rate also
increases in the long run by around 30 basis points compared to the initial steady
state.
As defaults accumulate and the default rate almost doubles in the long run,
economy experiences a severe capital loss that amounts to about 4.5% compared
to the initial steady state. This passes via the capital-output channel to aggre-
gate output and consequently causes a severe recession, where the output drop is
almost −1.6% lower compared to the initial steady state.
To summarize, the economy faces a consumption boom during the initial peri-
ods following the increase in the borrowing limit. This boom is credit-driven and
leads to a temporary increase in output.
However, as interest rate hikes and the default rate of the economy increases,
capital loses are taking place, that in turn affect directly output. Economy after a
prolonged booming period ends up in a worse steady state characterized by higher
default rates, lower consumption and capital stocks and households experiencing
negative net worth rise to almost 18% of the population.
This is because credit in this model does not have a productive role, namely
it is used only for subsidizing consumption. On the contrary, savings plays a
productive role, since they are transformed via financial intermediaries to capital
which is consequently used for production.
We claim that the mechanism described in this section can shed light on the
roots of the financial crisis of 2008− 2009 that in our opinion has its origin in the
credit-driven consumption and output boom that was observed during the period
of 2000−2007. To understand and explain this mechanism the role of defaults
and productive capital is indispensable, which are exactly the elements that
we highlight with our model structure.
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3.11 Conclusion
In this chapter we accomplished the following goals. Firstly we extended the
model of Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017) by also accounting for defaults and a
production economy. Both these features provide useful insights in understanding
and revealing the two transmission mechanisms working silently in the background
of the model economy. The first mechanism that drives the short run effects in
real activity is the “consumption channel” and the second that drives the long
run effects in the real activity is the “capital-defaults channel”.
Secondly instead of focusing only on periods of credit tightening we also studied
periods of credit expansion. We have showed that prolonged periods of credit
expansion, where credit is mainly fuelling consumption will unavoidably lead to a
severe recession of a similar magnitude as in the Great Recession. This is because
defaults during periods of easy credit increase and capital is getting destructed.
In this manner the experienced consumption and output boom in the short-run is
false, since it is not supported by an increase in productive capital, and is mainly
driven by misallocated credit utilised for consumption purposes.
Finally, we confirmed the results found by Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017)
when economy faces a “credit crunch”. We have additionally showed that their
results are correct in the short run, but in the long run economy would converge to
a better equilibrium in which output would be higher by 1.6% and consumption
almost 1.2%, provided that credit would keep being tight. This result stands
in support of macro-prudential policies and indicates that the real cause of a
financial crisis and a consequent recession is the misallocation of credit in the
non-productive parts of the economy.
Our results are in support of the recent concerns related to the expansion of
credit, households indebtedness and the high fraction of households with negative
net worth in the United States. The possible directions for extending this work is
to allow for aggregate shocks in the line of Krusell and Smith (1998) and introduce
space for fiscal/macro-prudential policies so as to arrive at a complete narrative of
a financial crisis. It would also be interesting to analyse how the wealth/income
distribution quantiles evolve after the credit shock and how preventive measures
can be constructed.
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3.A Computation of the Transition Path
The economy at time t = 0 is in steady state with stationary distribution µ0 = µ∗
over assets ` and idiosyncratic earnings y and s.Now consider the following thought
experiment, the financial intermediaries decide to lower the borrowing limit (credit
crunch) from −B to −B′. Here we describe a on-off shock and not a sequence,
the computation for a gradual sequence of shocks is similar. Hence, we need to
compute the relevant interest rates for t = 1, . . . T .
We will assume that after T periods with T arbitrarily large but finite, the
economy will converge to the new steady state. This assumption is useful because
it allows us to get a finite sequence of aggregate capital stocks, savings, consump-
tion and prices. The principle of backward induction can be conveniently used to
get the relevant time indexed value and the policy functions.
The computational algorithm is described below:
Algorithm
1. Fix the time period T big enough to allow for a smooth convergence to the
new steady state.
2. Compute the initial steady state objects {v∗, c∗, `∗, K∗} corresponding to the
initial borrowing limit−B and the final steady state aggregates {v∗∗, c∗∗, `∗∗, K∗∗}
3. Given a sequence of aggregate capital stocks {Kˆt}Tt=1 of length T such that
K1 = K
∗ since capital t time 1 is predetermined at time 0 which is a steady
state) and KT = K
∗∗. Since labour is exogenous in our model and there is
no aggregate uncertainty, Nt = N for all t.It is easy to determine for each
t, the corresponding wage and :
wˆt = FN(Kˆt, N)
rˆt = FK(Kˆt, N)
which are the necessary elements needed tin the budget constraint of the
household to solve at time t.
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4. We know that the vT (`, y, s) = v
∗∗(`, y, s), we can use backward induction
to solve for all value functions from time T−1 to 1 and the associated policy
functions including the {ˆ`t+1}T−1t=1 and the default probabilities.
5. Loan prices are computed for each time T − 1 to 1 using the default proba-
bilities corresponding these periods.
6. Given the savings policy functions, we can reconstruct the sequence of tran-
sition functions {Qˆt}T−1t=1 and since we know that µ0 = µ∗, we can recover
the entire sequence of measures { ˆµ(`, y, s)uct }T−1t=1 and { ˆµ(`, y, s)ct}T−1t=1 and
compute the aggregate level of assets supplied:∫
L×Y×S
ˆ`
t+1(`, y, s)dµˆ
uc
t +
∫
L+×Y×S
ˆ`
t+1(`, y, s; r)dµˆ
c
t
7. Market Clearing is checked in every period t, i.e., whether the guess of the
equilibrium capital stocks is {Kˆt}Tt=1 is consistent with the level of aggregate
assets supplied that households would accumulate when facing the sequence
of borrowing limit and the prices induced by the assumed sequence of aggre-
gate capital. Market Clearing is checked based on computing the absolute
values of excess demand or supply.
8. If the error in market clearance do not satisfy the convergence criterion, we
implement the bisection method modified with endogenous dampening g to
update a new guess for the time series of capital {Kˆt}Tt=1.
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